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Foreword 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its 
predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(NACA), have participated since 1920 in efforts to develop the 
technology required for supersonic cruise flight. Preliminary work con-
centrated on developing rudimentary test facilities and methods that 
would permit the investigation of supersonic problems. This was ac-
companied by research for defining aircraft and propulsion concepts 
for flight at speeds greater than the speed of sound. These early in-
vestigations contributed to the development of the joint U.S. Air 
Force/Navy/Bell XS- 1 airplane that was piloted on the first successful 
supersonic flight by Air Force Capt. Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager in 
1947. 
Between 1956 and 1971, a strong research effort supported the 
USAF supersonic B-70 and commercial supersonic transport concepts. 
After neither of these programs resulted in a production aircraft 
because of technical and political problems, NASA was given the 
responsibility of establishing the technology base for a viable super-
sonic cruise airplane. This latter effort, known as the NASA Super-
sonic Cruise Research (SCR) program, was conducted from 1971 to 
1981. The NASA Variable Cycle Engine (VCE) program, a propul-
sion offshoot of SCR, was conducted from 1976 to 1981. 
The SCR program was somewhat unusual for a NASA program in-
volving in-house and contractor participation. Several of the manufac-
turers provided company manpower and dollars to augment NASA 
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funding and personnel, even though there was no contractual require-
ment for them to do so. Dissemination of technical information was 
almost immediate to all participants because data dumps and separate 
status reports were mutually transferred openly and with high fre-
quency, and because of the day-to-day contacts by the major civilian 
and military airframe and propulsion system manufacturers. The 
disciplinary research/systems integration approach of the SCR and 
VCE programs led to a large number of major advances in the 
technology needed for supersonic flight. 
This document provides a historic perspective of supersonic cruise 
technology, beginning with the early NACA supersonic research and 
including efforts during the B-70 and SST phase. It also records 
technological progress made in the NASA SCR and VCE programs. 
Since every research result could not be detailed here, only the most 
critical technology issues and research findings are presented. 
WILLIAM S. AIKEN, JR. 
Director, Aeronautical Systems 
Division 
Office of Aeronautics and Space 
Technology 
Vi
Acknowledgments 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the following people 
for their assistance in the preparation of this document: Cornelius 
Driver, Domenic Maglieri, Sherwood Hoffman, Betty Pate, and 
Donald Hearth of the NASA Langley Research Center; Frank 
Neumann and Wilbur Middleton of the Boeing Airplane Company; 
Richard FitzSimmons and Bill Rowe of the Douglas Aircraft Com-
pany; John F. McCarthy, Jr., of the NASA Lewis Research Center; 
Clarence A. Syvertson of the NASA Ames Research Center; Isaac T. 
Gillam IV of the NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility; and William 
Pomeroy of NASA Headquarters. The author also expresses his ap-
preciation to Donald D. Baals of the NASA Langley Research Center 
for his excellent unpublished history of NACA/NASA participation in 
the early supersonic technology efforts leading up to the SST effort. 
VII
Contents 
Chapter	 Page 
I	 INTRODUCTION ....................................1 
2 SETTING THE STAGE FOR SUPERSONIC CRUISE 
TECHNOLOGY ......................................7 
The Sound Barrier .....................................7 
The First Supersonic Cruise Aircraft .......................9 
The Next Logical Step ..................................11 
After the U.S. Supersonic Transport Program ...............18 
3 NACA PRELIMINARY SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECH-
NOLOGY (?-1956) ....................................23 
Mounting an Attack on the Sound Barrier ..................24 
Breaking the Sound Barrier ..............................27 
4 NACA/NASA SUPPORTIVE SUPERSONIC CRUISE 
TECHNOLOGY (1956-1971) ..........................35 
The U.S. Air Force B-70 Bomber Program .................35 
The U.S. Supersonic Transport Program ...................39 
ix
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
Chapter	 Page 
5 FOREIGN SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT PRO-
GRAMS .........................................55 
The Soviet TU-144 ................................55 
The British/French Concorde ........................58 
6 LESSONS LEARNED IN PRE-1972 SUPERSONIC 
CRUISE EXPERIENCE ...........................65 
The Military/Commercial Difference .................65 
A Successful SST Will Permit Little Room for Design 
Compromise ....................................68 
The Value of Focused Technology Efforts ..............70 
U.S. Technology Subsidization ......................72 
Evolution of an Acceptable SST Will Be Difficult ........73 
Perceptions of a "Rampant" Technology ...............75 
Summary of Lessons Learned ........................76 
7 SUPERSONIC CRUISE PROBLEMS AND POTEN-
TIAL............................................79 
Technical Problems ................................80 
Environmental Problems ............................86 
Supersonic Cruise Potential .........................92 
8 PURSUING THE PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL 
OF SUPERSONIC CRUISE FLIGHT: THE NASA 
SCR AND VCE PROGRAMS ......................101 
Objectives and Rationale of the NASA SCR Program . . .. 102 
Organization and Elements of the NASA SCR Program .. 104 
Alterations to SCR Program Structure ................108 
Dissemination of SCR Technical Information ..........112 
Scope of NASA SCR Program .......................114 
x
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
Chapter	 Page 
9 PROGRESS IN SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECH-
NOLOGY SINCE 1972 ............................115 
Progress in Environmental Issues .....................116 
Progress in Aerodynamics ...........................123 
Progress in Structures and Materials ..................126 
Progress in Propulsion ...............................134 
Progress in Configuration Concepts/ Integration .........142 
Summary of Progress ...............................156 
10 SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY BEFORE 
(1971) AND AFTER (1982) THE NASA SCR AND VCE 
PROGRAMS	 ....................................157 
Comparisons	 .....................................158
Possible Ramifications of SCR and VCE Technology . . .. 165 
11 FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF SUPERSONIC CRUISE 
RESEARCH .....................................171 
REFERENCES ...................................175 
SELECTED ADDITIONAL READING .............183 
xi
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was 
established by the United States Congress in 1915 as the aeronautical 
research arm of the U.S. Government. NACA's principal goal was to 
establish and maintain a preeminence for America in the field of 
aeronautics, an assignment that NACA performed with distinction un-
til 1958. At that time a new agency, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), was formed by Congress to absorb and 
continue the aeronautical duties of NACA and to take on the additional 
responsibility of conducting a program for the exploration of outer 
space. One of NASA's chartered goals is "the preservation of the role of 
the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and 
technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful ac-
tivities within and outside the atmosphere." ' * 
For more than 60 years, first NACA and then NASA has 
endeavored to live up to its assigned goals. Working independently or 
in concert with the military services and other organizations, scientists 
and technicians at NACA/NASA have solved or assisted in the solu-
tions of the most complex problems associated with flight. The solu-
tions of these problems have led to dramatic extensions of the bound-
aries of manned and unmanned flight in the atmosphere and in outer 
space. In addition, while solving the problems, NACAINASA has 
Superscript numbers refer to references, which are listed at the end of this document. 
1
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
developed and acquired unique experimental facilities for use in the in-
vestigation of almost every facet of flight. 
A substantial portion of the aeronautical research effort at 
NACA/NASA has been devoted to the consideration of problems 
associated with manned flight at supersonic speeds up to four times the 
speed of sound. The purpose of this research was to develop a 
technology base that would permit the military services and the 
aerospace industry of the United States to take full advantage of the 
recognized potentials of high-speed flight - more rapid response, im-
proved offensive capability, increased survivability for military air-
craft, reduced trip times, improved comfort, and increased produc-
tivity for commercial air transports. 
The NACA/NASA program to provide a continuously viable super-
sonic technology base has evolved in three fairly distinct phases. First, 
there was a preliminary supersonic technology effort that began in the 
mid-1930s during the NACA era and lasted almost until NACA was 
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absorbed by NASA in 1958. In this period, NACA developed ex-
perimental methods and facilities for the study of supersonic problems 
and contributed to the technology base used to prove the feasibility of 
manned supersonic flight. Later, this technology was part of the data 
base used in developing a number of military airplanes such as the 
century-series fighters, the B-58 supersonic dash bomber, and the 
SR-71 supersonic reconnaissance airplane, which is still operational. 
Although these airplanes demonstrated many of the potential advan-
tages of supersonic flight, they all had limited payload capability or 
relatively short nonstop flight distances unless refueled in the air. 
After the feasibility of supersonic flight was established, NASA 
raised its research sights to consider the difficult technical problems 
posed by the concept of supersonic cruise flight (i.e., sustained, 
unrefueled supersonic flight of a large-payload airplane over transcon-
tinental and intercontinental distances). This second phase of the 
NACA/NASA supersonic technology effort began shortly before the 
formation of NASA in 1958 and lasted until 1971. During this period, 
NASA's principal task in supersonic technology was to conduct specific 
research in support of America's efforts to develop a supersonic cruise 
bomber (the B-70) and a commercial supersonic transport (the U.S. 
SST). Initiated in 1957, the B-70 was essentially canceled 2 years later 
when the decision was made to depend on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) for America's strategic defense. The program for 
developing a U.S. SST began in 1963 and ended in 1971 in a sea of 
controversy involving a mélange of technical, environmental, political, 
and social issues. 
Many people assumed that the cancellation of the U.S. B-70 and 
SST programs, along with the limited success of foreign SST efforts, 
provided positive proof that the promised advantages of supersonic 
cruise flight do not exist. Others believed that the advantages existed 
but that ways for using them had not been found. This latter belief led 
to the third phase of the NACA/NASA supersonic technology effort —a 
focused research program for solving the remaining technical problems 
that have inhibited the general acceptability and applicability of the 
concept of supersonic cruise flight. This program, which became 
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known as the NASA Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) program with 
a supersonic propulsion offshoot called the NASA Variable Cycle 
Engine (VCE) program, spanned the period between 1971 and 1981. 
During this period, NASA conducted a broad attack on the problems 
of supersonic cruise flight with the support of the U.S. aerospace in-
dustry. 
In each of three phases of supersonic cruise technology effort, 
NACA/NASA made vital contributions to the supersonic "state of the 
art." The early NACA preliminary research contributed substantially 
to the present understanding of high-speed flight and helped to open 
the door to the Moon and the planets. Although not assigned a 
decision-making role in America's aborted attempts to develop the 
B-70 and SST, NACA/NASA provided supporting research and con-
cepts that were very important to these programs. More recently, the 
NASA SCR and VCE programs have made outstanding progress in 
identifying solutions to the major problems associated with supersonic 
cruise flight. In fact, these latter programs have brought the technology 
base for an environmentally acceptable and economically competitive 
supersonic cruise transport very near at hand. 
Notwithstanding these important contributions, the NACA/NASA 
supersonic cruise technology program has not measured up to the suc-
cess normally expected of a NACA or NASA program. There is cur-
rently no large-payload, long-range supersonic cruise aircraft in the air 
with an American label, and there seems to be little prospect for one in 
the future. With the cessation of the NASA SCR and VCE programs 
in 1981, no focused United States efforts remain for providing the 
technology for supersonic cruise aircraft. In spite of NACA and 
NASA's outstanding contributions to the understanding of supersonic 
cruise flight, the future of this concept is uncertain at best. 
This rather bleak prognosis for the concept of supersonic cruise flight 
has tended to dim the lustre of early NACA research in this area. The 
spirited controversies that swirled around the B-70 bomber and U.S. 
SST programs, and eventually led to their cancellation, have obscured 
the NACA/NASA contributions to supersonic technology during these 
two programs. And the continuing SST controversy has perhaps 
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depreciated the outstanding progress in supersonic cruise technology 
that has resulted from the recent NASA SCR and VCE programs. 
The purposes of this document are to provide a brief perspective of 
the early NACA supersonic research, to review the NACA/NASA 
supersonic technology efforts during the B-70 and SST programs, to 
discuss the factors and events that led to the formulation of the NASA 
SCR and VCE programs, and to record the supersonic cruise 
technology progress that has been made in these latter programs. No 
attempt is made to provide a detailed history of supersonic cruise 
technology or to single out every research result. Rather, consideration 
is given to the most critical technology issues and research findings. 
The character of NASA's research on supersonic cruise flight has 
been influenced by the arguments for and against the concept, and by 
the ebb and flow of the nation's commitment to supersonic cruise 
development. Chapter 2 considers these arguments and commitments 
and essentially "sets the stage" for supersonic cruise technology efforts. 
The remaining chapters examine the results and ramifications of these 
technology efforts.
5
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CHAPTER 2 
Setting the Stage for Supersonic 
Cruise Technology 
After his first successful flight in a powered heavier-than-air vehicle 
in 1903, man continued to search for ways to fly faster and faster. This 
quest for speed was motivated by several factors. The early daredevil 
pilots sought, perhaps, a few days in the record book, the cheers of the 
crowd, or the satisfaction of flying faster than anyone else. The military 
services wanted faster airplanes to gain a tactical edge over the real and 
potential enemies in the sky. The airline operators looked for faster, 
larger transport airplanes to attract more passengers and to satisfy 
steadily increasing passenger demand. Test pilots and aeronautical 
scientists were driven to investigate the unknowns of faster speeds to 
extend the usable boundaries of flight for both civilian and military 
airplanes. Spurred by these and other motivating forces, the quest for 
speed led to more sophisticated airplanes, to more powerful engines, 
and, by 1946, to flight speeds that approached the mythical speed bar-
rier—Mach 1, the speed of sound. 
THE SOUND BARRIER 
By 1946, there was general, but not universal, public opinion that 
the speed of sound in air—. 760 miles per hour at sea level and 660 miles 
per hour at an altitude of 36000 feet - represented an impenetrable 
barrier through which no airplane could fly. 2 A number of airplanes 
and pilots had been lost during flights at velocities near the speed of 
sound, and others had experienced strong buffeting and loss of control. 
7
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Great Britain had abandoned all efforts to develop manned research 
airplanes for flying through the sound barrier, citing as a reason, 
among others, that "We have not the heart to ask pilots to fly the high-
speed models, so we will make them radio-controlled." 3 In the United 
States, however, a research effort was under way on the rocket-
powered Bell X-1, which would lead to the first successful flight of a 
manned aircraft through the so-called "sound barrier" on October 14, 
1947, by U.S. Air Force Capt. Charles Yeager. 
The first flight at supersonic speeds was a pivotal event in aviation 
history. Man soon found that he could design and construct airplanes 
that passed smoothly through the once formidable "sound barrier" and 
onward to speeds that pushed him to the outer fringes of the at-
mosphere and into space. In the early 1950s, supersonic flight of 
military "century series" fighter planes became commonplace, and the 
U.S. Air Force developed the B-58 bomber, which had a supersonic 
"dash" capability of Mach 2—twice the speed of sound. First flown in 
1956, this airplane signaled the approach of the era of supersonic cruise 
flight. 
The years leading to the first supersonic flight were exciting years in 
the progress of aviation technology in the United States. Technology 
advances in the speed and versatility of aircraft were supported not 
only by the government, but by wealthy patrons, organizations, and 
individual entrepreneurs lured by the prospects of worldwide fame and 
cash prizes offered in national and international competitions. As air-
craft entered the supersonic speed regime, however, the escalating 
costs of further increases in speed appeared to place future high-speed 
technology strictly in the province of the U.S. Government. 
THE FIRST SUPERSONIC CRUISE AIRCRAFT 
The first successful flight at supersonic speeds, along with subse-
quent experience gained in fighters and the B-58 program, led the 
U.S. Air Force to consider the development of a large-payload, long-
range supersonic cruise aircraft. On December 23, 1957, the North 
9
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Il/f 
First "real" supersonic cruise aircraft—the U. S. Air Force North American B-70 
bomber.
- 
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U. S. Air Force Lockheed YF-12 - companion to the SR— 71 that had supersonic cruise 
capability but without appreciable payload. 
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American Aviation Company (now Rockwell International) was placed 
under contract to design and produce the B-70 supersonic bomber, an 
airplane that was to have intercontinental range capability at a sus-
tained supersonic cruise speed of Mach 3—three times the speed of 
sound. At the announcement of the B-70 contract award, factories 
across the country began to hum in a massive project that would soon 
involve 8000 contractors spread throughout the nation. 4
 However, this 
flurry of activity was to subside rather rapidly since, only 2 years after 
the B-70 contract was issued, the Eisenhower administration essen-
tially canceled the program with the justification that "the age of 
manned bombers was doomed by intercontinental ballistic missiles." 
Many members of the U.S. Congress were not happy with the 
cancellation of the B-70 bomber program, and the battle between the 
Congress and the White House lasted through the remainder of the 
Eisenhower administration and into the administration of President 
John F. Kennedy. During attempts to keep the B-70 program alive, 
the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the powerful Senate 
Committee on Armed Services recommended in a report dated July 8, 
1960, that "unless an operational supersonic bomber is developed now 
there will be no replacement for the B-52 at the time at which it enters 
its period of obsolescence (mid-1960s)." 6 It was 22 years later, in 1982, 
that the Reagan administration selected the Rockwell B-i bomber as a 
replacement for the B-52. 
All efforts to restore production funding for the supersonic B-70 
bomber were unsuccessful, and the program was limited to the con-
struction of two prototype aircraft. In 1964, the U.S. Air Force an-
nounced the secret development of a high-altitude reconnaissance 
airplane, the SR-71, which had a supersonic cruise speed of Mach 3. 
Although this airplane is still in operation, production was limited, and 
the B-70 bomber program represented the last major interest of the 
U.S. military services in long-range supersonic cruise flight. 
THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP 
Although the July 1960 report of the Preparedness Investigating 
Subcommittee did not succeed in its primary goal of securing produc-
11
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tion funding for the B-70, the report left a ray of hope for the super-
sonic cruise aircraft concept with these words: 
It is generally believed by air transportation authorities that a Mach 3 cruise 
transport represents the next logical step [author's italics] beyond the present 
family of jet transports. For both economic and prestige reasons, other na-
tions, including the Soviet Union, will be interested in taking this step ahead 
of the United States. The impact of a supersonic transport on world traveling 
habits and on the entire field of transportation is expected to be far greater 
than the impact that accompanied introduction of current jet transports. Our 
leadership in commercial aviation will almost certainly be lost unless the Na-
tion continues the development of Mach 3 technology and applies it as 
promptly as possible to air transport adaptations.' 
NASA had expressed a view similar to that of the subcommittee in a 
report dated June 1960, which stated: "The successful development of a 
supersonic transport is of vital importance to the national prestige as 
well as the commercial stature of the United States." 8 Six months 
later, the Federal Aviation Agency recommended "that the Executive 
and Legislative branches of our government give prompt and careful 
attention to the immediate establishment of a national program for the 
development of a commercial supersonic transport aircraft." 9 The 
pressures for a U.S. supersonic cruise airplane program appeared to be 
mounting, with or without the B-70. 
Was the development of a commercial supersonic cruise transport the 
next logical step in the evolution of the air transportation system? It cer-
tainly appeared to be in light of the situation that existed in the early 
1960s. Among the factors that tended to favor this step were: 
• The introduction of American-built subsonic jet transports in 1958 
and 1959 had revolutionized the world's air transportation in-
dustry. The added speed and comfort of these jet airplanes over 
the existing propeller-driven transports led to a rapid increase in 
airline passenger demand and much improved airline productivi-
ty. Due to the popularity of its new subsonic jet transports, the 
American aircraft industry captured a dominant share of the 
world transport market, and the export sales of subsonic jet 
12
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transport aircraft became an increasingly important positive factor 
in the American foreign balance of trade. 
• The development of a commercial supersonic transport (SST) for 
airline service in the early 1970s would be properly timed to 
replace the subsonic jet transports that were just going into 
service. 
• Programs for developing a supersonic cruise transport had been 
announced by the Soviet Union (TU-144) and by a consortium of 
the British and French governments (Concorde). Both of these 
programs were to receive government funding support and, 
without a competing American aircraft, could threaten United 
States domination of the world's air transport market. 
• Although the production program for the supersonic B-70 had 
been canceled, two of the advanced airplanes were to be con-
structed. It appeared probable that research results and design in-
formation obtained on these two large B-70 airplanes would be 
applicable to an SST and would therefore effectively reduce the 
development cost of such an aircraft. 
• The American X-1 airplane was the first manned vehicle to fly at 
supersonic speeds. Since that flight, the military services and 
NASA had conducted many supersonic wind tunnel and flight 
tests. By 1963, manned American winged vehicles had flown to 
altitudes of 354 200 feet (67 miles) and at speeds of 4100 miles per 
hour (six times the speed of sound). These altitude and speed 
marks were recorded by an experimental aircraft, the X-15, and 
were not directly indicative of America's ability to develop an 
SST. However, the achievements of this experimental aircraft did 
indicate the advanced level of the nation's high-speed aircraft 
technology. 
• The U.S. Congress had provided the military services and NASA 
with funding for acquiring unique research facilities that could be 
used in investigating nearly every aspect of supersonic cruise 
flight. In NASA alone, the research facilities for transonic and 
supersonic investigations represented an investment of over $180 
13
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
million. 10, By the early 1960s, these research facilities had been 
widely used in the supersonic B-70 bomber program and in the in-
vestigations of potential SST configurations. 
• Both NASA and the American aircraft industry had a large 
number of experienced research engineers and scientists who had 
been involved in supersonic research and flight investigations. 
These factors, along with others that were present in the early 1960s, 
indicated the readiness of the United States to pursue the development 
of an SST and take what appeared to be the next logical step in the 
evolution of air transportation. However, negative factors were also 
present at this time, and many questioned the wisdom of taking the 
step. Among these negative factors were: 
• By 1963, America had placed manned spacecraft into Earth orbit 
and was well into a massive program for landing a manned 
spacecraft on the Moon by the end of the decade. The develop-
ment of a commercial SST would also be a big federal under-
taking, and it was questionable whether two programs of such 
technical magnitude could be successfully managed and funded at 
the same time. The two programs would also tend to compete for 
support and interest. 
• Historically, military airplane development had served as a 
pacesetter for technical developments that were subsequently used 
by the commercial sector. Because the military services had not 
fully developed a supersonic cruise aircraft, any such venture 
would have to be justified by the commercial application alone. 
Without military participation, the cost of development for com-
mercial application would be much higher. 
• Even with military support, the cost of supersonic cruise aircraft 
development would be beyond the means of the U.S. airplane in-
dustry, and hence, government financial support would surely be 
required. Never before had the government provided direct finan-
cial support in the development of a commercial airplane. 
14
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• The airlines had just invested heavily in the new subsonic jet 
transports and were less than enthusiastic about another new 
airplane, even a decade in the future. 
• A number of major technical problems, such as engine noise, 
sonic boom, off-design performance, and operating flexibility, 
were still to be solved before an SST would be economically viable 
and environmentally acceptable. Although it was generally be-
lieved that these problems could be solved, they represented a 
substantial technical risk. 
These and other issues relating to the advisability of an American 
program for developing a commercial SST were debated both inside 
and outside the government during the early 1960s. The U.S. Con-
gress provided funding for preliminary SST research in fiscal year 
1961, and announcements of the Russian and British/French SST pro-
grams came in 1962 and 1963, respectively. 
The announcement of an American SST program came on June 5, 
1963, when the late President John F. Kennedy, speaking at Air Force 
Academy graduation exercises, told the assembled group: 
As a testament to our strong faith in the future of airpower, and the manned 
airplane, I'm announcing today that the United States will commit itself to an 
important new program in civilian aviation. . . . It is my judgment that the 
government should immediately commence a new program in partnership 
with private industry to develop at the earliest practical date the prototype of a 
commercially successful supersonic transport superior to that being built in 
any country in the world. . . . This commitment, I believe, is essential to a 
strong and forward-looking nation and indicates the future of the manned air-
craft as we move into the missile age as well. .
	
12 
With this recommendation by President Kennedy and approval by the 
U.S. Congress, it appeared that the United States was finally ready to 
take the next logical step in the evolution of air transportation -
 the 
development of a commercial supersonic cruise transport. The Federal 
Aviation Agency (FAA), which had been assigned management 
responsibility for the new program, followed up quickly after receiving 
the go-ahead from Congress. The FAA presented a Development Plan 
15
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on June 19, 1963 , 13 and issued a "Request For Proposals" on August 
15, 1963. 
The FAA plan for commercial SST development called for two or 
three phases. Phase I was an initial design competition between all in-
terested airframe and engine manufacturers. If a clearly superior "win-
ning combination" resulted from this competition, these contractors 
would be awarded contracts for the development program by May 1, 
1964. If there was not a clear winner, a phase II competition would be 
interjected between the two leading airframe and engine manufac-
turers from phase I. The final selection of the airframe/engine com-
bination to go into the development phase would then be made early in 
1965 . 14
 As a matter of fact, the phase II "winning combination" was not 
selected until December 31, 1966, almost 2 years behind schedule. 
The winning design in the FAA SST competition was the Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Company concept, the B-2707-200. The pro-
posed airplane was to cruise at a supersonic speed of Mach 2.7 (nearly 
1800 miles per hour) and was estimated to weigh 675000 pounds. The 
airplane made use of the then controversial variable-sweep or swing-
wing concept now incorporated on the F- 111 and F-14 airplanes. In 
this concept, the wing can be swept during flight from a forward posi-
tion for low-speed flight conditions to a rear position for supersonic 
cruise flight. Boeing saw this complex arrangement as the best means 
of achieving low noise at takeoff and landing and good flight efficiencies 
at all parts of the flight spectrum. The B-2707-200 was to be powered 
by four General Electric Company GE-4 turbojet engines that used 
afterburners (i.e., additional fuel was burned in a duct at the rear of the 
engine to provide increased power at takeoff and during acceleration). 
On April 29, 1967, the FAA awarded contracts to Boeing and General 
Electric to proceed with prototype development of the B-2707-200 
airplane. 15 
After working on the design problems involved in the complicated 
variable-wing-sweep mechanism for about 1 year, Boeing concluded 
that the concept could not be integrated into a viable supersonic 
transport within the contract weight limitations. 16 Consequently, in 
April 1968, Boeing asked for and received the FAA's permission to 
16
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Lockheed L-2000 concept in competition with Boeing in U.S. SST competition. 
Boeing/Genera/ Electrzc 2707-200 concept that won the U.S. 551 coTnpetltcn.
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change to a simpler fixed-wing concept. This concept, a double-delta 
wing configuration labeled the B-2707-300 (Dash-300), was now to 
become the American entry in the SST sweepstakes. At the time of 
Boeing's decision to switch to the Dash-300, the other two entries in the 
SST race, the Soviet TU-144 and the British/French Concorde, were 
nearing flight status. The TU-144 made its maiden flight on December 
31, 1968, 17 and the Concorde took to the air on March 2, 1969.18 
The American program for developing an SST was a more demand-
ing technical challenge than those for the TU-144 and the Concorde. 
The U.S. decision to leapfrog the foreign supersonic versions by going 
to a larger size and higher speed brought forth temperature, materials, 
and potential operating problems not experienced by the foreign 
designers. Delays by the FAA in selecting an airplane for development 
and by Boeing in generating an acceptable design were perhaps in-
evitable. These delays, along with increasing public concern over en-
vironmental issues, allowed opponents of the SST effort to mass forces. 
With each passing year, in spite of strong White House support, votes 
appropriating SST funding got closer and closer in the U.S. Congress. 
Finally, on March 24, 1971, the U.S. Senate voted 51 to 46 to cancel 
the SST development program. 19 On May 12, 1971, the House of 
Representatives made a last-ditch move to continue theprogram at 
least to the end ofJune 1971. The Senate refused to go along with the 
House, and the American SST program finally died pn the night of 
May 19-20, 1971.20 
AFTER THE U.S. SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT PROGRAM 
By the time Congress terminated the SST program, over $1 billion had

been spent on it, but the social costs of the termination were also high.

Seven thousand Boeing workers and 6000Genera1 Electric workers

were laid off immediately. Seattle, Washington, with a 15 percent

unemployment rate, became a mini disasterarea. 21
 There was also tle
America's What would happen to erica's -future in
. 
terest in high-

speed research and flight? The wiIe-body subsonic jet transports had

been put into airline service in 1969 and would serve air 
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transportation's productivity needs for the near term. But could an in-
dustry that had increased its productivity by 500 percent in the past 15 
years while doubling its average speed continue to grow if the speed re-
mained static? What would happen to the American airplane industry 
if improved, economically viable versions of the British/French Con-
corde and/or the Russian TU-144 were developed? 
Following the cancellation of the American SST program, the Nixon 
administration and some members of Congress were concerned about 
these questions. The military services had shown no further interest in 
long-range supersonic cruise flight after the B-70 bomber program. 
Now, without the focus of the national SST program, there would like-
ly be little emphasis on supersonic cruise research by the airframe 
manufacturers, the propulsion industry, or NASA. 
Early in 1972, to fill this void in supersonic cruise research, the 
Nixon administration instructed NASA to formulate a focused super-
sonic technology program. The goal of this program was to provide 
answers to the environmental, performance, and cost problems of an 
SST and to establish a state of "technology readiness" within 3 to 4 
years. The administration provided $11.7 million for this program in 
fiscal year 1973, and President Nixon requested $46 million in the 
fiscal year 1974 budget. 22 Opponents of the SST saw this program as a 
move to "restart the SST" and cut the funding back to $10.1 million for 
fiscal year 1974, but at least the program was under way. 
The supersonic technology program that evolved from the concerns 
of the White House and some members of Congress was first called the 
NASA Advanced Supersonic Technology (AST) program and has 
subsequently been known as the NASA Supersonic Cruise Aircraft 
Research (SCAR) program and the NASA Supersonic Cruise 
Research (SCR) program. This program, hereafter referred to as the 
SCR program, operated continuously as a focused technology program 
in the NASA budget from fiscal year 1973 to fiscal year 1981 at a fund-
ing level of $8 million to $11.7 million per year. In fiscal year 1975, the 
SCR program identified a new propulsion concept, the "variable cycle 
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engine," which showed promise of solving the noise and off-design 
operating problems of an SST. The variable cycle engine (VCE) study 
was broken out as a separate focused program under the management 
of the NASA Lewis Research Center. The VCE program operated 
from fiscal year 1976 to fiscal year 1981 at funding levels ranging from 
$0.5 million in the initial year to approximately $6.0 million in the 
peak years, FY 1979 and FY 1981. 
As focused efforts within NASA, the SCR and VCE programs took a 
fresh look at all of the problems exposed in the U.S. and foreign SST 
programs - excessive noise, marginal range/payload capability, high 
cost, poor economics, etc. The major airframe manufacturers, Boeing, 
Douglas Aircraft Company, Lockheed-California Company, and 
Rockwell International, and the major propulsion system companies, 
General Electric and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Company, were 
called into a partnership of research and technology. Some of these 
companies added their own funds to those of the government to stretch 
the research capability of the programs, 23
 and the results of in-house 
company-funded research were published and reported along with 
those of the government-funded technology effort. This provided for an 
almost unprecedented instantaneous exchange of technical information 
between companies competing in both military and civilian projects 
and led to very little duplication of effort. 
A recent report summarizes the NASA SCR and VCE program 
results as follows: 
Dramatic progress has been made in the major technical discipline areas, 
making it possible to show large gains in range/payload capability for super-
sonic transport type airplanes. At the same time, stringent environmental 
noise and pollution restraints can be met. Even if the supersonic airplanes 
should cost twice as much per pound as their subsonic competition, the super-
sonic vehicles may nearly equal subsonic tourist ticket prices while reducing 
trip time to less than half its present value. Two very recent developments, as 
yet unproven, one structural, one aerodynamic, could provide the perform-
ance improvement margin necessary to end the subsonic jet dominance of the 
long-haul over-water passenger market. Advanced SSTs could displace sub-
sonic jets on these routes just like the subsonic jets displaced the propeller 
airplanes 24 
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Unfortunately, this report goes on to say that "funding limitations 
have forced cancellation of the focused government/industry 
approach.	 . 11 25 
Now that we have "set the stage" for the various phases of the 
NACA/NASA research and technology effort on supersonic cruise 
flight, let us turn back to the beginning and consider some of the details 
of this effort.
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CHAPTER 3 
NACA Preliminary Supersonic Cruise 
Technology (?-1956) 
No "red letter" date marks NASA's entry into the field of supersonic 
cruise research. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, NACA engineers 
and scientists were conducting preliminary studies of airplane and 
engine combinations that might possibly fly at velocities greater than 
the speed of sound. However, these studies were limited by the uncer-
tainties that existed in the aerodynamic characteristics of airplanes that 
were considered for such flight. At that time, wind tunnels were of the 
closed-throat type, and as the speed of the airflow approached that of 
sound, the tunnels "choked." Shock waves forming off the test model 
and its supports would reflect off the tunnel walls, inhibiting accurate 
measurements of flow characteristics and behavior around the model. 
This condition persisted from about Mach 0.7 to about Mach 1. 3, the 
very area in which the scientists were interested, the transonic region 
between subsonic and supersonic flight. 26 Without some better 
research data in the transonic region, the accomplishment of transonic 
or supersonic cruise flight seemed hopeless. 
With the entry of the United States into World War II in December 
1941, the means for removing the uncertainties of transonic and super-
sonic flight became critically important. Greater high-speed capability 
was incorporated in each new American fighter and attack airplane, 
and these airplanes were getting into difficulties because of local 
regions of transonic and supersonic flow, even though their forward 
speeds were still subsonic. "Army Air Forces and Navy combat 
squadrons suddenly found that their aircraft faced a new and frighten-
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ingly mysterious danger aside from the enemy. An epidemic of tail 
failures during dives appeared in three production high-speed aircraft, 
the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, the Curtis SB2C Heildiver, and the 
Bell P-39 Airacobra." 27 Although NACA was able to recommend 
suitable fixes for these three aircraft, the aerodynamic uncertainties of 
flight at velocities near the speed of sound remained. The turbojet 
engine, introduced in an experimental aircraft in Britain in 1941, 
promised further increases in speed if the aerodynamic uncertainties 
could be resolved. By 1943, ". . . the only remaining barrier to high-
speed flight - including flight faster than the speed of sound - appeared 
to be a knowledge barrier, where aerodynamicists could not predict 
with certainty what occurred in the turbulent speeds of transonic flight. 
The immediate problem facing aerodynamicists was how to arrive at 
accurate research tools and methods to derive needed data and strip the 
mystery from compressibility and transonic aerodynamics." 28 
MOUNTING AN ATTACK ON THE SOUND BARRIER 
In the early 1940s, with no immediate prospects for solving the wind 
tunnel blockage problems at velocities near the speed of sound, NACA 
engineers developed several stopgap methods for obtaining transonic 
aerodynamic data. One of the methods involved the dropping of 
weighted bodies from high altitudes. "The bodies would then attain 
velocities equal to or faster than that of sound. Radar and visual track-
ing from the ground could determine the speed and path of the falling 
body." 29 Another method, developed by Robert Gilruth of the NACA 
Langley Laboratory, involved placing small models in the local tran-
sonic and supersonic flow fields that were known to exist over the wing 
of a North American P-51 "Mustang" during high-speed dives. 30 These 
methods—together with the later NACA rocket-propelled model work 
under Gilruth— providedvital data on drag variation through the 
speed of sound. 3 ' However, there was rising sentiment that a research 
airplane was the best way to secure the transonic data necessary for 
breaking the "sound barrier" and proceeding into the supersonic speed 
regime. 
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As early as 1939, Ezra Kotcher, a senior instructor at the Army Air 
Corps Engineering School at Wright Field, advocated comprehensive 
flight research programs for correlating wind tunnel data with full-scale 
performance. 32
 In 1944, over 4 years after Kotcher's recommendation, 
and after a name change from Army Air Corps to Army Air Force in 
1941, Air Force Headquarters authorized a study into the possible 
development of an experimental article for investigating aerodynamic 
phenomena in the 600- to 650-mph range." Kotcher went on to make a 
comparative investigation of the merits of rocket and turbojet propul-
sion for the transonic research aircraft in early 1944. The study showed 
that, from every standpoint, rocket power appeared to be better for 
transonic research aircraft because high speeds could be attained, mak-
ing dives to high Mach numbers unnecessary.34 
At NACA, John Stack and Eastman Jacobs were the chief pro-
ponents of a transonic research aircraft. Stack had proposed the idea in 
1941 and had set up a team consisting of himself, Milton Davidson, 
Harold Turner, and Walter Williams to study possible research con-
figurations. Jacobs had earlier set up a group that also included David-
son and Turner, along with Macon C. Ellis, Jr., and Clinton E. 
Brown. The Jacobs group was particularly interested in an aircraft 
with a "Campini" engine that promised ample thrust for flying at tran-
sonic speeds if aerodynamic problems could be solved." 
Capt. Walter S. Diehl, USN, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics 
representative on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
felt as early as 1942 that the research airplane appeared to be the only 
way to convince people that the "sonic barrier" was just a steep hill. 36 
On September 22, 1944, 1st Lt. Abraham Hyatt, a Marine Corps 
engineer attached to the Bureau of Aeronautics, proposed the develop-
ment of a turbojet-propelled high-speed research airplane for acquiring 
knowledge on transonic drag, flight loads, and stability and control, as 
well as data on engine thrust and duct inlet design.37 
With the transonic problems of high-speed military airplanes becom-
ing more serious by the day, representatives of the Army Air Force, 
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U.S. Navy, and NACA met at the NACA Langley Laboratory on 
March 15, 1944. Two meetings that day tied together the separate in-
terests in the possible development of a transonic research aircraft.38 
The parties present had different ideas as to what the research aircraft 
should be and what it should try to accomplish, but there was general 
agreement that some type of transonic aircraft was urgently needed. 
The NACA representatives suggested a joint effort for constructing a 
turbojet-powered research airplane, 39
 and NACA followed up on July 
10, 1944, by submitting a turbojet research airplane design proposal to 
the Army Air Force. The Air Force rejected the NACA design as being 
too conservative because its studies had shown that the turbojet engine 
would not give the aircraft good high-speed capabilities. 40
 The NACA 
design was more in line with the research aircraft requirements that 
were recommended by the Navy's Lt. Abraham Hyatt a few months 
later. 
As the end of 1944 approached, both the Army Air Force and the 
Navy had programs under way for developing their own separate tran-
sonic research aircraft. Both services relied on the advice of NACA in 
establishing and guiding their programs. The Navy chose to develop a 
turbojet research airplane, which became the Douglas D-558. The 
Army Air Force chose to develop the more radical rocket-propelled 
design—the Bell XS-1—rejecting NACA's recommendation of air-
breathing engines. 4 ' Note that neither the XS-1 nor the D-558 
resulted from extensive design competitions for finding the best tran-
sonic research airplane. Ezra Kotcher had some difficulty interesting 
Army Air Force contractors in developing this "one of a kind" airplane, 
and was rejected several times before Bell agreed to develop the XS-1. 
Similarly, the Navy went to Douglas, a principal Navy airplane builder 
at the time, and requested that the company work on the design that 
was to become the D-558. Careful attention by the Army Air Force, 
the Navy, and NACA kept the two separate research airplane pro-
grams from being duplicative. Although different in organizational 
structure and function, the three groups worked together in a common 
mission to solve the problems associated with transonic flight. 
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BREAKING THE SOUND BARRIER 
As dawn approached on October 14, 1947, the Muroc Dry Lake in 
Southern California became a beehive of activity. The focus of atten-
tion was the Bell Aircraft Corporation's XS-1, America's first transonic 
research aircraft. This was the day that the XS-1, piloted by Capt. 
Charles E. Yeager of the newly named U.S. Air Force, would attempt 
to fly through the mysterious "sound barrier." The assembled 
engineers, technicians, and pilots anticipated success because the air-
craft had nearly reached supersonic speeds on its previous flight 4 days 
earlier. 
Poised and ready for its most important mission, the XS-1 was the 
result of almost 3 years of intensive effort by the Bell Aircraft Corpora-
tion, Reaction Motors, Inc., the Air Force, and NACA. Only 1 year 
First supersonic airplane — the L'S. Air Force Bell X'S-] experimental airplane.
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after Ezra Kotcher secured a commitment from Bell to design and con-
struct three transonic research airplanes, Bell completed the first 
XS-1. Less than 16 months after construction, the XS-1 had suc-
cessfully completed its first powered flight with the new Reaction 
Motors rocket engine. Six months later, the XS-1 was ready to go 
supersonic. 
NACA engineers and aerodynamicists participated with the Bell 
Aircraft Corporation and the Air Force in many elements of the XS-1 
design and flight-test program. Floyd Thompson, Assistant Chief of 
Research at the NACA Langley Laboratory, decided to use a "thin" 
wing based on transonic wingflow test results obtained by NACA's 
Robert Gilruth. 42
 John Stack recommended that the horizontal tail be 
made relatively thinner than the wing to ensure that the airplane could 
be controlled even if critical conditions occurred over the wing. 43
 Stack, 
Gilruth, and others further suggested that the horizontal tail be "all-
moving" to ensure adequate control during transonic flight and that the 
horizontal tail be placed as high as possible on the vertical fin to posi-
tion it above the wing wake." NACA engineers set the ultimate design 
load factor45
 and recommended the research instrumentation that 
would go on the airplane. 46
 Walter Williams, a NACA Langley 
engineer who had been on John Stack's transonic design team, was 
project engineer for the NACA group that was responsible for the flight 
tests, data gathering, and data dissemination. 
Although the XS-1 had flown successfully during the contractor pro-
gram and the early Air Force flights, some people believed that the 
airplane would disintegrate because of compressibility effects at sonic 
speeds. However, after his epoch-making flight of October 14, 1947, 
here is what Capt. Yeager had to say about it: 
With the stabilizer set at 2° the speed was allowed to increase to approximate-
ly .98 to .99 Mach number where elevator and rudder effectiveness were 
regained and the airplane seemed to smooth Out to normal flying 
characteristics. This development lent added confidence and the airplane was 
allowed to Continue to accelerate until an indication of 1.02 on the cockpit 
Mach meter was obtained. At this indication the meter momentarily stopped 
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and then jumped to 1.06 and this hesitation was assumed to be caused by the 
effect of shock waves on the static source.47 
Yeager had attained an airspeed of 700 mph, Mach 1.06, at an 
altitude of approximately 43 000 feet. He had become the first pilot to 
successfully exceed the speed of sound. There had been no violent buf-
feting or wrenching of the airplane, and Yeager did not note anything 
spectacular about broaching the "sound barrier." 48 
Yeager's flight laid to rest the myth of the "sound barrier" and opened 
the door to the possibilities of supersonic flight. Data obtained by 
NASA pilots on the XS-1 and the Navy's D-558 transonic research air-
craft provided a rich trove of transonic and supersonic flight informa-
tion. During the period September 25, 1947, to November 6, 1958, 
NASA pilots made 358 research flights in various versions of these two 
aircraft. 
Navy transonic research airplane - the Douglas A ircrafi Company D-558.
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Another important aspect of the XS-1 and D-558 programs was the 
impetus they provided to the development of better ground-based 
research facilities and testing methods. The requirements for the best 
possible data in the development of these two aircraft led directly to 
several important innovations in wind tunnel testing. In 1945, NACA 
Langley engineers, adopting Gilruth's wing-flow techniques, 
developed the "transonic bump" method for wind tunnel testing. With 
the use of a carefully designed "bump," a region of transonic flow could 
be generated in the tunnel even though the main flow remained sub-
sonic. Langley engineers also developed an entirely new method of 
testing high-speed models using special sting supports with internal 
balances. Using small models and the nonchoking sting support 
system, Langley wind tunnel engineers could test the XS-1 and D-558 
almost up to the speed of sound.49 
Perhaps the most important ground-test development spawned by 
the XS-1 and D-558 programs was the "slotted wall" transonic wind 
tunnel. In 1946, Ray Wright at NACA Langley suggested the use of 
slots in wind tunnel walls to more nearly duplicate free-air conditions. 
Making use of this concept, John Stack and his associates developed a 
"slotted wall" transonic wind tunnel that was essentially free of the 
"choking" experienced in existing solid-wall tunnels. With this tunnel it 
was possible, for the first time, to increase tunnel airspeed continuously 
through Mach 1 by merely increasing fan speed. For this important 
development in aviation research, John Stack and his associates at 
Langley received the prestigious Collier Trophy in 1951.0 
The American quest to break the "sound barrier" also led to several 
revolutionary aerodynamic discoveries that have had a lasting effect on 
the design of high-speed aircraft. Two of the most important of these 
discoveries were the swept wing and the "area rule," both of which were 
made at the NACA Langley Laboratory. 
Before 1945, military and civilian airplanes made use of straight 
wings that were essentially perpendicular to the direction of flight -an 
adequate wing orientation for speeds up to 300 to 400 mph. As airplane 
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velocities approached the speed of sound, however, the straight wing 
gave rise to large increases in the drag or resistance of the airplane. In 
1944, Robert T. Jones of NACA Langley noted that these drag in-
creases could be substantially reduced by sweeping the wings back 
from the direction of flight. Jones had developed his wing-sweep theory 
independently and without knowledge of the pioneering wing-sweep ef-
fort of German scientist Adolph Busemann in 1935. The discoveries of 
these two scientists changed the shape of high-speed airplanes, and 
essentially all such aircraft now employ swept-back wings. 
The discovery of the "area rule" was almost directly due to the 
development of the "slotted wall" transonic wind tunnel and the 
capability it provided to test models near Mach 1. In 1951, while con-
ducting such tests, NACA Langley engineer Richard Whitcomb and 
his team observed the expected shock disturbances from the nose of a 
model, but also found additional disturbances emanating from the 
trailing edges of the wings. Whitcomb believed that these latter dis-
turbances were leading to high drag and that they were caused by ir-
regularities in the cross-sectional area distribution at the wing/fuselage 
juncture. He theorized that drag could be substantially reduced if the 
total combined cross-sectional area of the wing, fuselage, and tail were 
adjusted to approach that of an ideal streamlined body. Thus, the 
fuselage should be constricted where the wings were attached and ex-
panded at their trailing edges. Subsequent wind tunnel tests proved 
Whitcomb's concepts, and the transonic "area rule," with its attendant 
"coke bottle" fuselage shape, was born. 5 ' The "area rule," which 
resulted in a Collier Trophy for Whitcomb, was later expanded to 
supersonic speeds by Boeing and NASA engineers and is a major tool 
in the design of high-performance supersonic airplanes. 
Thus, the necessary first step in the evolution of supersonic cruise 
flight—"breaking the sound barrier"—had been successfully taken. As 
NACA engineers and scientists participated in this effort, they pro-
duced breakthroughs that would have far-reaching effects on the shape 
of future civilian and military aircraft. However, NACA was aware 
that short-duration supersonic flights of small experimental airplanes 
31
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
did not ensure the ready development of long-range supersonic air-
craft. Much work was yet to be done. 
During the latter part of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, 
NACA prepared for the new era of supersonic flight. With the support 
of the U.S. Congress, a wind tunnel construction program was ini-
tiated at all three of NACA's ground test centers. As a result of the 
Unitary Plan Act, passed by Congress on October 27, 1949, a large 
transonic/supersonic wind tunnel complex was built at NACA Ames, 
Moffett Field, California; a new supersonic tunnel was constructed at 
NACA Langley, Hampton, Virginia; and a large supersonic tunnel, 
dedicated to propulsion system integration, was established at NACA 
Lewis, Cleveland, Ohio. In addition, the Unitary Plan Act authorized 
a new Air Force aeronautical test center at Tullahoma, Tennessee, 
now known as the Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC). 
Under the Unitary Plan, NACA was to concentrate on industrial 
development work (i.e., commercial aircraft), and the Air Force 
AEDC was to focus on military development testing.52 
In addition to acquiring these facilities with increased research 
capability, NACA made other preparations for the approaching era of 
supersonic cruise flight. At the Ames and Langley aeronautical 
centers, scientists began to collect data on a myriad of aeronautical 
configurations that appeared to be suitable for supersonic cruise flight. 
These two NACA groups also began the development and validation of 
analytical methods 'that could be used in supersonic design and 
analysis. The Lewis propulsion center initiated a massive effort for 
developing turbojet engine technology for supersonic airplanes. The ef-
fort covered the aerodynamic design of all components of the engine, 
inlet, and nozzle and the development of new high-temperature 
materials and cooling techniques for turbine blades and considered the 
most suitable design characteristics of a turbojet engine. Meanwhile, at 
the NACA Flight Research Center at Edwards, California, engineers 
and pilots continued to collect valuable transonic and supersonic data 
on a bevy of high-speed research airplanes such as the X-2, X-4, X-5, 
D-558-II, and XF-92. Also under way at NACA was an advanced 
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structures research program in which new materials, such as titanium, 
and the "super alloys" were being investigated at the temperature levels 
to be expected during supersonic flight. 
The preparations for the development of long-range supersonic 
airplanes were being made. The question now was: When would the 
development begin?
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CHAPTER 4 
NACA/NASA Supportive Supersonic 
Cruise Technology (1956-1971) 
As NACA prepared for the approaching era of supersonic cruise 
flight, the military services followed up quickly on the knowledge 
gained in the X-1 and D-558 programs. By 1953, the first American 
supersonic fighter, the North American F-100, had been developed, 
and it was soon followed by the Mach 2 fighter, the Lockheed F-104. 
In 1956, the Convair B-58, a medium range bomber also having Mach 
2 "dash" capability, was brought into the Air Force inventory. 
All of these aircraft performed well in the transonic and supersonic 
speed regimes, but they all had rather short supersonic range and dura-
tion of flight. Even though a number of aircraft were now capable of 
flying at supersonic speeds, the total flight experience at supersonic 
speeds was still very small. For example, during its first 10 000 hours of 
flight time, the B-58 bomber logged only 500 hours at speeds above 
Mach 
This early flight experience with supersonic aircraft gave little in-
dication that a vehicle could be developed that would be capable of sus-
tained long-range supersonic flight. At this point, it appeared that the 
advent of the concept of supersonic cruise flight would hinge on some 
substantial breakthrough in aerodynamic, structural, or propulsive 
efficiency. 
THE U.S. AIR FORCE B-70 BOMBER PROGRAM 
In late 1951, Gen. Curtis LeMay, Commander of the U.S. Air 
Force's Strategic Air Command, began looking around for a B747 
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bomber replacement. A "split mission" aircraft was envisioned—one 
that would cruise subsonically to the enemy early-warning line (EWL) 
and then "dash" supersonically to the target. On October 14, 1954, 
after several years of study and consideration, the Air Staff published a 
general operating requirement (GOR) for a supersonic strategic 
bomber for the 1965-1975 time period. 54
 This GOR initiated the 
preliminary studies that would lead to the Air Force supersonic B-70 
bomber program. 
Four companies responded to the Air Staff GOR and undertook 
preliminary design studies for such an aircraft: General Electric for 
propulsion, IBM for homing and navigation devices, and Boeing and 
North American for design integration and the manufacture of the en-
tire weapon system.55 
At the time of these preliminary B-70 studies, the Air Force perhaps 
expected little more than a larger version of the B-58. There was little 
to indicate that more than supersonic "dash" capability could be 
achieved, and "the only recourse available to the design engineer was 
the so-called brute-force concept - tremendous fuel capacity and an op-
timized aerodynamic shape for the target sprint." 56 
General LeMay is said to have groaned when he saw the resultant 
1955 B-70 design; the concept called for jettisonable wing-tip tanks 
that weighed 191 000 pounds and were about the size of a B-47. Gross-
ing out at more than 750 000 pounds, the design featured a huge 
canard arrowhead control surface that cut the pilot's forward vision by 
50 percent.57 
Shortly after Air Force rejection of this preliminary concept, a 
NACA aerodynamic "breakthrough" was revealed that had dramatic 
implications on the B-70 program and on future supersonic design 
philosophy. This breakthrough was the product of A. J
.
 Eggers and 
C. A. Syvertson of the NACA Ames Research Center. 58
 Their 
research indicated that a substantial quantity of favorable "compression 
lift" could be created on the under surface of a wing at supersonic 
speeds by the proper placement of a body or "splitter" beneath the wing 
surface. A supersonic airplane that employed this concept could effec-
tively ride its own shock wave. The "compression lift" concept was 
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tested at the NACA Ames, Lewis, and Langley centers. Dr. Hugh 
Dryden, the NACA Director, had this to say about the compression lift 
concept in 1958 testimony to the U.S. Congress: 
A year or so ago, the Air Force was reconciled to the idea that the best it could 
obtain in the way of performance from a new large bomber would be what the 
engineers call high subsonic cruise plus supersonic dash similar to the B-58. 
About a year ago a strange and wonderful thing happened. It was as if the 
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle began falling into place. Almost simultaneously 
research programs that had been under way at NACA labs in Virginia 
[Langley], California [Ames], and Ohio [Lewis] began paying off. 
The result—this is oversimplification, but it is not overstatement—was that 
the companies [i.e., North American and Boeing] and the Air Force suddenly 
realized it would not be much harder to design a long-range bomber that 
could fly its whole mission supersonic than to design one that would fly sub-
sonic all the way with only a small fraction of the flight supersonic. Not only 
that, but the top speed of the prospective bomber was raised to Mach 3, about 
2000 miles an hour.59 
The aerodynamic promise of Eggers and Syvertson's compression lift 
concept encouraged the Air Force to proceed with the B-70 bomber 
program. A North American configuration, which made use of this 
concept, was selected as the winning entry in the B-70 competition. 
The company was awarded a design and production contract on 
December 23, 1957. The production contract was not to remain in ef-
fect very long, however. On December 3, 1959, a teletype from the 
Pentagon informed North American that "THE B-70 IS BEING 
REDIRECTED AS FOLLOWS: (A) CEASE ALL STUDY, 
DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND FABRICATION AND TEST 
WORK TOWARDS THE B-70 WEAPON SYSTEM IN WING 
STRENGTH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MASTER PHAS-
ING SCHEDULE; (B) PROCEED WITH DESIGN, DEVELOP-
MENT, FABRICATION AND TEST WORK AND PRODUCE 
ONE XB-70 FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE FLIGHT DATE 
CONSISTENT WITH TENTATIVE FUNDING CEIL-
INGS.	 11 60
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Ale 
North American B— 70 bomber program spurred supersonic cruise research. 
This Pentagon directive was eventually amended to permit the con-
struction of two B-70 aircraft, but it effectively signaled the end of the 
U.S. military's interest in long-range supersonic cruise aircraft. The in-
tercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had replaced the manned 
bomber as America's major strategic weapon system. 
The first of the two B-70 prototypes authorized by the Pentagon 
made its initial flight on April 21, 1964. It attained the design cruise 
speed of Mach 3 (2000 mph) in May 1965. The second aircraft made its 
first flight on July 17, 1965. This latter aircraft had been heavily in-
strumented by NASA for research experiments when it was lost in a 
tragic midair collision with an F104 on June 8, 1966. The two B-70 
prototypes flew a combined total of about 100 missions. 
The B-70 bomber was a remarkable airplane for its time period. 
Designed before the development of high-speed computers and 
automated aerodynamic and structural design methods, the B-70 pro-
vided a mass of useful data on aerodynamics and sonic boom. NACA 
provided one of the principal design features of the airplane (i.e., com-
pression lift). Although it was never conclusively proven whether the 
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B-70 obtained the full predicted benefits of compression lift during 
flight, the principle of compression lift or "favorable lift interference" 
was incorporated in later aerodynamic design methods. 
THE U.S. SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT PROGRAM 
There was a feeling in some quarters that the cancellation of the Air 
Force B-70 bomber program would be a mortal blow to the concept of 
supersonic cruise flight, at least in America. The B-70 was expected 
not only to establish the feasibility of such flight, but also to serve as a 
proving ground for a future commercial supersonic transport. A wing 
of long-range B-70 bombers could rapidly obtain the 20 000 or so 
hours of supersonic flight experience that were desired prior to com-
mercial development. Moreover, later models of the B-70 could try out 
new technology for later application on the commercial transport 
airplane. 
Many were happy to see the demise of the B-70 production program 
and were even more pleased that this demise might inhibit or deter the 
development of a commercial SST. Concerns were rising about the ef-
fect of a fleet of SSTs on the environment, and the questions about 
pollution, safety, radiation, noise, etc., were beginning to dim some of 
the ardor for the apparently insatiable quest for higher speed. One of 
the most disturbing phenomenon associated with supersonic flight was 
the sonic boom —astartling thunderclap that is produced by a vehicle 
moving at supersonic velocity through the atmosphere. 
NASA, by 1960 heavily involved in the national space program, 
looked on the challenge of supersonic cruise flight as well within its 
chartered responsibility for preserving the leadership of the United 
States in aeronautical science and technology. While recognizing the 
difficult problems that had to be solved before commercial supersonic 
flight, NASA saw such flight as a rational and necessary evolution in 
commercial transportation. Accordingly, NASA began to build rapidly 
on its base of supersonic technology with the firm belief that this 
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technology would be useful to the United States. This belief was 
strongly shared by others both within and without the government. 
In the early 1950s, NACA had initiated concerted efforts to improve 
the technology of supersonic cruise flight. Now, in the latter half of the 
decade, the newly formed NASA was stepping up the research and 
technology efforts. Fundamental programs were under way in all 
design and operational areas associated with supersonic cruise flight. 
At each of the NASA aeronautical centers, engineers were seeking 
ways to provide the levels of aerodynamic, propulsive, and structural 
efficiencies that would be required of a viable commercial SST. A 
variety of aerodynamic and propulsive concepts that had the potential 
for meeting the required efficiency levels were exhaustively tested in 
the NASA low-speed and new supersonic Unitary Plan wind tunnels. 
Programs for studying the air traffic control and other operational 
problems were initiated in cooperation with the FAA. In 1960, NASA 
formed a Supersonic Transport Research Committee to coordinate and 
guide this mushrooming supersonic technology effort. 
In mid-1960, the NASA Langley Research Center summarized the 
effects of supersonic research of the 1950s on the technical status of the 
supersonic transport. John Stack, who had been heavily involved in 
NACA's earlier transonic research, said in his introduction to this 
technical summary: 
The prospects for commercial flight at supersonic speeds herald a new era in 
the transportation field. The successful development of a supersonic transport 
is of vital importance to the national prestige as well as the commercial stature 
of the United States. If the United States is to achieve a supersonic air 
transport capability at the earliest practical date, a vigorous effort is de-
manded on all fronts.61 
Stack went on to comment about the potential SST configurations that 
had evolved from NASA studies: "While many of these configurations 
have serious limitations for commercial operation, reasonably clear 
definitions of the problem areas have been achieved and possible new 
approaches are under study." 62 
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Therefore, in 1960, NASA believed that the development of a com-
mercial SST was of vital importance to the United States and that 
supersonic research had come a long way toward providing the 
technology for a viable SST, but that much research effort was still re-
quired before the goal could be reached. NASA was busily conducting 
this research. 
In 1961, the preliminary groundwork for establishing a U.S. SST 
program moved forward. Representatives of NASA, the Federal Avia-
tion Agency, and the Department of Defense met to consider the 
responsibilities of each agency in the event that such a program would 
be approved by the U.S. Congress. Out of this meeting came a joint 
report which indicated that "A vigorous [SST] effort must be started 
immediately in order to have an operational aircraft in the 1970 time 
period." 63 The report suggested the following agency roles in such an 
effort: 
• Federal Aviation Agency—Leadership and fiscal support 
• Department of Defense — Administrative and technical support by 
the U.S. Air Force 
• National Aeronautics and Space Administration—Basic research 
and technical support. 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, NASA Administrator 
James E. Webb, and FAA Administrator N. E. Halaby signed this 
joint agency report. The three agencies established an SST Steering 
Group, consisting of the Administrator, FAA, Chairman (Halaby); the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development 
(Joseph S. Imirie); and the Director of Aeronautical Research, NASA 
(Stack). The Steering Group was to coordinate joint efforts on SST 
problems. 
Shortly after this joint agency report was signed, an FAA request for 
$12 million in fiscal year 1962 SST funding came before the U.S. 
Senate. This funding was to provide for FAA-managed research that 
would augment the supersonic effort at NASA. On July 31, 1961, a 
motion was made in the Senate to strike the SST funding from the FAA 
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budget. The first SST funding measure barely survived when the "mo-
tion to strike" the funding failed to pass on a 35 to 35 tie vote. 64
 An SST 
funding level of $11 million was subsequently approved by Congress, 
and the FAA research program was under way. 
FAA received an additional $20 million in fiscal year 1963 to con-
tinue the preliminary SST research program. NASA assisted FAA in 
monitoring the research contracts and grants that evolved from this 
program. 
Meanwhile, NASA engineers were homing in on some aerodynamic 
configurations that showed very good potential for meeting the re-
quirements of a commercial SST. From approximately 20 concepts, 
four aircraft arrangements had emerged as likely SST candidates after 
a series of analyses, wind tunnel tests, and refinement. In the latter half 
of 1962, NASA prepared to submit'these four concepts to an SST 
feasibility study by the American airplane industry. 
NASA SUPERSONIC COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT (SCAT) 
FEASIBILITY STUDIES 
The NASA/Industry SCAT Feasibility Studies were initiated in 
January 1963, making use of $1 million of NASA funds. The major 
purposes of the studies were to bring the NASA SST effort into focus 
and to establish the technological state of the art for guidance of a possi-
ble national SST program. NASA would also receive the unique exper-
tise of industry in the evaluation of the four candidate SST concepts 
and in the identification of areas requiring further research attention. 
The four NASA configurations submitted for industry feasibility 
studies bore the designations SCAT-4, SCAT-15, and SCAT-16 
(generated at the Langley Research Center), and SCAT-17, which 
was developed at the Ames Research Center. All three of the Langley 
designs incorporated highly swept arrow wings. The SCAT-4 wing 
was fixed, the SCAT-15 made use of auxiliary variable-sweep panels 
to improve low-speed performance, and the SCAT-16 was a classical 
variable-sweep wing design. The Ames SCAT-17 configuration was 
characterized as a fixed-delta-wing airplane with a small auxiliary wing 
or canard near the nose. 
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NASA supersonic transport feasibil ity concept - the highly swept fixed arrow-wing concept 
SCA T-4. 
NASA SSTfeasibility concept - the variable-sweep SCAT-15 with blended body and in-
terlocking wings (forerunner of the fixed-wing SCA T— 15F.)
11 ICI
/ 
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NASA SSTfeasibility concept - the SCA T-16 with highly swept arrow wing in aft posi-
tion.
NASA SCA T-16 with wings in swept-forward position. 
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NASA SSTfeasibility concept - the fixed delta-wing SCA T-17 with forward canard and 
aft tail. 
The Boeing Airplane Company and Lockheed California Company 
were selected to assess the feasibility of the four SCAT designs on a 
3200-nautical-mile SST mission with 125 passengers at a cruise Mach 
number of 3, as well as the feasibility of one of the designs as an 
aluminum Mach 2 transport. In addition, they were to evaluate several 
engine types and levels of propulsion technology. In flying the mission, 
the sonic boom levels could be no more than 2 pounds per square foot 
(psf) in climb and no more than 1.5 psf while at cruise conditions. The 
engine noise would be comparable to present-day subsonic jet aircraft. 
The results of the NASA SCAT Feasibility Studies were reported on 
September 17-19, 1963, at a Langley Research Center conference.65 
The studies indicated the following: 
• Either a Mach 3 variable-sweep transport, patterned after the 
SCAT-16, or a fixed-wing transport, following the lines of the 
SCAT-17, could make the New York/Paris mission with 125 
passengers. 
• If the SCAT is to be a competitive transport, an advance in the 
propulsion state of the art would be required.
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• A Mach 2 aluminum SCAT could not make the mission within 
the sonic boom constraints used in the study. 
• Titanium was preferred over stainless steel as the basic material 
for a Mach 3 SCAT. 
• For the transport to have satisfactory characteristics, research in 
several areas would be urgently needed. The aircraft needs to 
have better aerodynamic performance than that used in the 
studies, and configurations need to be devised that can obtain the 
high aerodynamic performance while still maintaining low struc-
tural weight. Research and development work in the engine field 
is required. Research is needed in stability and control to improve 
flying qualities of the aircraft. Considerable work is needed to 
establish confidence in the use of titanium. Research is needed to 
determine if the sonic boom can be reduced. Research is needed to 
determine the public acceptance of sonic boom so that boom 
restrictions can be set at the highest possible level. 
In essence, on the basis of then-current status of technology in 
almost all areas of research, the NASA SCAT Feasibility Studies of 
1963 indicated that a commercial supersonic transport was not feasible. 
However, 1 month later, on August 15, 1963, FAA circulated to in-
dustry the "Request for Proposals for the Development of a Commer-
cial Supersonic Transport." The United States SST program was 
under way. 
FAA SST EVALUATIONS 
While the NASA SCAT Feasibility Studies were in progress, Presi-
dent Kennedy and the U.S. Congress took the actions that launched 
the American commercial SST program. With the release of the FAA's 
request for proposals, NASA's role changed from one of having its own 
concepts evaluated by the airplane industry to one of evaluating the 
SST concepts of the airplane industry. 
The FAA allowed the interested airplane and propulsion companies 
about 4 months to develop and submit proposals for the SST develop-
ment program. During this time, NASA participated with the FAA in 
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setting up evaluation criteria and organizing the SST Evaluation 
Team. The FAA development plan called for one evaluation during 
January 1964, which was to be followed by: 
• Selection of the winning airframe/propulsion combination by May 
1964 
• A 1-year detailed design effort ending in May 1965 
• First flight of a United States SST in the fall of 1968 
• SST entry into passenger service in the summer of 1970 66 
As it turned out, four FAA SST evaluations were held before the 
selection of the "winning combination" on December 31, 1966. The 
evaluation process extended from January 1964 to October 1966—a 
period of 33 months. During this time, NASA provided totals ranging 
from 41 Evaluation Team members in the first evaluation to 74 
members in the last evaluation in September 1966. Approximately 
one-third of the evaluators were from NASA, and about two-thirds of 
NASA's representation were from the Langley Research Center. 
Langley engineers also provided a large part of the analytical tools that 
were used in the evaluation process and, during the last three evalua-
tions, conducted extensive wind tunnel tests on models provided by the 
contractors. In the final evaluation, Ames Research Center conducted 
low-speed wind tunnel tests of contractor models. 
Three airframe companies—Boeing, Lockheed, and North 
American—and three engine companies—General Electric, Pratt and 
Whitney, and Curtis Wright—submitted proposals for evaluation in 
January 1964. The first FAA/SST evaluation found that none of the 
airframe/engine combinations met the basic criteria of range (4000 
statute miles), passengers (125 to 160), or sonic boom (2.0 psf during 
climb, 1.5 psf during cruise). The principal problem areas appeared to 
be cruise aerodynamic performance and sonic boom. 
From this first evaluation, Boeing, Lockheed, General Electric, and 
Pratt and Whitney proposals were judged to have the most potential, 
and they were continued in a competition that was to last nearly 3 
years. In none of the subsequent FAA evaluations, including the final 
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one in late 1966, did any of the airframe/engine combinations 
simultaneously meet all of the evaluation criteria. Throughout the 
selection process, Boeing steadfastly stuck to the variable-sweep con-
cept with its uncertain weight penalty and promised advantages in mis-
sion versatility and cruise performance. Lockheed just as firmly stayed 
with their relatively uncomplicated fixed double-delta-wing design, 
which offered simplicity at the expense of possible growth potential. 
Because each concept had possible advantages and potential disadvan-
tages, the selection of the Boeing/General Electric (B-2707-200/GE-4) 
combination on December 31, 1966, was less than a clear-cut decision. 
The difficulty of this decision was borne Out in April 1968 when Boe-
ing dropped the variable-sweep B-2707-200 and changed to the 
B-2707-300, a fixed double-delta-wing design not unlike the Lockheed 
configuration. After Boeing had worked the Dash-300 for most of 1968, 
the FAA called for a validation team to review the design. The United 
States Supersonic Transport Integrated Configuration Validation 
Group met on-site at Boeing in December 1968 and January 1969 to 
review the Dash-300 design. This validation, unlike the previous 
rigorous FAA evaluations, represented little more than an audit of 
Boeing substantiating information. 
This "validation" exercise was the last formal contact between the 
NASA evaluators and the FAA SST program before the cancellation of 
the program in May 1971. Individual contacts of NASA engineers with 
the Boeing SST team continued until the program was terminated. 
The cancellation of the U.S. SST program was a severe blow to 
those who had devoted a large part of their careers to research on 
supersonic cruise flight. The aura of negativism and controversy that 
surrounded the program in its last phases tended to depreciate the real 
accomplishments that had been made by both NASA and the SST con-
tractors. Some of these accomplishments are summarized herein. 
IMPROVEMENTS IN SUPERSONIC DESIGN AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
At the beginning of U.S. interest in supersonic cruise flight, the 
aeronautical literature contained theories for optimum supersonic area 
distributions, optimum supersonic wings, and optimum supersonic lift 
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Boeing B2707-300 with four GE-4 engines -the proposed U.S. SST at the time pro-
gram was canceled. 
distributions .11, The problem was that no means were available for 
designing these optimum aerodynamic features into a complicated 
supersonic aircraft. There were also no "real flow" constraints on the 
first-order theories and no means for handling the design effects of 
"favorable lift" interference. 
Immediately preceding and during the course of the U.S. SST pro-
gram, NASA and industry engineers adapted the principal elements of 
these basic theories into high-speed digital computer programs. "Real 
flow" constraints and "favorable lift" interference were incorporated, 
and each element of the theory was validated with carefully controlled 
wind tunnel tests. These programs can be used to design, analyze, and 
optimize the aerodynamic characteristics of complex, arbitrary super-
sonic configurations with a high degree of accuracy. 
The design and analysis methods developed during this program 
were the standards for supersonic evaluation of the proposal SST con-
figurations, and they are widely used today in the design of supersonic 
military airplanes.
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IMPROVEMENTS IN SONIC BOOM TECHNOLOGY 
Prior to NASA's emphasis on supersonic cruise technology, little was 
known about sonic booms except that they were generated by airplanes 
flying at supersonic speeds. The principal airplane factors that caused 
them and the manner in which they were propagated were still 
mysteries. 
Using the asymptotic pressure-field theory developed for supersonic 
projectiles69
 and the lift-area equivalency principles of the supersonic 
area rule, 70
 NASA Langley developed and validated a "far field" sonic 
boom estimation procedure for use in the FAA SST evaluations. It was 
later discovered at Langley that the SST, because of its relatively large 
size, would generate "near field" sonic booms with somewhat lower 
levels than those predicted by the "far field" method. The discovery of 
this "near field" application to the SST opened up a new field of 
research in sonic boom minimization. This application was immediate-
ly incorporated into the methodology for sonic boom prediction and 
has been the subject of many research papers. 
Until this point, the sonic boom disturbance was assumed to be 
propagated through a mean uniform atmosphere that accounted for 
differences between the atmospheric pressures between the airplane 
and the ground. In 1969, this approximation was greatly improved 
with the development of a method for propagating the sonic boom 
through a stratified atmosphere 71 
In addition to these developments in sonic boom methodology, 
NASA engineers participated in the measurement of sonic booms from 
essentially every supersonic airplane, participated in all of the FAA 
sonic boom acceptability programs, gathered a bulk of data on the ef-
fect of atmospheric disturbances, and conducted studies on the possible 
damages that might be caused by sonic booms. Thus, in the period 
1959-1969, NASA brought the status of knowledge on sonic booms to a 
very high level. 
IMPROVEMENTS IN SUPERSONIC CRUISE AERODYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
The lift/drag ratio is used by aerodynamicists as a measure of the 
aerodynamic efficiency of a given configuration. At the beginning of 
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the U.S. SST program, lift/drag ratios of 7.0 to 7.5 were typical of air-
craft designed for supersonic cruise flight in the range from Mach 2 to 
Mach 3. 
As one means of validating the supersonic design methodology that 
had recently been developed, in 1964 Langley engineers designed an 
SST configuration that demonstrated a lift/drag ratio of 9.3 at Mach 
2.6. This level was 25 to 30 percent above the previous state of the art. 
The design, called the SCAT-15F, was a fixed-wing version of the 
variable-sweep SCAT-is that was considered in the earlier SCAT 
Feasibility Studies. The SCAT-15F incorporated the principles of 
wing design, wing/fuselage integration, engine placement, and 
favorable lift interference that were validated in the process of develop-
ing the supersonic design methods. 
The SCAT-15F was considered by both Lockheed and Boeing dur-
ing 1965 and was studied again by Boeing in 1968 as a backup to the 
Dash-300. The concept was also the subject of a 1966 NASA study on 
the feasibility of a low sonic boom domestic transport requested by the 
FAA. 
Although neither contractor adopted the SCAT-15F as a primary 
SST concept in spite of its superior supersonic cruise efficiency, many 
of the design features of the aircraft were incorporated in the contractor 
designs. 
IMPROVEMENTS IN PROPULSION TECHNOLOGY 
By the end of the U.S. SST program, turbojet and turbofan engines 
producing 50 000 to 60 000 pounds of thrust appeared feasible com-
pared to about 30 000 pounds at the start of the program. On October 
28, 1966, the GE-4 engine produced 52 600 pounds of thrust on the 
test stand, and on December 11, 1966, the other SST engine, the Pratt 
and WhitneyJTF17, produced 57 000 pounds of thrust— a Free World 
record at that time.72 
Much of the improvement in supersonic engine capability was at-
tributable to the high-temperature turbine and advanced materials 
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NASA SCA T-15F fixed-wing concept that advanced state-of-the-art levels of supersonic 
cruise aerodynamics. 
programs of the NASA Lewis Research Center. This same technology 
has also brought improvements in present-day subsonic turbojet and 
turbofan engines. 
Kelly Johnson, the noted Lockheed designer of the U-2, SR-71, and 
other advanced airplanes, once said, "At supersonic flight speeds 
around Mach 3, our current and proposed jet engines produce only 
about 25 percent of the thrust propelling the aircraft. The inlet duct 
pressure distribution provides about 50 to 60 percent of the thrust and 
the exhaust ejector the rest." 
The importance of the propulsion system inlet was not overlooked in 
NASA's effort in support of the SST program. The NASA Ames 
Research Center became the hub of the SST inlet program and pro-
vided much of the technology that would go into the Boeing transport. 
Engineers at Ames conducted detailed large-scale tests of axisymmetric 
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and two-dimensional inlets in the Ames facilities and developed a 
number of innovations to improve inlet performance. 
IMPROVEMENTS IN STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY 
The U.S. decision to develop a Mach 2.7 transport led to the re-
quirement for a new structural material. Aluminum, the material most 
generally used in airplane construction, would not survive in the 500'F 
temperature environment experienced at that speed. Although 
stainless steel had been used in the construction of the B-70 supersonic 
bomber, the scant design information available indicated that titanium 
would be a better high-temperature material. A large part of NASA's 
effort in support of the SST was devoted to expanding the status of 
knowledge on titanium. At both the Langley and Lewis Research 
Centers, exhaustive research programs were conducted to determine 
the design variables, material properties, and fabrication problems of 
titanium. Now, because of these technology efforts and other studies 
carried out by the aerospace industry, titanium has replaced aluminum 
in some areas of current subsonic airplanes, even where temperature is 
not a problem. 
As in the aerodynamics area, the design methodology in structures 
was vastly improved because of the SST program. The more complex 
structural design problems associated with the SST - compared to sub-
sonic aircraft - led to the requirement for advanced methods for design 
and analysis. As a result of efforts by both NASA and industry, 
sophisticated and accurate computerized structural design and analysis 
methods were developed. Adaptations of these SST methods are cur-
rently used in the design of advanced subsonic aircraft and are being 
applied to automotive and other vehicle designs.74 
OTHER TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES DERIVED FROM THE 
U.S. SST PROGRAM 
The concepts of relaxed static stability and variable camber flaps on 
the wing leading edge were developed and evaluated in the U.S. SST 
program and have since been applied to the F-16 fighter. Various 
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elements of the Boeing 747 jumbojet are direct descendants of develop-
ment work on the SST. Digital displays and advanced navigation 
systems developed for the SST are now being used in the advanced 
subsonic jet transport—the Boeing 767. 
Stratospheric emission impact is another important technology area 
that was spurred by the SST program. Although particulate emission is 
not a problem unique to the SST, unknowns about the problem con-
tributed to program cancellation. The SST program, in turn, perhaps 
led to the U.S. Congressional mandate to sort out the unknowns about 
atmospheric pollution. From this mandate grew the Department of 
Transportation's Climatic Impact Assessment Program (ClAP) and 
the High Altitude Pollution Program (HAPP). In addition to the con-
tributions of its own atmospheric analysis and monitoring efforts, 
NASA was a prominent participant in the interagency activities arising 
from ClAP and HAPP. As indicated later, these programs led to a 
much better understanding of atmospheric pollution phenomena. 
The cancellation of the U.S. SST program perhaps kept these im-
portant technology advances from being a complete victory for those 
who had worked on them. Would the same "hollow" victory be the fate 
of participants in the foreign SST programs? 
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Foreign Supersonic Transport 
Programs 
Supersonic transport programs by the Soviet Union and a consor-
tium of the British and French governments perhaps precipitated 
America's entry into the SST race. Problems experienced in these 
foreign programs might also have influenced America's decision to step 
out of the race, at least for the present. Whatever the case, the cancella-
tion of the U.S. effort in 1971 left the supersonic market to the Soviet 
TU-144 and the British/French Concorde. Since these foreign pro-
grams have probably directly or indirectly influenced the NASA super-
sonic technology effort, it might be well to take a brief look at them 
before proceeding. 
THE SOVIET TU-144 
The first flight of a prospective commercial SST was made by the 
Soviet Union's TU-144 on December 31, 1968. Design development of 
this airplane was initiated in 1962, and the formal development project 
was started in 1964. The airplane was designed to cruise at Mach 2.2 
(approximately 1350 miles per hour) and to carry 140 passengers a 
distance of 4000 statute miles. The TU-144 employs a highly swept 
ogee-delta wing, and the production version of the airplane makes use 
of small retractable canard surfaces near the nose to control approach 
speed. In the original version, four Kuznetsov NK-144 turbofan 
engines in the 38 000-pound thrust class were clustered close together 
along the wing centerline in twin-ducted nacelles that stretched over 
the full length of the wing. 76 Andrei Tupolev, the well-known Soviet 
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Soviet TU— 144 supersonic transport airplane. 
Soviet TU-144 (courtesy ofAviation Week and Space Technology, McGraw-Hill, Inc.). 
designer responsible for the TU-144, revealed in June 1966 that he had 
borrowed the B-70's " 'compression lift' design to let the wing ride on 
top of the shock wave induced by the engine intake splitter. . . ." 
This technological advancement (discussed in Chapter 3) had been 
discovered by NACA's Eggers and Syvertson. 
Although most elements in the development of the TU-144 have 
been clothed in secrecy, many problems were obvious in the early 
prototypes. Cruise-drag was a problem because of the poorly 
sculptured wing design and engine placement. The four engines were 
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clustered in a split nacelle directly under the fuselage. This arrange-
ment necessitated that the landing gear and carriage be placed in the 
outer wing. Consequently, a large proportion of the outer wing was 
unavailable for fuel.78 
Based on engine technology available at the time, the turbofan ap-
peared to be a poor choice of power plant for the TU- 144. The average 
jet velocity of a turbofan engine is less than that of a turbojet of com-
parable technology. Consequently, to provide thrust equal to a turbo-
jet, the comparable turbofan must be larger in diameter, or additional 
fuel must be burned in the fan duct. Eastern European sources in-
dicated that the TU- 144 used "30-40 percent of available reheat" at 
Mach 1.9, a situation that could cause severe fuel consumption rates 
and drastically reduce range.79 
Because of the rather crude status of the first TU-144 prototype, it 
can be conjectured that this airplane was constructed to "scoop" the 
Concorde, which it did, and to provide data for incorporation into later 
prototypes. There were three such prototypes in the program leading 
up to the production aircraft.80 
The "production" version of the TU-144 showed many refinements 
over the earlier prototypes. The wing was more elegantly tailored, and 
the engines were moved from the clustered arrangement under the 
fuselage to two twin nacelles outboard on the wing. The landing gear 
was stowed in more favorable locations within the engine nacelles, per-
mitting a 40 000-pound increase in fuel capacity. The basic engines 
were not uprated, but larger burners were incorporated to increase 
thrust. The production version of the TU-144 first flew in mid-1972.8' 
The TU-144 was involved in a tragic accident at the Paris Air Show 
in 1973. While making low-speed runs, the aircraft went out of control 
and crashed, killing the crew and a number of spectators. Although no 
official report as to the cause of the crash has been given, it is believed 
that the breakup in flight was due to structural overload.82 
The current status of the TU-144 program is difficult to ascertain. 
Rumors are that the aircraft was used in passenger service for a short 
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time and in freight service for a while and is now grounded. Other 
rumors say that an advanced version of the TU-144 is under develop-
ment. Aleksei I. Smenkov, Soviet first deputy minister of civil aviation, 
said after the tragic 1973 Paris accident, "We know there are plans for a 
larger airplane. Of course, our industry will not stop with this model. 
But so far, we have been talking about real airplanes, airplanes we 
know." 83 A lot has happened since Smenkov made this statement, but 
none of it has been particularly good for the concept of supersonic 
cruise flight. About the only thing that can be said with certainty is 
that, in building and flying three prototype and five or so production 
SSTs, the Soviet Union has amassed a great deal of experience in com-
mercial supersonic cruise flight. 
THE BRITISH/FRENCH CONCORDE 
In spite of being cast as a transportation "heavy" by critics around the 
world, the British/French Concorde ranks as one of the foremost 
technical achievements that has ever been made. The two nations that 
developed this aircraft not only spoke different languages, but also used 
different measurement systems. Yet, out of this unusual alliance came 
the first and, so far, only commercial supersonic transport in regular 
passenger service. Like it or not, the Concorde is a remarkable 
airplane. It reduced the trip times between continents to one-half of 
those of the best of the subsonic jet transports, an accomplishment that 
would have been cheered in bygone years. The Concorde is perhaps 
the world's most tested transport airplane and, in its operations to date, 
has experienced no major accidents and has had no passenger fatalities. 
The Concorde was probably born out of the desire of the British and 
French aircraft industries to break the virtual monopoly that the 
American airplane industry was building in the commercial subsonic 
jet transport market. The British had missed the chance to corner this 
market when early problems beset the De Havilland Comet, the first 
commercial jet transport. The British Overseas Airways Corporation 
(BOAC) had introduced the DH Comet I turbojet transport into 
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passenger service on May 5, 1952, some 6 years before America's first 
turbojet transport, the Boeing 707. In its second year of operation, 
however, two Comets mysteriously exploded in flight, killing 55 peo-
ple, and the Comets were withdrawn from service in April 1954. 
A 
'a 
The British Concorde SSTaI Dulles Airport in Washington, D. C. (courtesy of BOA Q. 
British Concorde (courtesy of BOA(—).
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french Lunc ulde ( ourte ul BOA C). 
Subsequently, exhaustive tests indicated that metal fatigue had caused 
the Comet disasters. By the time the problem was fixed and the Comet 
returned to service on October 4, 1958, however, the American turbo-
jet aircraft had just about cornered the market,84 
The problems with the Comet prompted the British Ministry of 
Aviation to set up the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee 
(STAC) to consider the pros and cons of a British supersonic transport 
program. The first meeting of STAC on November 5, 1956, was really 
the beginning of the British SST effort. At this meeting, interest 
centered on a slender delta wing configuration for long-range Mach 2 
flight and an M-wing concept with waisted fuselage for short-range 
operation at Mach 1.2.85 
The STAC considered all the problems associated with supersonic 
flight from the sonic boom to ozone, radiation, and airport noise. 
When Sir Morien Morgan submitted his STAG report to the controller 
of aircraft at the Ministry of Supply on March 9, 1959, no less than 500 
separate studies were attached. The principal recommendations of the 
report were that the British government should embark as soon as 
possible on a program for two airliners—a 3450-mile, 150-passenger 
airplane with a cruise speed of not less than 1200 mph (Mach 1.8) and 
a second airplane capable of carrying 100 passengers over a stage
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length of 1500 miles with a cruise speed of about 800 mph (Mach 
1.2). 86
 The report went on to say: 
Since this country's future will depend on the quality of its technological prod-
ucts and since its scientific manpower and resources are less than those of the 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., it is important that a reasonable proportion of such 
resources are deployed on products which maintain our technical reputation 
at a high level. A successful supersonic aircraft would not only be a commer-
cial venture of high promise but would also be of immense value to this coun-
try as an indication of our technical skill.7 
Duncan Sandys, the British minister of aviation, strongly backed the 
STAC report with the statement, "If we are not in the supersonic air-
craft business, then it's really only a matter of time before the whole 
British aircraft industry packs it in. It's obviously the thing of the 
future. It may pay. It may not pay, but we cannot afford to stay out. If 
we miss this generation of aircraft we shall never catch up. We will end 
up building executive aircraft." 88 
Sandys' recommendation that the British government proceed with 
the supersonic transport effort was taken, and preliminary design 
studies were begun. The long-range Mach 1.8 contract was given to 
the Bristol Aircraft Company and the medium-range Mach 1.2 study 
to Hawker Siddeley Canada, Incorporated. 
In the meantime, the Sud Aviation Company in France • had in-
dependently decided on a slender delta-wing approach to their new 
Super-Caravelle, the same general approach favored in the British 
long-range Mach 1.8 study. Sud Aviation and Bristol designers were 
on common ground. 
After about 2 years of discussions and exchanges of information, the 
British and French designers came into general agreement on the 
characteristics an SST should have and on how they would proceed on 
a joint program. The Supersonic Aircraft Agreement, signed on 
November 29, 1962, committed both nations to the development of an 
SST. The agreement contained no break clause - neither country 
could withdraw from the program without the approval of the other. 
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The absence of this escape clause probably ensured the survival of the 
Concorde 89 
The aircraft that evolved from discussions between the British and 
French designers was essentially an all-aluminum design with a thin 
ogee-delta wing. It was to be powered by four Bristol/Siddeley 
(BS-593) Olympus engines in the 35 000-pound thrust category. These 
straight turbojets were equipped with afterburners for use in takeoff 
and acceleration to cruise flight conditions. Originally, the aircraft was 
to carry 128 passengers a distance of 4000 statute miles at a cruise 
speed of 1450 mph (Mach 2.2). During the course of development, 
however, the cruise speed was reduced to 1350 mph (Mach 2.05), and 
the passenger load was reduced to the order of 90 to 100 on transatlan-
tic missions. 
Although a number of technical problems were encountered during 
the development of the Concorde, perhaps the most critical problems 
were in the political arena. Less than 2 years after the project was 
launched, the United States announced their program for building a 
larger, faster SST. BOAC, apparently doubtful that the smaller, more 
conservative Concorde would have adequate range for the transatlantic 
operation, placed an order for six U.S. SSTs. 9° Caught by this an-
nouncement and the escalating cost of the Concorde—the projected 
cost had risen to twice the original estimate—the British government 
opted to get Out of the program in late 1964. 
The British appeal to France to break the SST agreement was re-
fused, and the French let it be known that there was a binding agree-
ment between the two countries "to develop and produce jointly a civil 
supersonic transport aircraft." It was clear that the French could well 
take their grievance to the International Court ofJustice at The Hague 
and could probably win.9' 
The British government did not want to face the embarassment of an 
international lawsuit while they were trying to get into the European 
Common Market. Consequently, they assured the French that they 
would honor the treaty. In reflecting on the decision later, Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson wrote: 
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Had we unilaterally denounced the treaty, we were told, we could have been 
taken to the International Court, where there would have been little doubt 
that it would have found against us. This would have meant that the French 
could then have gone ahead with the project no matter what the cost, giving 
us no benefit from the research or the ultimate product. But the court would 
almost certainly have ruled that we should be responsible for half the cost. At 
that time, half the cost was estimated—greatly underestimated as it turns 
out—at 190 million pounds. This we should have had to pay with nothing to 
show for it.	 92 
The Concorde project survived through several changes in govern-
ment; it survived the removal of Charles DeGaulle as French presi-
dent; it survived several strikes in both countries; it survived technical 
difficulties that required a redesign of the wing and engine exhaust 
system; and it survived the escalating costs that were to rise from a 
1965 estimate of $400 million to a 1977 total cost of about $4 billion,93 
ten times the original estimate. 
The first flight of the Concorde was originally scheduled for 1967, 
and it was to enter passenger service in the middle of 1971. As it turned 
out, the first test flight did not occur until March 1969, and passenger 
service did not begin until 1976, with flights , from Paris to Rio de 
Janeiro (via Dakar) by Air France and from London to Bahrain by 
British Airways. Service from Paris and London to Washington, D.C., 
began on May 24, 1977. The combined level of service for the two 
airlines was about 110 flights per month for the first year of operation 
and rose to about 140 flights per month after the inauguration of flights 
to New York in December of 1977. 94
 In 1982, the level of service was 
reduced because of a worldwide recession and the escalating price ofjet 
fuel. 
The Concorde has been described as a "supersonic bust" 95 and as an 
aircraft with "disastrous economics." 96 In some respects, these descrip-
tions are accurate. The shortcomings of the Concorde are attributable, 
in part, to the limited passenger load and to the conservative approach 
followed in the design. For the first really operable supersonic 
transport, this design approach was probably in order. The balance of 
the shortcomings are in the minds of those who are not ready for the 
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supersonic transport. An airplane can hardly be a success if its 
operators have to fight endless legal and political battles to secure land-
ing rights in American airports that have previously been open or if 
they must fight a mob that is resisting the plane's approach by lying 
down on the runway. 
The fact remains that, in its first 3 years of operation, the Concorde 
carried 400 000 passengers over 25 million miles and accumulated 
nearly 30 000 flying hours. 91 In the next 3 years, these numbers trebled 
as the Concordes accumulated nearly 100 000 hours of passenger serv-
ice. This record was achieved without a serious accident and with very 
low utilization because of limited landing rights. 
Although many feel that the Concorde program proved to be 
economically disastrous, 98 the technical achievement of the Concorde 
is best summarized by the words of Goeffrey Knight: 
Technically, Concorde's-is a triumphant story. Apart from the American 
space programme, .1 can think of no other aircraft project involving high 
technology that has come through with such success. We are probing the fron-
tiers of knowledge all the time, and advanced the state of our art at every 
stage.°9 
The American SST program was canceled after 8 years without the 
construction or flight of a prototype. The Soviet Union's SST program 
is essentially at "parade rest" after the construction and flight of eight to 
ten aircraft. Sixteen Concordes were built by the British and French 
before the assembly lines were closed. Only the state-owned airlines of 
the participating countries purchased the Concorde, and it is the only 
SST currently in regular passenger service. How long it can maintain 
this service is yet to be determined. 
Why have these three advanced aircraft programs, launched with 
such high expectations and with the support of their respective govern-
ments, failed to really open up the era of supersonic cruise flight? Are 
there some lessons to be learned from the essential failure of these pro-
grams? 
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Lessons Learned in Pre-1972 
Supersonic Cruise Experience 
Over the past 35 years, four of the world's most advanced 
technological nations—Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States—have mounted concerted efforts to develop long-
range supersonic airplanes. It was once anticipated that these efforts 
would lead to the wide use of supersonic transport airplanes by the 
early 1970s. In reality, only the British/French Concorde has achieved 
a modicum of success, and this success has been tempered by the fact 
that only a few of these airplanes were built and that no replacement 
aircraft or advanced supersonic transport is under serious considera-
tion. Although the Concorde is an outstanding technical achievement, 
its current limited-passenger service certainly does not represent the 
anticipated coming of the era of supersonic commercial air transporta-
tion. 
In spite of large expenditures of time and money, the efforts to 
develop an environmentally acceptable, economically competitive 
supersonic transport have not been successful. Even with this lack of 
success, however, perhaps some important lessons can be learned from 
the efforts. Some of these "lessons learned" are now discussed, not 
necessarily in order of importance. 
THE MILITARY/COMMERCIAL DIFFERENCE 
Each of the efforts to develop a successful SST took considerably 
longer than expected—even the American effort that did not result in a 
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flight vehicle. Also, each of the programs led to substantially higher ex-
penditures than were estimated at the outset. A contributing factor in 
the underestimation of the time and costs of commercial SST develop-
ment was the overly optimistic projection of the value of supersonic 
military flight experience. All of the nations involved in attempts to 
develop a commercial SST had constructed and flown experimental 
and military supersonic airplanes. This flight experience had, in fact, 
provided the data that suggested the feasibility of supersonic commer-
cial flight. And, of course, the engineers involved in the development of 
SSTs were aware of differences between military and commercial 
supersonic flight. It is doubtful, however, that the magnitude of these 
differences was fully understood at the beginning of the SST develop-
ment. 
Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, leader of Lockheed's well known 
"Skunk Works" airplane design team was said to have made the follow-
ing remark, "Give me a big enough engine and I'll design you an iron-
ing board that'!! fly." '°° This statement, whether actually made or not, 
leans toward a representation of the design philosophy followed in 
many of the early military supersonic airplanes. Most of these 
airplanes were designed for maneuverability, high rates of climb, and 
short-range flight at supersonic speeds. The engines were sized to pro-
vide performance rather than efficiency, and little attention was given 
to noise or other environmental factors. Extended ranges were made 
possible by aerial refueling or flight at subsonic speeds, recourses that 
would not be desirable in a commercial SST from safety and economic 
considerations. 
The nearest military prototype for a commercial SST was the 
American B-70 bomber. In the design of this airplane, efforts were 
made to achieve the high levels of supersonic cruise efficiency demand-
ed of a commercial SST. However, no attempt was made to meet en-
vironmental constraints or economic requirements. The B-70 did not 
have to operate in the strict environment of a commercial airport, did 
not have to meet the reserve fuel requirements of an SST, and was not 
designed for the 50 000 hours of life expected of a commercial 
transport. In addition, the B-70 operation was not threatened by sonic 
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boom restrictions. Thus, the critical elements in SST design—
economics, airport performance, reserve fuel requirements, airplane 
life, and sonic boom—were not controlling elements in the design of 
the B-70, nor have they been in any other military design. 
With the cancellation of the B-70 program, there was no longer any 
supersonic military airplane that even remotely resembled the design 
and operating requirements of an SST. The bulk of the supersonic 
military airplanes spend only a few minutes of each mission at the sear-
ing temperatures experienced at high-speed flight conditions. On the 
other hand, the SST would be bathed in temperatures of one to two 
times the boiling point of water for nearly 3 hours on an intercontinen-
tal flight. At Mach 2.7 cruise conditions, for example, the nose of the 
proposed Boeing SST would have been 6 inches longer than when it 
was sitting on the ground. This heat-expansion problem, not present in 
most military airplanes, forced Boeing to consider abandoning the 
traditional primary cable control system in favor of a triply redundant 
electrical command or fly-by-wire system with cable backup. 10 
The pilot and crew of supersonic military airplanes are provided 
with pressure suits for protection against sudden decompression at high 
altitudes. Such protection would not be practical nor acceptable for 200 
to 300 passengers on an SST flight. Accordingly, the SST structure has 
to provide a fail-safe protection against rapid decompression, an event 
that would bring quick death to the passengers from ebullism— boiled 
blood—at an altitude of 60 000 feet. At this altitude, there would not 
be time to reach for the oxygen mask. 102 
In the development of commercial subsonic transports, the step from 
military to commercial application was small. In some cases, par-
ticularly in the era of propeller-driven airplanes, the transition was 
essentially direct. Approximately 25 000 hours of subsonic jet bomber 
cruise experience preceded the first American commercial subsonic jet 
transport design—the Boeing 707.103 This has not been the case in the 
supersonic speed regime. The military design criteria for aerodynamic 
performance, structures, and operations have been so different from 
the criteria required for an acceptable SST that little technology 
transfer has been possible, except in the propulsion area.
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A SUCCESSFUL SST WILL PERMIT LITTLE ROOM 
FOR DESIGN COMPROMISE 
Past experience indicates that there will be little room for design 
compromises in the development of a successful SST. To meet the 
stringent environmental constraints of noise, sonic boom, and pollu-
tion in a safe, economically competitive SST will require the best possi-
ble combination of aerodynamic, structural, and propulsion 
technologies. Isolated advances in the disciplinary technologies are 
meaningless unless they can be integrated into a congruent airplane 
that meets all mission requirements. 
Technology integration is important in the development of aircraft 
for any flight speed. Disciplinary technology advances are not 
automatically applicable to any airplane until a careful integration 
study is made, particularly in the case of supersonic airplane design. 
The performance of all elements of the design are interrelated, and 
these interrelationships are as important in the overall design as the 
basic elements. For example, the placement of engines on a supersonic 
airplane not only affects the performance of the engines, but also affects 
the aerodynamic and structural design and performance of the 
airplane. Similarly, the structural design influences aerodynamic per-
formance, and aerodynamic characteristics and flight speed are critical 
in the structural design and material selection. The miscalculation or 
simplification of any of these mutual interactions can lead to a failure to 
meet the overall airplane requirements. 
Commenting about the British/French and American SST design 
approaches, Dr. A. E. Russell of the Bristol Aircraft Company re-
marked, "The Mach 2 solution offers close competition on similar 
financial arrangements [to the subsonics] while the Mach 3 hotrod 
needs a very indulgent backer and an uninhibited operator. . . ." 104 In 
their decision to develop an aluminum Mach 2 SST with a simplified 
ogee-delta wing, the British and French perhaps knowingly com-
promised aerodynamic potential in return for a measure of confidence 
in structural design and projected costs. In spite of this conservative ap-
proach, however, the Concorde development did not go as planned. 
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Entry into flight service took 50 percent longer than anticipated, and 
the project ran up costs 10 times the original estimate. Without 
depreciating the 'technical achievement embodied in the Concorde, the 
limited range/payload capability and marginal aerodynamic potential 
were factors that led to the lukewarm acceptance of the airplane by the 
world's airline operators. 
In further commenting about the American effort to develop an SST 
somewhat faster than the Concorde, Dr. Russell said, "The advocates 
of Mach 3 airliners seem to be confronted by a formidable array of self-
inflicted difficulty!" 105 Although the final choice of cruise speed for the 
proposed American SST was only Mach 2.7, the U.S. design was at 
the opposite extreme from the Concorde in that no element of the 
design could be considered conservative. The higher temperatures at 
Mach 2.7 made it necessary to switch from aluminum —a material that 
had been used on nearly all the previous transport airplanes. The com-
plicated variable-sweep feature of the proposed American SST was 
chosen in a conscious effort to achieve flexibility of operation and op-
timum aerodynamic performance, but this feature also posed structural 
design and weight problems of uncertain magnitude. The Boeing 
Airplane Company made a concentrated effort over 2 years to reap the 
potential aerodynamic advantages of variable sweep. As Fortune 
magazine reported: 
Boeing Co.'s attempt to build a supersonic airliner has turned out to be the 
most bafflingly complicated job of research and development in the history of 
American industry—and it may end up the costliest. The undertaking has 
come to demand engineering resources, human and inanimate, second only 
to those going into the national effort to put a man on the moon. During the 
five years that Boeing has been engaged in this task on a significant scale— the 
last two at maximum effort—the company has run up 30,000 hours of 
research on eight different wind tunnels scattered across the nation, 80,000 
hours of analysis on computers that include the largest in existence and a total 
of 8V2 million engineering man-hours altogether—all this to the end of reduc-
ing the Boeing vision of the SST engineering drawings from which the shop 
can begin to fabricate a prototype. °5 
In spite of this effort, the potential aerodynamic advantages of variable 
sweep could not be reconciled with the structural and weight uncertain-
ties, and the concept was dropped from SST consideration.
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It should be pointed out that there is nothing wrong with the ogee-
delta-wing concept of the Concorde or the variable-sweep feature pro-
posed on the Boeing B-2707 SST. The delta wing has been successfully 
used on supersonic military airplaines such as the F-102, F-15, and 
B-58 and on several foreign military aircraft. Similarly, the variable-
sweep wing idea is used in the United States on the F- Ill, F-14, and 
B-i airplanes and in the Soviet Union on several military airplanes. 
However, none of these aircraft are required to meet the operating and 
economic requirements of the SST. Successful application of a dis-
ciplinary concept to one mission did not guarantee its useful applica-
tion to an SST mission. 
The lesson—the importance of technology integration—learned in 
past SST experience was a principal element in the NASA SCR pro-
gram that will be discussed later. 
U.S. Air Force B-I variable-sweep bomber made by Rockwell International. 
THE VALUE OF FOCUSED TECHNOLOGY EFFORTS 
We sometimes like to believe that most of America's advances in the 
science of high-speed flight have resulted from "basic disciplinary re-
search" conducted in a laboratory atmosphere by dedicated scientists 
working at the outer fringes of the state of the art. As a matter of fact, 
this is not the case. American "advanced fundamental basic aeronauti-
cal research" provided a totally inadequate foundation for the era of 
70
LESSONS LEARNED IN PRE-1972 EXPERIENCE 
transonic and supersonic flight that exploded upon us in the 1940s. 
Aeronautical testing methods in the transonic and supersonic speed 
regimes were crude and inadequate; there were no reliable methods for 
transonic and supersonic design and analysis; and U.S. technology of 
turbojet engines was essentially a "buy in" from our British allies. In 
March 1941, because of reports of German research into reaction 
powerplants, the Army requested that NACA study jet propulsion. 
The Army Air Corps chief, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, 
journeyed to Great Britain, where he was surprised to learn that the 
British were preparing to flight-test a turbojet engine, the Whittle 
W-1. He subsequently arranged for the development of the Whittle 
engine in this country by the General Electric Company.107 
While moving rather slowly in the basic research mode, U.S. 
technology of high-speed flight made rapid advances under the focus 
and urgency of America's efforts to "break the sound barrier" and later 
under the focus of efforts to develop a commercial SST. Within a 
relatively short time, U.S. engineers and scientists had solved testing 
problems at transonic speeds, developed methods for use in the design 
and analysis of high-speed airplanes, improved the facilities for testing 
at supersonic speeds, developed a fairly complete understanding of 
sonic boom, and launched a comprehensive technology program for 
improving the performance of jet engines. 
Note also that America's basic space technology was unsuccessful in 
developing and launching a Vanguard satellite in 1957 during the In-
ternational Geophysical Year program. Under the leadership of a 
former German scientist, Dr. Wernher von Braun, and using German 
technology (Jupiter C modified intermediate range ballistic missile), 
America's first space satellite, the Explorer, was successfully launched 
in 1958. After that, with the focus of a national space program, U.S. 
engineers made rapid and remarkable strides in space technology. 
As a result of recognition of the importance and value of focused 
technology efforts, this approach was followed in the NASA Supersonic 
Cruise Research (SCR) and Variable Cycle Engine (VCE) programs 
to be discussed later.
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U.S. TECHNOLOGY SUBSIDIZATION 
A recent report by the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. 
Congress indicated that "One of the most important lessons learned 
[from the U.S. SST program] is that a genuine and important national 
interest will have to be clearly identified before any future high-
technology large-scale commercial undertaking can expect to receive 
significant Government support in the future." 108 Although this state-
ment is probably true, it serves to point up anomalies in the subsidiza-
tion policies of the U.S. government. 
One of the fastest growing commercial enterprises in America is the 
satellite communications industry. This industry has directly benefited 
from the NASA satellite program and the millions of dollars expended 
on it. The electric power companies have directly benefited from the 
billions of dollars that the U.S. government has spent in developing 
nuclear energy. The U.S. railroads, unable to make it on their own, as 
well as the mass transit systems and the interstate highway network, 
have received billions of dollars in government subsidies over the past 
few years. For years, the U.S. government has provided millions of 
dollars in subsidies to the maritime interests in this country, with the 
stipulation that the ships built can be used by the U.S. military in the 
event of war. Billions of dollars are also spent by the U.S. government 
each year to purchase surplus commodities from the agricultural com-
munity, and additional millions are spent in storage costs for these 
farm products. In addition, the NASA space shuttle, which is under 
development by the government at a projected cost approaching $10 
billion, is expected to have many commercial uses. 
In spite of these obvious subsidies of many commercial ventures, the 
U.S. government has been reluctant to directly participate in the 
development of high-technology commercial airplanes. In fact, in the 
1940s, the U.S. Congress refused to approve funds for constructing a 
subsonic jet transport to meet the challenge of the British Comet. 109 If 
the Comet had not developed problems, this decision could have cost 
the U.S. aircraft industry the tremendous business it now has in sub-
sonic jet transports. The airplane industry is currently one of the 
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largest employers in the nation and has had a long-term positive effect 
on America's balance of trade. The air transportation industry, user of 
airplane industry products, has been a powerful factor in America's rise 
to economic and technological preeminence. It is difficult to under-
stand the political aversion to direct support of these industries. 
Although this aversion was temporarily put aside by President Ken-
nedy and the Congress in 1963 in their support of the U.S. SST pro-
gram, the uncertainty of government support was one of the factors 
that was to plague the effort from start to finish. 
Government funding was only one of the uncertainties that led to the 
cancellation of the U.S. SST program. There were worries about en-
vironmental impact and passenger safety. There were questions about 
radiation and air-traffic control. The airlines did not know if the SST 
would be economically viable or if they could afford such airplanes. 
The airplane manufacturers had committed heavily to the development 
of "wide-body" subsonic jet transports and were concerned that the 
SST would reduce the subsonic market. 
In view of these uncertainties, it was difficult to determine if the 
development of a commercial SST was of genuine and vital importance 
to the interests of the United States. It was purely a matter of semantics 
that the subsidization of an SST was different from that of a commer-
cial railroad, a commercial satellite communications company, or a 
commercial power company. However, Congress certainly could not 
be expected to continue funding the SST when the people who would 
build and use it were negative or ambivalent. '0 
EVOLUTION OF AN ACCEPTABLE SST WILL BE DIFFICULT 
In the advancement of a technology, it is not generally anticipated 
that the prototype of an innovation or improvement in the state of the 
art will provide the ultimate answer in terms of performance. This 
ultimate answer will come after evolutionary refinements and im-
provements in the finished product. However, the prototype is ex-
pected to demonstrate performance and provide a firm basis for future 
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improvements in both performance and costs. This process has been 
followed in the development of the air transportation industry. The 
Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC-8, prototypes of the highly efficient 
subsonic jet transport fleet, represented a revolutionary step in air 
transportation. From these original prototypes, more efficient, more 
productive, more comfortable, and safer subsonic jet transports have 
evolved. 
The experiences of the Concorde and the U.S. SST programs in-
dicate that the evolution of an acceptable SST will be difficult. The 
Concorde represents a technological triumph for its British and French 
developers. However, in the eyes of its potential customers—the 
airlines—the Concorde did not represent a suitable prototype for 
development into a family of advanced SSTs. Consequently, the Con-
corde has not been allowed the evolutionary cycles that were so impor-
tant in the development of subsonic transport technology. In the case of 
the U.S. SST, enough uncertainty existed about the acceptability of 
the design to preclude further funding of the project. 
Almost no one will deny that "the SST presents the greatest 
challenge in aviation history. . . ." " I Consequently, perhaps too 
much was expected of both the Concorde and the American SST pro-
gram. Both programs were conducted during a period of social unrest 
and upheaval, and both efforts sought to bring about a quantum jump 
in the technology of air transportation. Both efforts anticipated that the 
unacceptable prototypes would evolve into acceptable SSTs through 
future advances in technology. Because of the nebulous nature of these 
projected technology advances and the mounting costs of the projects, 
however, the evolutionary phases did not come to pass. 
In any future effort to introduce the SST into the air transportation 
system, it appears that the prototype SST must be acceptable in nearly 
every respect. "There will be no room for unsuspected bugs in the 
SST." There will also be no margin for error, and this is the greatest 
challenge of all, for no commercial airliner ever built has been com-
pletely free from design bugs. 112
 The available technology must be 
more than adequate to sustain the program, and answers to all the 
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uncertainties must be in hand. It is unlikely that an acceptable SST will 
be permitted the luxury of evolving from an unsatisfactory prototype 
base. 
PERCEPTIONS OF A "RAMPANT" TECHNOLOGY 
It is quite possible that the Concorde and the American SST would 
be in wide use today had it not been for a rising sentiment that 
technology had "gone wild." Citizens of the highly developed nations 
were becoming more and more concerned about noise, pollution of 
rivers and the atmosphere, and what they perceived to be a misuse of 
our natural resources. Unchecked technological growth was seen to 
have been responsible for slums, pollution, and even the Vietnam 
War. 113 The SST became a symbol of technical arrogance and an ob-
ject on which anti-technology sentiment could be focused. 
Many people who had gratefully acknowledged and taken advantage 
of great advances in air transportation felt that these advances had 
gone far enough. The horror stories about SST noise, sonic boom, fuel 
use, and atmospheric pollution were enough to convince large 
segments of the population that the SST was a harbinger of 
catastrophe. Anti-SST groups, which began to form in the United 
States and Europe, initiated concerted efforts to stop the Concorde and 
the U.S. SST programs. 
The organized efforts against the SST were perhaps the first 
evidence of a powerful new area of politics—the politics of technology. 
Fundamental to the new politics was the choice that industrial society 
made about what priority it allocated to technical growth and what 
priority it gave to the environment. At stake were such important fac-
tors as the public's right to question governmental decisions in areas 
that might affect drastically the quality of life for everyone.' 4 
The politics of technology, which surfaced while the American SST 
was under development and at about the time the Concorde flight tests 
began, became a factor in these and other technology programs. Efforts 
to develop nuclear energy, to make use of oil shale and coal deposits, to 
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construct oil and gas pipelines, and to search for new mineral deposits 
came into the sphere of the new political force. 
The opponents of the SST had legitimate questions and concerns 
about what the operation of such a vehicle would do to the environ-
ment. They also had legitimate questions as to why the SST was being 
developed and why the governments were paying for it. Unfortunately, 
SST proponents waited too long to face up to these questions. In the 
meantime, the anti-SST forces were providing their own answers, 
which in many cases are now recognized as exaggerations or half-
truths. Consequently, the SST was unable to assume its legitimate role 
as the next revolution in the air transportation industry. Rather, it 
became billed as a development program for the benefit of "jet-set 
playboys and their ladies" 115 and one of the most resented 
technological programs of all time. 
It cannot be stated with certainty that the "politics of technology" led 
to the cancellation of the U.S. SST program or that it has been a factor 
in the reluctant acceptance of the Concorde. However, it is almost 
assuredly true that any future SST effort in this country will be subject 
to this new political force. 
SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
In summary, some of the lessons learned from the pre-1972 super-
sonic cruise experience are as follows: 
• Major differences exist between the technologies required for a 
supersonic military aircraft and an acceptable SST. Aeronautical 
technology that is applicable to supersonic military aircraft may be 
totally useless for a commercial SST. 
• A successful SST will require the best possible combination of 
disciplinary technologies. An exciting technical innovation in one 
discipline is unusable if it cannot be successfully integrated with 
the other disciplines. 
• Focused technology efforts will bring about a more rapid improve-
ment in the aeronautical state of the art than will basic generalized 
research. 
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• U.S. subsidization policies are rife with anomalies. A stronger 
case must be made for the SST or any other high-technology item 
before much government support can be expected. 
• A future evolution of an acceptable SST is not likely. The 
technology for a satisfactory prototype must be in hand, and 
answers to the uncertainties must be available. 
• The politics of technology will be a powerful factor in any future 
high-technology effort. 
These "lessons learned" had an impact on the formulation of the 
NASA post-1972 program in supersonic technology. But, why was 
there a post-1972 NASA supersonic technology program? What were 
the problems to be worked on? After the SST program was canceled, is 
there still some promise in the concept of supersonic cruise flight?
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CHAPTER 7 
Supersonic Cruise Problems 
and Potential 
Senator William Proxmire, an astute politician and outspoken critic 
of U.S. government funding of the SST, said in 1970 that "it seems ut-
ter folly to continue with the production of this plane (the SST) until we 
have developed the technology necessary to make supersonic flight 
compatible with respect for our environment." 116 At the same time, 
Representative Henry Reuss said, "Considering increased airport 
noise, sonic booms, air pollution, and potentially harmful weather 
changes, the SST, for which the American public is being compelled to 
pay, is an environmental outrage." 117 On the other hand, Representa-
tive John McFall commented that, "It seems to me that the SST has 
become a symbol of the need to improve our environment, and in a 
sense it is a false symbol because the SST is really not that important to 
the environment, but it has become sort of a rallying point for those 
who want to improve the environment." 118 
The environmental argument certainly was a factor in the cancella-
tion of the U.S. SST program and the negative acceptance of the Con-
corde. The deeper underlying reason for the failure of the SST, 
however, was the fact that the level of aeronautic technology available 
in the 1960s was not adequate to sustain the development of an 
economical SST. It was expected that, when the SST was under way, 
solutions could be found to the critical technical problems. In the end, 
the SST would meet everyone's concept of what it should be. 
The expectations of the SST proponents and developers were neither 
unreasonable nor unusual. Many high-technology programs had 
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begun with less than all the technical answers to become successful ad-
ditions to the state of the art. However, the lengthy, expensive, and 
sometimes fitful efforts to develop supersonic technology during the 
course of the Concorde and American programs provided arguments 
for SST opponents and detractors. These efforts also served to alienate 
the interest of SST supporters, the people, the governments, and even 
the developers. What are some of these critical technical problems of 
supersonic cruise airplanes? 
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS 
AERODYNAMIC PROBLEMS 
The level of aerodynamic efficiency (lift/drag ratio) at supersonic 
cruise speeds is a critical factor in the performance of a supersonic 
cruise airplane. All other things being equal, the higher the supersonic 
lift/drag ratio, the greater the range potential for a given fuel supply or 
the lesser the fuel requirement for a given range. If no other factors 
were involved, the design with the highest value of supersonic lift/drag 
ratio would lead to the most efficient supersonic cruise airplane. Ac-
cording to all available aerodynamic theories and tests, a supersonic 
design utlizing a highly swept arrow-head wing would provide the 
highest attainable levels of supersonic lift/drag ratio. 
As a matter of fact, the supersonic cruise lift/drag is not the only 
critical aerodynamic factor in the design of a supersonic cruise 
airplane, particularly a commercial SST. An SST is also expected, and 
required, to operate efficiently at subsonic speeds. The reserve fuel re-
quirements—the fuel required for flight to an alternate destination and 
holding for landing clearance—are based mainly on subsonic lift/drag 
ratio. The noise characteristics of the airplane are also related to low-
speed aerodynamic performance. For these low-speed flight conditions, 
theory and experience suggest that a moderately swept-wing design 
provides the highest levels of aerodynamic efficiency. Highly swept 
wings were seen to provide relatively po6r aerodynamic performance in 
this low-speed regime. 
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PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL 
As a possible means of resolving the conflicting wing-sweep re-
quirements in the subsonic and supersonic flight modes of a supersonic 
airplane, NASA proposed the use of variable sweep —a concept that in-
volves altering wing sweep during flight to the most optimum position. 
This concept has been successfully adapted in the design of military air-
craft, in which range/payload performance and efficiency are not 
critical design factors. However, during the SST program, it proved to 
be unfeasible because of weight and integration problems. Both the 
Concorde and the American SST developers finally chose a swept-delta 
or delta-ogee wing design that was a compromise between subsonic and 
supersonic lift/drag ratios. Although understandable, this compromise 
was a limiting factor on the growth potential, range/payload char-
acteristics, and economic feasibility of the two airplanes. Technology 
was not available to permit the achievement of the necessary optimum 
or near-optimum aerodynamic efficiency at supersonic cruise condi-
tions while simultaneously meeting the other design and operating re-
The SCR Aerodynamic "Problem" 
High wing sweep is GOOD at supersonic speeds, BAD subsonically-
it's just the opposite for low wing sweep. 
WiMm 
Subsonic	 Supersonic 
Mach Number 
Supersonic cruise aircraft aerodynamic "problem."
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quirements. The development of this high lift/drag (arrow-wing) 
technology could dramatically improve SST performance. 
PROPULSION SYSTEM PROBLEMS. 
In developing a propulsion system for supersonic cruise airplanes, 
the engine designer runs into the same incompatible flight conditions 
faced by the aerodynamicist. At supersonic speeds, engine thrust or 
power is provided most efficiently by .
 moving a relatively small volume 
of air at high velocities, a characteristic of the straight turbojet engine. 
At subsonic speeds, however, it is more efficient, and quieter, to move 
a larger volume of air at fairly low velocities, a feature of the turbofan 
engine. For application to an SST, a turbojet engine sized to give op-
timum performance at supersonic speeds does not provide adequate 
thrust at takeoff and during climb conditions. The turbojet also re-
quires more fuel for subsonic overland operations and for alternate 
Problem 1.: The turbojet engine is more 
efficient than high-bypass turbofan at 
supersonic cruise conditions, but high. 
bypass turbofan is more efficient for 
subsonic operations.
Problem 2.: High jet-velocity turbojet 
engine is desirable for supersonic cruise 
but is noisy around the airport. The 
inverted velocity profile (VP) coannular 
nozzle illustrated in inset is a character-
istic of VCEs and gives inherent noise 
relief. 
Bypass Ratioc	 Jet Velocity (=> 
Supersonic cruise aircraft propulsion "problem." 
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field and "hold" reserves than the turbofan. On the other hand, a tur-
bofan engine would be quieter than a turbojet engine, but would re-
quire more fuel for the critical supersonic cruise condition. The tur-
bofan engine also requires a larger diameter, with increased drag, than 
the turbojet to provide the same thrust level. 
Turbojet engines were selected for both the Concorde and the U.S. 
SST because of their more efficient performance at the critical super-
sonic cruise conditions. Afterburners were incorporated to augment the 
basic engine thrust for takeoff, climb, and acceleration to cruise speed 
and altitude. The afterburner essentially increased the basic jet exit 
velocity and, hence, thrust by burning fuel in a duct at the rear of the 
engine. The afterburner proved to be a noisy way to produce thrust 
and made it unlikely that either the Concorde or the U.S. SST could 
meet the new Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR), part 36, noise rule 
enacted by the FAA in 1969. In the latter stages of the American pro-
gram, an oversized nonafterburning turbojet engine was considered in 
an effort to meet this new noise rule. The weight and size of the engine 
had a catastrophic effect on the American design. In the belief that the 
FAR 36 noise rule would not be applied to an airplane already under 
development, the Concorde retained the afterburning turbojet engine. 
The afterburning turbojet engine has been the major powerplant for 
supersonic military airplanes for which engine noise and subsonic flight 
efficiency are not primary design parameters. Large turbofan engines 
are now used almost exclusively on subsonic jet transports because of 
their superior noise characteristics and subsonic fuel efficiency. 
Because a commercial SST must operate efficiently at both subsonic 
and supersonic speeds, it could use an engine that incorporates the best 
features of the turbojet and turbofan engines. This technology was not 
available during the SST program, and the turbojet engine with after-
burner was selected as the best compromise. 
Other technical problems in the propulsion discipline impacted the 
development of an SST. For example, the inlet is as critical to engine 
performance as the engine itself. Unless the inlet can deliver air to the 
engine in an efficient manner, the engine cannot perform efficiently on 
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an overall basis. The nozzle, or engine exit, also contributes important-
ly to propulsion system performance and noise. Both the inlet and noz-
zle, as well as the engine itself, require a high degree of control for 
maximum performance. Although considerable work was done on inlet 
and nozzle configurations during the SST program, further intense ef-
fort was required, particularly with a new engine cycle. Questions also 
remained about engine emissions and pollution, particularly on after-
burning engines. This problem became a critical issue in the latter 
stages of the U.S. SST program, when fear was expressed that nitric 
oxide (NO) emissions from SST engines would seriously deplete the 
protective ozone layer in the atmosphere and lead to a substantial in-
crease in skin cancer. The technology was not available to allay these 
fears or to effectively reduce the emission levels. 
STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS PROBLEMS 
Structures and materials technology for building supersonic air-
planes was certainly available in the 1960s. A number of supersonic 
military airplanes were already in service, and an advanced titanium 
supersonic reconnaissance airplane, the SR-71, was under develop-
ment. As the SST program proceeded, it became readily apparent that 
the structural design of an SST presents different challenges than the 
design of a military airplane and has more impact on the acceptability 
of performance. Structural materials are also used differently on an 
SST than on a military aircraft. 
The structure of a military airplane is usually rigid because of the re-
quirements of maneuverability. The weight, safety, and cost of the 
structure are important, but have no direct bearing on whether the air-
craft is considered satisfactory for its design mission. On the other 
hand, the structure of an SST is generally quite flexible because it has 
no harsh maneuver requirement and because the structure is usually 
lightly loaded. The weight, safety, and cost of the structure are ex-
tremely important factors in the acceptability and economic perform-
ance of an SST. 
Because of the flexible nature of SST structure, the relationship be-
tween structural and aerodynamic design is very important. The differ-
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ing aerodynamic forces during the takeoff, subsonic cruise, climb and 
acceleration, and supersonic phases of flight alter the shape of the flexi-
ble structure. The shape of the structure in turn influences the 
aerodynamic forces. An accurate assessment of these mutual interac-
tions is necessary for achieving an optimum overall design. 
During the course of the SST program, supersonic structural design 
methods were available. These methods were cumbersome and time 
consuming, however. It was not unusual to make a configuration 
change that was expected to improve performance, only to find that an 
adverse weight increase due to the configuration change had canceled 
the anticipated improvement. 
Another structures problem exposed by the SST effort was the 
absence of well-defined, low-cost fabrication for supersonic high-
strength aluminum and titanium structures. The mounting costs of the 
development phases of the Concorde and the U.S. SST were 
significantly affected by fabrication cost, and the projected production 
costs made the SST a questionable economic venture. 
The U.S. decision to develop a Mach 2.7 SST posed a materials 
problem that was not present in the Concorde program. At the higher 
temperatures experienced at Mach 2.7 flight conditions, the available 
technology for necessary nonmetallic materials such as fuel-tank 
sealants was inadequate. This problem had not been resolved at the 
time the American SST program was canceled. 
TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION PROBLEMS 
The pre-1972 supersonic cruise experience indicated the overwhelm-
ing importance of technology integration in developing a successful 
SST. Perhaps no other high-technology program besides the SST has 
been considered unsuccessful when its performance goals have been 
met. The Concorde essentially met its design expectations in aero-
dynamic performance, structural weight, propulsion system efficiency, 
safety, noise, sonic boom, etc. However, many consider the airplane to 
be a failure because the levels of technology, although successfully 
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employed, were not adequate to make the Concorde an economical 
transportation system. 
The American SST program was unsuccessful because the advanced 
levels of technology employed were never integrated into a coherent 
airplane. The complicated variable-sweep and highly swept arrow-
wing concepts offered dazzling advantages in aerodynamic perform-
ance, but the structural design methods and materials were not 
available to make them work within acceptable weight limitations. The 
relatively simple structural concepts of the delta wing offered fantastic 
weight advantages, but had insufficient aerodynamic potential to 
promise more than a marginal SST. Propulsion systems that offered 
optimum performance at supersonic speeds were not very good at sub-
sonic speeds, and vice versa. 
The experiences of both SST programs indicate that the develop-
ment of a successful supersonic transport will depend more on the ad-
vancement of the state of the art of integrated technology than on the 
advancements in the separate disciplinary technologies. In the least, 
the disciplinary technologies must be developed within the focus of the 
integrated airplane and mission requirements. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
The pre-1972 supersonic cruise experience exposed a number of en-
vironmental problems that were either critical to the acceptability of 
the SST or unanswered by its proponents. The major environmental 
issues associated with the SST were: 
• Engine noise 
• Sonic boom 
• Engine emissions 
• Radiation exposure. 
Although only two of these issues—engine noise and sonic 
boom—proved to be significant, all of the environmental questions 
merit consideration and will be factors in any future SST effort. Some 
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people consider the anxiety and uncertainty caused by these en-
vironmental issues to be the factors that finally led to the cancellation of 
the American SST effort. 
ENGINE NOISE 
Any piece of machinery that produces work, power, or any other 
useful product creates noise. The SST engines would certainly be no 
exception. Each of the four Concorde engines produce on the order of 
35 000 to 40 000 pounds of thrust at takeoff, and the four engines on 
the U.S. SST would have produced about 60 000 pounds of thrust 
each. Both the British/French and U.S. engines made use of after-
burners, and both engines were developed before the promulgation of 
the FAR 36 noise rules in 1969. Neither engine could meet the noise 
rules, but it was generally believed that the noise rules would be waived 
since both SST programs had been initiated before the rules were 
adopted. 
In the early 1970s, the support for the American SST was waning, 
and the Concorde was undergoing flight tests. At this time, public sen-
timent, driven by widely held perceptions that all jet aircraft are noisy, 
began to swing heavily against the noise that was to come from the 
SST. In an effort to win support for the flagging American effort, a 
belated attempt was made to bring the proposed U.S. SST within the 
1969 noise rules. To do this would require the development of a new 
engine, a further delay in the program, and substantially more money. 
This gambit did not work, and the Concorde developers were left to 
fight the SST noise battles. 
By the time the U.S. SST program was canceled in 1971, it was too 
late for the Concorde to meet the new noise rules. The airplane was 
under construction, and it proposed to fly in the face of the rising 
public clamor over SST noise. The Concorde developers maintained 
that the Concorde noise would be no worse than that of the early sub-
sonic jet transports, which were still in use throughout the United 
States, Europe, and the rest of the world. Although the Concorde 
essentially produced the same levels of noise as the early transports, the 
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stance of the Concorde developers led to a showdown with the 
American public in 1977 when the Concorde sought landing rights in 
the United States. After a great furor, the Concorde was granted a 
16-month trial period to operate into and out of the Dulles Airport in 
Washington, D.C., and, later, to John F. Kennedy Airport in New 
York City. Since the hectic public demonstrations died down after the 
first few Concorde flights, little has been said about Concorde noise. 
Because of its unique operating capabilities to climb and turn away 
from the heavily populated regions, the Concorde has added very little 
to the noise exposure of the citizens of Washington, D.C., or New York 
City. 
Even though the SST has not been the noise "monster" that many 
people expected it to be, noise is one of the major technical problems to 
be solved before any future generation of SSTs will be acceptable. An 
aircraft engine, or any other machine, cannot be expected to produce 
60 000 to 70 000 pounds of useful force without producing noise. 
However, it is possible to reduce the noise levels substantially below 
those of the first generation SST without compromising the ability to 
meet other SST requirements. 
A NEW SOUND BARRIER-THE SONIC BOOM 
When Chuck Yeager broke the so-called "sound barrier" with his 
flight in 1947, he introduced the world to an even more intractable bar-
rier to acceptable supersonic flight—the sonic boom. This nerve-
shattering disturbance created a ground swell of resentment toward 
supersonic flight and represents one of the most difficult aeronautical 
problems to be faced by the technical community. 
The sonic boom is essentially a direct result of supersonic flight. 
Disturbances in air can travel only at the speed of sound and, hence, 
cannot move ahead of an aircraft that is traveling at supersonic speeds. 
Consequently, a sharp pressure pulse forms and is swept behind the 
airplane to form a conical surface in which the pressure and 
temperature are locally higher than in the surrounding air. This con-
ical surface follows the supersonic aircraft along its flight path. When a 
point on this conical surface passes over an observer on the ground, 
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The sonic boom pressure disturbance, Ap, is a constant companion of 
an airplane in supersonic flight and was one of the major environmental 
concerns of the SST program. The furor caused by this phenomenon 
led to the passage of an operating rule that forbade commercial super-
sonic flights over the continental limits of the United States. As indicated 
by the inset sketch, the large size of the SST permits it to retain the 
"near-field" characteristics at the ground. For many flight conditions, 
the SST sonic boom levels can be reduced by shaping the airplane. 
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there is a rapid increase in pressure, which the observer perceives as a 
boom. 119 The level of sonic boom expected of SSTs was 2 to 3 psf, 
which represents a rather miniscule change in the ambient pressure at 
sea level of 2116 psf. The abrupt nature of the pressure disturbance 
startles the observer, and this is the factor that makes the sonic boom 
such an environmental nuisance. The sonic boom levels created by an 
SST are not expected to cause any appreciable property damage.120 
In the early phases of the U.S. SST program, the permissable sonic 
boom levels for an SST were set at 2 psf in the climb and acceleration 
phase of flight and 1.5 psf at supersonic cruise conditions. These 
restrictions severely affected the ability of the SST evaluation airplanes 
to make a reasonable range/payload mission. Consequently, the sonic 
boom restrictions were relaxed to a level of 2.5 psI during climb and ac-
celeration and 1.7 psf at cruise. The public fears over sonic boom con-
tinued, however, and some people expected the SST program to be 
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canceled because of sonic boom considerations alone. To allay these 
fears, and perhaps to save the program, Congress passed a law in 1971 
prohibiting supersonic flights of civil aircraft over the continental 
United States. This law, which is still in effect, made the potential 
American SST a strictly over-water airplane with a more restricted 
market. 
The sonic boom is an irreversible fact of supersonic flight. 121 Means 
have been found to reduce the levels of sonic boom caused by a large 
supersonic aircraft and to alter the shape of the disturbance.122 
However, no realistic ways have been discovered to eliminate the 
disturbance completely. This problem remains a challenging technical 
goal. 
ENGINE EMISSIONS 
In the early 1970s, shortly before the SST program was canceled, 
there was concern that the engine emissions from a fleet of supersonic 
transports would have a drastic adverse effect on the chemistry of the 
upper atmosphere. The greatest of these fears was that the nitrous 
oxide emissions would deplete the ozone in the atmosphere, reduce the 
shielding from the Sun's ultraviolet rays, and thus cause an increase in 
the incidence of skin cancer. This concern, originally directed at the 
anticipated supersonic aircraft, spread to the potential impact of the 
growing fleet of subsonic aircraft.123 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, these concerns led the U.S. Congress to 
instruct the Department of Transportation (DOT) to conduct a scien-
tific study that would provide information for assessing the potential 
ozone-depletion effects. This major study, the Climatic Impact Assess-
ment Program (ClAP), drew on nine other Federal departments and 
agencies, seven foreign agencies, and the individual talents of 1000 in-
vestigators. The results of this study were not conclusive because of the 
simplified atmospheric models that were available. Indications were, 
however, that the first generation of SSTs would cause climatic effects 
that are much smaller than those minimally detectable. The report 
went on to say that if high-flying aircraft (including subsonic aircraft) 
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increase greatly in number beyond the year 1980, improvements over 
1974 propulsion technology will be necessary to ensure that emissions 
do not significantly disturb the stratospheric environment .124 
A subsequent High Altitude Pollution Program (HAPP), conducted 
by the FAA, indicated that the earlier DOT ClAP study had substan-
tially exaggerated the extent to which future aircraft will reduce the 
ozone layer. Present understanding of the phenomena indicates much 
smaller impacts and perhaps no net impact at all. 25 Encouraging as 
these results may be, the question of atmospheric pollution by air 
transport engines will continue to be raised. The technical challenge is 
to continue to search for and find means for reducing the levels of 
undesirable engine emissions. 
RADIATION EXPOSURE 
Because supersonic transports will cruise at higher altitudes than 
previous commercial aircraft, there will be less atmosphere to filter out 
radiation from outer space. This opens the possibility that the crew of 
an SST might undergo excessive radiation exposure. It may be ra-
tionalized that the SST crew will be exposed to more intense radiation 
over shorter periods because of the higher speed and reduced trip time 
for a given flight. This factor would tend to compensate and equalize 
the total radiation exposure of supersonic and subsonic crews. The best 
evidence to date is that such radiation exposure will not exceed permit-
ted occupational levels.126 
OTHER SUPERSONIC CRUISE PROBLEMS 
Several other problems were evidenced by the prior supersonic 
cruise experience, such as fuel usage, cost, economics, and air-traffic 
control. These factors are almost directly related to the status of 
technology and the severity of the environmental restraints. These 
issues will have to be considered in any future supersonic transport 
program.
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SUPERSONIC CRUISE POTENTIAL 
As technical problems and environmental issues eroded support for 
the U.S. SST program in the early 1970s, the real reasons and poten-
tial for supersonic cruise flight were obscured in the conflict that even-
tually led to program cancellation. Many of the arguments that had 
been used to sustain the program either were proven false or were 
much less important than had previously been claimed. Other support-
ive arguments were difficult for the average person to understand and, 
hence, were not helpful in bringing public support to the program. 
Among the arguments used to support the development of a U.S. 
SST were: 
• National prestige/foreign competition 
• Technological fallout 
• Employment 
• Balance of trade 
• Increased airline productivity. 
NATIONAL PRESTIGE/FOREIGN COMPETITION 
Both the NASA and FAA recommendations for a national SST pro-
gram cited prestige and the threat of foreign competition as major 
reasons for initiating such a program. At the time these arguments 
were used, they were probably valid. If either or both of the foreign 
SST efforts were to result in a viable supersonic transport, it was in the 
interest of the United States to do likewise. However, it is almost ax-
iomatic that prestige and foreign competition are not normally suffi-
cient motivation for a commercial venture. This sort of venture is 
usually made to capture and sustain a market for the product and to 
make a profit. Certainly, the British/French consortium and the Soviet 
Union introduced their programs in an effort to recapture some of the 
air transportation market that they had lost to the United States. 
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When it began to appear that neither the British/French nor the 
Soviet SST programs would be economically successful, the arguments 
about national prestige and foreign competition were no longer able to 
generate support for the U.S. SST program. Even so, the answers to 
this argument are probably not all in as yet. By carrying their respec-
tive SST programs to flight hardware, the foreign nations have gained 
a mass of supersonic experience that is not available to the United 
States. 
TECHNOLOGICAL FALLOUT 
A major argument of SST proponents was that an American SST ef-
fort would provide a technological fallout that would be valuable to the 
aircraft industry in general and to other industrial and military applica-
tions.' 27
 This had certainly been the case in other high-technology ven-
tures. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the focus of the SST program 
provided major improvements in the state of the art in supersonic 
design and analysis, sonic boom, supersonic propulsion, structures and 
materials, advanced navigation systems, etc. Completion of the SST 
program to prototype flights would probably have brought further 
technological gains. However, if the major goal—a viable SST—is not 
attained, the technology fallout would probably not be worth the ex-
pense of the program. A costly program cannot be sustained on the 
basis of technology fallout alone. 
EMPLOYMENT 
Proponents of the SST cited the favorable effect on employment as a 
principal reason for continuing the SST program. It was claimed that 
the U.S. SST program would provide a direct labor force of 50 000 
highly skilled jobs with potential application throughout the United 
States. Taking into account the multiplier factor, the SST program 
could have more reasonably affected 150 000 jobs. 128 
Although everyone was in favor of employment, it was easy to say 
that these workers could be applied to programs of more value than 
that of the SST. On a few occasions, the United States has instituted 
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programs for the major purpose of providing employment. One of 
these was the Work Projects Administration (WPA) during the depres-
sion of the early 1930s. The U.S. government has also awarded high-
technology programs to companies in regions of high unemployment. 
However, no expensive high-technology effort has been either started 
or maintained on the basis of the employment it would provide. 
BALANCE OF TRADE 
The U.S. balance-of-trade argument for the SST was one of the 
most difficult arguments for the public to understand. Figures were 
quoted on U.S. balance of trade both with and without an American 
SST, with and without an advanced Concorde, with and without a suc-
cessful Soviet TU-144, and nearly every combination in between. The 
impacts ranged from a positive U.S. trade balance of $16.6 billion if 
the United States would compete with an advanced Concorde to a 
negative U.S. trade balance of $18.7 billion if we would not compete 
with the Concorde, a total swing of $35.3 billion.129 
These balance-of-trade figures became moot when the Concorde 
program proved to be less than successful, and no plans for the 
development of an advanced Concorde became apparent. Many peo-
ple assumed, with relief, that the relative economic failure of the Con-
corde would remove the need for any further consideration of the in-
fluence of the SST on U.S. trade balance. This assumption represented 
a subtle change in the U.S. reaction to foreign competition. When the 
British Comet subsonic jet program faltered in the 1950s, the American 
aircraft industry moved in with subsonic jet transports, which subse-
quently captured the largest part of the subsonic jet transport market. 
Foreign sales of these early jet transports and derivatives have con-
sistently provided the most favorable positive effect on the U.S. 
balance of trade. On the other hand, when the Concorde program 
faltered, many in the United States dropped the SST and went on to 
other pursuits. It is difficult to assess what would have happened if the 
U.S. airplane industry would have been ready to move in with a 
superior SST. 
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It is also difficult to make a meaningful balance-of-trade argument 
based on assumptions of any number of predicted events happening, 
estimating a number of future markets for airplanes of unknown 
characteristics, etc. One thing is certain, however. The U.S. airplane 
industry is one of our greatest assets and has been one of the major 
positive factors in the foreign balance of trade. It is to the advantage of 
the U.S. government and the American people that this industry re-
main competitive. 
INCREASED AIRLINE PRODUCTIVITY 
A recent report published by the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) of the U.S. Congress stated as one of its findings that "The most 
compelling argument for an advanced supersonic transport is im-
proved productivity - seat-miles generated by an aircraft per unit 
time." 130 Other than the SST advantages of improved comfort and 
reduced trip time, the OTA statement might be carried further to say 
that there is no real reason for an advanced SST unless it provides in-
creased productivity within desired economic and environmental constraints. This 
is the true goal of supersonic cruise flight and the challenge of super-
sonic technology. 
Over the past 50 years, the demand for commercial air transporta-
tion has increased at a phenomenal rate. In the United States alone, 
the demand grew from 93 million revenue-passenger-miles (rpm) in 
1930 to nearly 163 billion rpm in 1975. This represents a remarkable 
1750-fold increase in air traffic during the period. Perhaps the most 
astonishing aspect of the air transportation growth picture is that only a 
4.5-fold increase in the number of transport airplanes has been re-
quired to meet this 1750-fold increase in air travel demand. Until now, 
the U.S. airplane -and propulsion companies, unfettered by the size, 
speed, and utilization limitations that have led to the decline of the 
ship, train, and motorbus as principal intercity carriers, have met this 
increasing travel demand by providing successive generations of more 
productive air transports. The continuous evolution of these advanced, 
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more productive air transports has successfully prevented air transpor-
tation from entering the period of stagnation and decline experienced 
by other commercial transportation systems. 
Productivity has become a widely used yardstick for measuring prog-
ress. The Gross National Product (GNP), as well as the rate of growth 
of the GNP, of the United States, for example, is closely followed by 
economists. The continuous aim of the U.S. industry is to increase the 
amount of a given product that is created per unit cost. There is no par-
ticular gain to the industry, or the country, if twice the manpower, 
twice the time, or twice the cost is required to generate twice the 
product. 
The product of any transportation system is revenue-passenger-
miles, and the major measurement of the progress of the.system is the 
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improvement in product per unit of time or per unit of equipment. For 
an individual transportation unit or for the entire transportation fleet, 
the product can be written: 
PRODUCT (rpm) = Revenue Passengers x Speed (mph) x Hours 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of this equation (revenue 
passenger miles per hour) is considered to be the productivity of the 
given unit or fleet. 
In the foregoing equation, the Revenue Passengers term is related to the 
size of the transportation unit or fleet, since the larger the unit or fleet 
the greater the number of revenue passengers that can be transported. 
The Speed term is simply the velocity at which the revenue passengers 
are transported, and the Hours term is the number of hours that the 
unit or fleet is operated during the period that the PRODUCT is to be 
measured. The fleet total hours can be increased by improving the 
utilization of a given unit or by providing more units. Thus, we can say 
that the principal elements of the PRODUCT of a transportation 
system are size, speed, and utilization hours. 
In the past, the U.S. aircraft industry has met the need for im-
provements in fleet product or productivity by making simultaneous 
increases in size, speed, and utilization hours with each successive 
generation of transport aircraft. Of course, the fleet productivity did 
not immediately reach the productivity levels of the new aircraft 
generation because older aircraft remained in the fleet. Gradually, 
however, the impact of the new aircraft was felt, and the average fleet 
productivity improved. During the 25-year period 1951-1975, this im-
provement in average fleet productivity led to the emergence of the 
airline as the major intercity passenger vehicle in the United States 
with over 80 percent of the traffic. During this same 25-year period, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board statistics were of sufficient detail to determine 
the relative contributions of increased size, speed, and hours to the 
tremendous increases in U.S. airline product. Each element made an 
important contribution. 
It should be recognized that improved airplane productivity, 
whether achieved through increased size, speed, or utilization, will per-
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mit a reduced number of aircraft to carry a given passenger traffic. The 
high productivity of an advanced SST, for example, could limit pro-
duction to 200 to 400 aircraft and would, of course, affect initial cost 
and break-even point of the Return on Investment. However, reduced 
number of aircraft to do a given job is one of the principal aspects of in-
creased productivity in the air transport business, 
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If past trends continue, the demand for air travel will increase 
significantly in the future. To meet this demand, it will be necessary to 
increase the size, speed, or number of air transports or to improve the 
use of the airplanes that are currently in the airline fleet. The option of 
increased size offers some room for improvement, but an airplane can 
get too big to be effective on anything but a specific route. Similarly, 
small improvements can be made in aircraft utilization, but there is a 
limit to the number of hours in a day that passengers want to depart 
from or arrive at an airport. Therefore, the only options for meeting 
further increases in air travel demand are to increase the number of air 
transports in the fleet and/or to increase the speed. Increasing the 
number of air transports in the fleet will meet passenger demand but 
will soon result in congestion in the terminal or congestion in the air. It 
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will not increase fleet productivity. Consequently, the only real hope 
for meeting the increased demand for air transportation in the future is 
to again remove the barriers to increased speed that Capt. Chuck 
Yeager removed some 35 years ago. 
The goal and promise of supersonic cruise technology is to again 
open the air transportation industry to the advantages of increased 
speed—not speed for speed's sake, not speed for the jet-setter's sake, 
but speed for the reason that it is a necessary ingredient of productivity. 
Because speed serves productivity only when it can be bought within 
desirable economic and environmental guidelines, this was the goal 
and challenge of the supersonic cruise technology effort conducted 
under the NASA Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) and Variable 
Cycle Engine (VCE) programs. 
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Pursuing the Problems and Potential 
of Supersonic Cruise Flight: The NASA 
SCR and VCE Programs 
As indicated in the previous chapter, a number of difficult technical 
and environmental problems are associated with commercial super-
sonic cruise flight. Most of these problems were not satisfactorily 
resolved during the U.S. SST program. Although an American SST 
could have been developed with the supersonic technology available at 
the time, such an SST would not have measured up to the standards of 
performance and environmental acceptability that the people and the 
government of the United States demanded. Such an SST would also 
have been a marginal investment for its airline customers. 
Contrary to some views, the cancellation of the U.S. SST program 
did not establish the insolubility of the problems of commercial super-
sonic cruise flight or alter the fact that increased speed is an important 
element of improved productivity, but is a desirable characteristic to be 
sought and achieved. Consequently, the demise of the SST did not lead 
to the discontinuation of supersonic cruise technology efforts within the 
United States. A number of members of the U.S. Congress were con-
cerned about the possible competitive threat of SST efforts in England, 
France, and the Soviet Union and were in favor of further supersonic 
technology efforts. The U.S. aeronautical research agency, NASA, 
viewed the supersonic cruise problems as challenging and difficult, but 
amenable to solution through a focused research effort. 
In early 1972, the Nixon administration directed NASA to formulate 
a supersonic research program that would provide the technology for a 
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viable commercial supersonic transport. This new program was 
developed in early 1972 and was originally called the NASA Advanced 
Supersonic Technology (AST) program. It was to build on the 
knowledge gained during the U.S. SST program and was to bring a 
state of supersonic cruise "technology readiness" within 4 years. 
However, because the opponents of any future American SST program 
quickly read into the acronym, AST, a program for developing an ad-
vanced supersonic transport, the designation was changed to Super-
sonic Cruise Aircraft Research (SCAR) in 1974. The pace and funding 
of the program was also cut back so that no "technology readiness" date 
could be specified. Even with the sharp cutback in anticipated funding, 
the word "Aircraft" in the title SCAR still gave rise to the spectre of 
NASA developing an SST. Consequently, the title of the program was 
changed to Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) in 1979. This latter 
designation (SCR) will be used in the balance of this document. 
OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE OF THE NASA SCR PROGRAM 
The official objectives of the NASA SCR program were as follows: 
The Supersonic Cruise Research Program has been undertaken to provide a 
sound data base to support rational decisions in consideration of future civil 
and military supersonic cruise aircraft. 
The objectives are to define the potential benefits and trade-offs of ad-
vancements in aerodynamic efficiency, structures and materials, propulsion 
systems, and stability and control methods applied to promising advanced 
supersonic aircraft concepts that also meet environmental requirements. In-
tegration of the technical disciplines will be undertaken, needed analytical 
tools developed, and wind tunnel and laboratory investigations will be con-
ducted in a closely coordinated effort to provide an advanced technology base. 
As this statement shows, the principal objective of the NASA SCR pro-
gram was to conduct or support disciplinary research on the problems 
of supersonic flight and to provide advancements in the state of 
technology. However, in line with one of the lessons learned in the 
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prior SST effort (see Chapter 6), the disciplinary research was to be 
conducted and assessed, when possible, on the basis of its impact on an 
integrated supersonic airplane system. This would preclude the ex-
penditure of large amounts on research solutions that had no real ap-
plication to a practical airplane. 
The basic approach of the SCR program, then, was to search for the 
solution to supersonic problems through disciplinary research. Most of 
these problems were well known (see Chapter 7), but no satisfactory 
solution had been found. When the new SCR research suggested a 
potential solution to a supersonic problem, the applicability of the sug-
gested solution was assessed by determining if it could be integrated in-
to a practical commercial supersonic airplane and mission. If the 
potential solution withstood the test of the integration exercise, at-
tempts would be made to further validate the solution with wind tunnel 
tests or hardware construction and tests. If the potential solution could 
not be integrated, it was discarded, and the disciplinary research teams 
sought another solution to the problem. 
The integrated technology approach of the NASA SCR program was 
one of its most important aspects. This approach helped to point out 
the most fertile areas for research and permitted progress to be 
measured in a quantitative manner. 
An important decision in the formulation of the SCR was to conduct 
the program in a focused manner. SCR was a "line item" in the NASA 
budget, and this factor promoted an interest and impetus within the 
aerospace community that a NASA in-house generic research program 
probably would not have provided. It was perhaps this display of in-
terest by the U.S. government and NASA that prompted some aero-
space companies to augment the SCR program with company funding 
and manpower. 
The SCR program was set up to involve all of the NASA 
aeronautical centers. As the program progressed, it also involved many 
of the aerospace companies, research organizations, and universities. 
It was believed that solutions to the supersonic problems could be 
103
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
Operational Demonstration 
of Technical Solutions 
When Deemed to be in the
Public Interest 
Integrated Technology
Advances 
Integration
Studies	 That Effect Aircraft,	 I 
Safety, Cost, and	 I 
Performance 
Disciplinary 
Research 
In Critical
Problem Areas 
SCR operating plan. 
found if there was wide enough participation by those who had ex-
perience in the field. Before the SCR program came to an end in 1981, 
more than 100 separate organizations had been involved in some 
aspect of the effort.13' 
ORGANIZATION AND ELEMENTS OF THE 
NASA SCR PROGRAM 
The NASA SCR program was conducted under the overall direction 
of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology at NASA Head-
quarters. Day-to-day operation of the program was the responsibility of 
the SCR Program Office established at the NASA Langley Research 
Center. Although the program office had a leader for each major 
disciplinary research area, the effort req4ired for solving the supersonic 
cruise problems was in the hands of the research organizations within 
NASA. The important technology integration function was under the 
leadership of the SCR Program Office. 
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At the outset, the major elements of the SCR program were as men-
tioned earlier in the objectives statement. The disciplinary research 
elements were Aerodynamic Performance, Propulsion, Structures and Mate-
rials, Stability and Control, and Stratospheric Emissions Impact. Mission 
Performance Integration, or Systems Integration Studies, was the other major 
element written into the original SCR Program Plan. Brief descriptions 
of these elements follow. 
AERODYNAMIC PERFORMANCE 
This research element was responsible for developing and testing ad-
vanced aerodynamic concepts that could be applied to the commercial 
supersonic transport mission. The element also was responsible for 
developing and validating advanced analytical techniques for use in 
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aerodynamic design and analysis, and for conducting studies to im-
prove the understanding of sonic boom phenomena. Subelements of 
this research area were Concept Development, Theory Development, 
and Sonic Boom. Research under the discipline was conducted or 
monitored mainly by personnel of the Aerodynamic Directorates at the 
NASA Ames and Langley Research Centers. 
PROPULSION 
The major goal of this SCR research element was to develop a pro-
pulsion system that would efficiently meet the conflicting requirements 
of subsonic and supersonic operation. Solutions were also needed for 
the noise and pollution problems that became critical issues in the latter 
stages of the U.S. SST program. Subelements of the Propulsion pro-
gram were Engine Studies, Noise Reduction, Pollution Reduction, 
Dynamics and Control, and Unique Components. This research was 
conducted or monitored by personnel at the NASA Lewis Research 
Center. 
STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
Major goals of the Structures and Materials research element were 
to develop structural concepts and materials that would efficiently 
withstand the constantly variable load and temperature environment 
that is experienced during a supersonic flight. The developed concepts 
and materials would also have to be relatively low-cost if a commercial 
supersonic transport was to be economically viable. To meet these 
goals, improved analytical methods for structural design and analysis 
would be required, as well as improved nonmetallic materials such as 
fuel-tank sealants and windshields. Subelements of the Structures and 
Materials program were Structural Concepts, Design Data and Tools, 
Material Applications, and Fuel-Tank Sealants. Research in this ele-
ment was under the direction of personnel from the Structures Direc-
torate of the Langley Research Center with participation by engineers 
and scientists at the Dryden Flight Research and Ames Research 
Centers. 
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STABILITY AND CONTROL 
The research responsibility of this SCR element was to develop 
methods for accurately determining the stability characteristics and 
control requirements for large, flexible supersonic cruise aircraft and to 
determine the requirements and problems associated with stability 
augmentation systems and active control systems. Subelements of this 
research were Design Data and Tools, Pilot/Aircraft Interface, and 
Stabilization and Control Systems. Research was directed mainly by 
the NASA Ames and Dryden Flight Research Centers, with some par-
ticipation by the Langley Research Center in the Active Control area. 
STRATOSPHERIC EMISSIONS IMPACT 
The critical research goal of this SCR element was to answer ques-
tions that arose during the SST program concerning the pollution of 
the upper atmosphere by high-flying aircraft. Major questions involved 
the jet-wake chemistry and how the jet wake propagated and 
dissipated. There were also questions about the level of stratospheric 
pollution due to natural causes alone. This research area was critical to 
the future of supersonic cruise aircraft, but was not a problem unique 
to such aircraft. The NASA Office of Space Science had been the prin-
cipal NASA group involved in the problem of stratospheric pollution, 
and after October 1, 1976, NASA research in this area was funded and 
managed by that group. All of NASA's aeronautical centers par-
ticipated in some facet of the investigation of upper atmospheric pollu-
tion. 
MISSION PERFORMANCE INTEGRATION 
The important function of this element of the SCR program was to 
assess the impact of disciplinary technology advances on the integrated 
performance of various supersonic cruise aircraft concepts. With this 
element, it was possible to measure the progress of the technology effect 
and determine if the technology for an economically viable, en-
vironmentally acceptable commercial supersonic transport had been 
identified. The SCR program was fortunate to get talented, experi-
enced systems integration teams from the Boeing Commercial Airplane 
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Company, the Lockheed-California Company, and the Douglas Air-
craft Company of McDonnell Douglas. An excellent in-house team 
was also assembled through a NASA nonpersonal services contract 
with Ling-Temco-Vought. The SCR program was also fortunate to 
secure experienced propulsion system design groups from the General 
Electric Company and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Company. 
It might appear that the SCR program was somewhat frivolous for 
bearing the expense of four systems integration teams and two propul-
sion design teams. Actually, however, this was a major strength of the 
program. First, the three major U.S. airplane companies with capabili-
ty to develop a supersonic cruise aircraft were in the program. (The 
fourth company, Rockwell International, was brought in later with a 
propulsion-integration contract.) Second, the two propulsion com-
panies with the capability to build an American supersonic engine were 
in the program. Third, all of the integration teams had different ideas 
as to what a commercial supersonic cruise aircraft should look like, 
what altitude and speed it should fly at, what it should be made of, and 
how many passengers it should carry. This variation of reference 
airplane permitted the disciplinary technology to be assessed over a 
wide range of applications and conditions. Finally, all of the industry 
teams contributed important disciplinary technology advances during 
the course of the SCR program in addition to performing their integra-
tion functions. 
In addition to the foregoing technical factors, the inclusion of the 
major aerospace companies added an important competitive tone to the 
program. As a result of this competitive atmosphere, company 
managements assigned some of their best engineers to the program and 
supported in-house supersonic cruise research with company funding. 
ALTERATIONS TO SCR PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
During the course of the SCR program, some additions, subtrac-
tions, and alterations were made to the program structure. Although 
the Stratospheric Emissions Impact research that had been supported 
by SCR funds was returned to the NASA Office of Space Science in 
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1976, the SCR program kept abreast of efforts in the field. Added to 
the SCR program were the important elements of Flight Experiments 
and Airframe/Propulsion System Integration. Broken away from SCR, 
but still closely associated with the effort, was the important VCE 
program. 
FLIGHT EXPERIMENTS 
The U.S. Air Force provided NASA with a high-altitude supersonic 
YF-12 airplane prior to the beginning of the SCR program. Although 
the airplane did not meet the requirements of a commercial supersonic 
airplane, it had been useful in supersonic experiments conducted by 
the Dryden Flight Research Center. It became a useful adjunct to the 
SCR program, being used to flight-test advanced structural panels, to 
validate methods for aeroelastic analysis, and to investigate the prob-
lems associated with airframe/propulsion system interactions at super-
sonic speeds. The YF-12 was also quite useful in the study of control 
system problems and in the development of control system concepts. 
Personnel at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center supervised the 
flight tests and experiments involving the YF-12. 
AIRFRAME/PROPULSION SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
In 1977, after the SCR program had identified a technology base 
that could lead to a viable SST, it became apparent that a more de-
tailed look should be taken at the important interfaces between the 
airplane and its propulsion system (i.e., the engine inlets and nozzles). 
Accordingly, the Lewis Research Center, the SCR Program Office, 
and the mission integration contractors developed a research program 
for studying these interfaces. Personnel from the Lewis Research 
Center monitored this effort, which was initiated in 1977. 
VARIABLE CYCLE ENGINE PROGRAM 
During the first 3 years of the SCR program, the propulsion system 
contractors, General Electric and Pratt and Whitney, identified 
engines that showed promise of efficiently meeting the subsonic/super-
sonic requirements of an SST mission. The two engines accomplished 
the conflicting requirements of subsonic/supersonic flight with variable 
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features that permitted the engine to change operating characteristics 
during flight. To focus effort on these two promising "variable cycle" 
engines, a separate Variable Cycle Engine program was established in 
1976. Although the VCE program became a separate "line item" in the 
NASA budget, it was closely associated with the SCR program. A pro-
gram office at the NASA Lewis Research Center was formed to 
manage this effort. 
DISSEMINATION OF SCR TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
In many respects, SCR technical information was disseminated in 
the same manner as that of other NASA programs. Nearly 1000 
reports and presentations resulted either directly or indirectly from 
research supported by the SCR program. 132,133 In addition, formal an-
nual reviews of the disciplinary research and mission integration results 
and two major NASA conferences* were held in 1976 and 1979. These 
conferences were well attended by members of the aerospace, military, 
and academic communities. 
Certain elements of NASA SCR technology and data were con-
trolled through the use of the heading "For U.S. Government Agencies 
and their Contractors Only." A unique feature of the SCR program, 
however, was the rapid and almost simultaneous dissemination of this 
technology and data to most of the major military and civilian airplane 
and propulsion manufacturers. This rapid dissemination was possible 
because four major airplane and two major propulsion manufacturers 
were involved in the SCR program. Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas 
were prime mission integration contractors, and Rockwell was in-
volved in a propulsion integration contract. General Electric and Pratt 
and Whitney provided propulsion data to all of the airplane contrac-
tors. Each of these contractors presented their disciplinary research and 
mission integration results at the annual SCR reviews. Except for the 
first few years, when neither propulsion contractor wanted the other 
*The SCAR Conference (NASA CP-001, 1976) and Supersonic Cruise Research '79 
(NASA CP-2 108, 1980). 
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present at his review, the annual meetings were open to representatives 
from all companies. During the course of the SCR program, Boeing, 
Lockheed, and Douglas conducted a considerable amount of SCR-
related technology effort with their "in-house" funding and manpower. 
All of the companies reported the results of these proprietary data at 
meetings attended by the other contractors. 
An unusual spirit of cooperation existed among the contractor teams 
even though each was competing for a larger share of the SCR funding. 
For example, Rockwell, which had bid unsuccessfully to become an 
SCR mission integration contractor, provided a meeting place for the 
three winning teams to review their progress. On another occasion, 
Douglas provided the SCR office with some valuable proprietary noise 
suppressor data for use in a program for supporting the Federal Avia-
tion Agency in setting noise rules for supersonic aircraft. 
Equivalent 
Full-Time 
Manpower 
120	
Total SCR Industry Manpower 
80
Industry-Supported SCR Manpower 
60 F 
40 -
	 - - 
20	
SCR Government-Supported Industry Manpower 
1974	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981 
Fiscal Year 
Major airplane contractors supported SCR and VCE with 'in-house"funding and man-
power.
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SCOPE OF NASA SCR PROGRAM 
Some opponents of the SST saw the SCR program as a surreptitious 
attempt to resurrect the SST that had just been canceled by the U.S. 
Congress. This feeling became even more prevalent when the program 
brought the major airframe and propulsion manufacturers into the 
systems integration function. Further misunderstanding resulted from 
the use of reference supersonic transport airplanes and missions for 
measuring the progress of the technology. 
These concerns, though probably natural, were completely un-
founded. The SCR program was no more than an effort by NASA to 
meet its chartered commitment to provide technology that would en-
sure American supremacy in civilian and military aircraft. The $300 
million NASA supersonic technology effort proposed in response to the 
Nixon administration directive was by no means an SST development 
program. Rather, it was a minimum 4-year proposed program for pro-
viding the technology base for possible future use in the development of 
an SST. The decision to involve all of the major airframe and propul-
sion companies was made essentially to get as much help and as many 
ideas as possible for solving the very difficult supersonic problems. The 
use of practical supersonic cruise aircraft for assessing technology was 
dictated by experience, which had shown that an advancement in one 
supersonic discipline means little unless it can be integrated with the 
other supersonic requirements. 
The cutback of anticipated SCR funding in the second year and the 
eventual support level of around $10 million per year made it impossi-
ble to set or shoot for any "technology readiness" date. However, this 
cutback in funding support did not alter the supersonic cruise aircraft 
problems or change the SCR objective of finding solutions to these 
problems. The scope of the program had always been to establish a 
technology base that could be used to develop a viable SST whether it 
was a 4-year program or an indefinite one. The next two chapters 
describe some of the efforts of the SCR program to establish this 
technology base. 
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Progress in Supersonic Cruise 
Technology Since 1972 
In the years since 1972, the U.S. Congress has supported a number 
of research programs on supersonic cruise technology. In addition to 
the NASA SCR and VCE programs, there were the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) SST Follow-On Program, the Climatic Impact 
Assessment Program (ClAP), the High Altitude Pollution Program 
(HAPP), and the NASA Emissions Reduction Research and 
Technology Program. The DOT SST Follow-On Program supported 
the continuation or completion of research on several technology items 
associated with the then-canceled SST. Some of this research found im-
portant application to later military and commercial airplanes, and 
some of the technology elements became the basis for other NASA and 
industry programs. 134 Results from the ClAP and HAPP efforts pro-
vided a substantially improved understanding of atmospheric pollu-
tion, and the NASA Emissions Reduction Program provided means for 
reducing the pollution from jet engines. 135 
The DOT SST Follow-On, ClAP, HAPP, and NASA Emissions 
Reduction efforts were directed either to the solution of a specific 
supersonic cruise problem or to the accumulation of data that would 
shed light on the magnitude of the problem. All of the programs con-
tributed greatly to the supersonic technology, but none had the overall 
responsibility for developing the base for a viable supersonic cruise air-
craft. This responsibility was given to the NASA SCR program when it 
was established in 1972. The SCR effort was to assimilate the results of 
the other supersonic programs with whatever new research was 
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necessary for developing the desired supersonic technology. The VCE 
offshoot program bore the same responsibility in the propulsion area. 
Supersonic technology efforts in the United States after 1972 in-
volved several hundred individual, but coordinated, research efforts. 
The SCR and VCE programs alone had more than 100 research areas, 
many of which involved subareas and phases. Some of these research 
areas were not expected to provide far-reaching technology advances, 
but were needed to furnish data banks that could be used to make a 
dramatic breakthrough. In other research areas, such as engine noise, 
any advance would be dramatic because of the "front line" importance 
of the research area. Although this chapter and the next deal mainly 
with progress in these "front line" issues, they also mention the impor-
tant "data gathering" efforts, when appropriate. Liberal excerpts are 
taken from Driver's excellent paper entitled Progress in Supersonic Cruise 
Technology. 136 This chapter examines progress in environmental issues, 
aerodynamics, structures and materials, propulsion, and configuration 
concepts/integration. 
PROGRESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
Environmental issues such as noise, sonic boom, and pollution had a 
lot to do with the cancellation of the U.S. SST program and with the 
failure of supersonic cruise aircraft to assume a prominent role in air 
transportation. These issues could also be responsible for a reticence to 
consider the SST as a future transportation system. Certainly, any 
future SST program would have to answer the environmental ques-
tions before any action could be taken. Although progress has been 
made on many of the environmental issues, some questions remain. 
UPPER ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION 
As indicated in Chapter 7, the SST brought fears of ozone depletion 
in the upper atmosphere and of an increase in the incidence of skin 
cancer on the Earth. The ClAP study showed these concerns to be 
overstated, and the later HAPP program indicated a possible increase 
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in ozone rather than a depletion. 137 Nevertheless, there is still a lack of 
complete understanding of the chemistry of the upper atmosphere and 
the effect of jet-engine emissions on it. Consequently, programs for 
reducing emissions are still needed. 
Among the programs that attempted to provide the technology for 
reduced engine emissions were the NASA Emissions Reduction 
Research and Technology program and elements of the SCR Propul-
sion and VCE programs. These programs identified concepts that 
could reduce nitrous oxide (NO) emissions to less than one-third the 
levels of first-generation SSTs and provide for substantial reductions in 
carbon monoxide (CO) and unburned hydrocarbons (THC).138 
Although further study of the chemistry of the upper atmosphere could 
indicate that these concepts (complicated advanced burners) might be 
unnecessary, their validation for subsonic or supersonic use is 
desirable. 
SONIC BOOM 
As indicated in Chapter 7, the sonic boom is a direct result of super-
sonic flight, and no means is available for eliminating this accompani-
ment of such speeds. As mentioned in Chapter 4, NASA has conducted 
and supported a massive program for improving the understanding of 
sonic boom and for reducing its impact by design. None of these pro-
grams have given a reliable hint, however, that this disturbance can be 
completely abolished. Consequently, the major goal of the SCR pro-
gram was to establish a level of public acceptability of the sonic boom to 
guide research on design methods for reducing the disturbance. Plans 
for this program were put in limbo when the anticipated funding for the 
SCR effort was reduced from more than $40 million in the second year 
to approximately $10 million. Because a rule was in effect that pro-
hibited supersonic overland flights of commercial supersonic aircraft, it 
was difficult to justify a large sonic boom effort in light of the cut in the 
overall program. 
It is quite possible that a level of sonic boom can be found that is ac-
ceptable to most of the public and that such a level could be achieved 
through the design methods developed by NASA and others. From the 
117
SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
standpoint of the SCR program, it was decided that the most feasible 
way to accomplish this goal was to develop the technology for an 
outstanding overwater SST, provide the technology that would permit 
the flexibility of efficient subsonic overland flight, and then use this 
vehicle to explore the sonic boom acceptability question. Although this 
did not represent a direct frontal attack on sonic boom, it appeared to 
make best use of the funding at hand. 
ENGINE NOISE 
Engine noise, a necessary environmental issue with all modes of 
engine-powered airplane flight, was a particular problem with the 
SST. Although many of the subsonic jets were as noisy, they appeared 
to be much more necessary than supersonic transports. Much progress 
was being made on subsonic jet transport noise, and nothing less could 
be tolerated for an SST. Consequently, engine noise was a primary 
research element of the NASA SCR program and, later, the NASA 
VCE program. 
During the course of the SCR and VCE programs, some exciting 
technologies were discovered that showed promise for dramatically 
reducing the projected noise of supersonic cruise aircraft. The first of 
these technology advances was the inherent coannular noise reduction 
of the variable cycle engines under consideration in the SCR propul-
sion program at the NASA Lewis Research Center. These engines 
utilized an "inverted jet" velocity profile (i.e., a high-velocity outer jet 
stream exhausted through a high-radius-ratio annulus and a lower 
velocity jet stream exhausted through an inner nozzle). This system 
was the opposite of the normal turbofan engine, which has an inner 
high-velocity stream and an outer low-velocity stream. The inverted 
velocity profile (IVP) coannular nozzles were extensively tested and 
validated in a series of model-scale tests, tests on a complete running 
engine, and free-jet tests to check the effects of forward velocity.139 
These tests verify a significant noise reduction (approximately 7 
EPNdB) relative to a fully mixed conical nozzle at the same specific 
thrust and mixed-pressure ratio.140 
118
PROGRESS IN TECHNOLOGY SINCE 1972 
I _ 
Coannular noise tests in Boeing anechoic facility (courtes)- of Boeing). 
The second important engine noise development in the SCR pro-
gram was the mechanical suppressor technology validation by the 
Douglas Aircraft Company. This effort, perhaps the most complete 
one under the partial aegis of the SCR program, involved: (1) small-
scale suppressor development tests by Douglas at a Douglas facility; (2) 
spin tests of the suppressor on Roll Royce's rotating-arm rig in 
England; (3) flight tests of the mechanical suppressor nozzles on a Rolls 
Royce Viper 601 engine installed on a Hawker Siddeley HS-125 air-
craft modified to accept the engine/nozzle/suppressor/treated-ejector 
combination; and finally (4) tests of the engine, nacelle, and nozzles on 
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a simulated fuselage in the NASA Ames Research Center 40- by 
80-foot wind tunnel. The combination of tests indicated that the 
Douglas multitube/lobe retractable suppressor with acoustically treated 
translating ejector would provide 12 to 16 EPNdB noise reduction 
relative to a conic nozzle at equal thrust and a thrust loss of 4.5 percent 
relative to a conic nozzle at takeoff. 141, 142 This suppressor performance 
is much better than that of previous suppressors, and the results pro-
vide real hope that the mechanical suppressor can be a powerful noise-
reduction device on future supersonic airplanes. It remains to be seen 
whether suppressors of this type can be integrated on the engine and if 
they can withstand the operating pressures and temperatures at takeoff 
conditions. 
A third important noise technology development of the SCR pro-
gram was the concept of acoustic shielding. Two methods of noise 
shielding were considered. First, the Lockheed Company placed the 
engines in an over/under arrangement on the wing and used the wing 
and fuselage to shield some of the noise from the ground. This ap-
proach promised a noise reduction of 3 to 5 EPNdB compared to that of 
placing all engines under the wing in the conventional manner. 141 The 
other approach to noise shielding made use of a thermal acoustic shield 
(i.e., a high-temperature low-velocity gas stream, partially surround-
ing a high-velocity central jet exhaust). This concept was borne out in 
theoretical predictions and experimental tests conducted by NASA, the 
Boeing Company, and the General Electric Company. Although this 
noise reduction concept is still being investigated, the effect is believed 
to be associated with the reflection and refraction properties of the 
high-temperature acoustic shield. 144 
The use of "minimum noise" flight profiles during terminal area 
operations was the fourth noise reduction concept to show promise in 
the SCR program. This approach essentially makes use of advanced 
operating procedures such as thrust modulation during ground roll and 
takeoff, engine cutback at optimum "noise" altitude, thrust cutback to 
optimum "noise" level, and configuration changes during takeoff other 
than raising the landing gear. Making use of these procedures during 
takeoff and using decelerated approaches and increased glide slopes 
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Advanced operating procedures for noise reduction. 
during landing operations can lead to substantial decreases in engine 
noise exposure. 145
 Unfortunately, current Federal Air Regulations 
(FAR) do not permit these advanced procedures. Several elements of 
the SCR and supporting programs could make it possible to certify 
these procedures in the future. The YF-12 flight research program in-
cluded an effort to develop a cooperative airplane/engine control 
system that would permit the fine degree of control required of the ad-
vanced operating procedures. 146
 In addition, the SCR stability and 
control element supported visual piloted simulator studies of the use of 
these procedures on an advanced supersonic transport. It was deter-
mined that the advanced operating procedures did not compromise 
flight safety. 141 
The substantial noise reduction potential of the methods identified in 
the NASA SCR and VCE programs give rise to some optimism about 
the potential noise characteristics of future supersonic cruise aircraft. 
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Although probably not any of these separate methods will provide the 
desired noise levels, a combination of methods appears to be possible. 
The basic underlying principles of most of these noise reduction 
methods have been validated in some form of experimental program, 
in sharp contrast to the noise technology situation that existed at the 
close of the SST program in 1971. At that time, the only readily 
available noise reduction technology was a vastly oversized propulsion 
system that had an extremely deleterious effect on the entire airplane 
concept. 
PROGRESS IN AERODYNAMICS 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the status of the aerodynamic technology 
for supersonic cruise vehicles had been brought to a high level by the 
close of the SST program in 1971. Not only had accurate supersonic 
design and analysis methods been developed, but an advanced arrow-
wing configuration, the NASA SCAT-15F, had been introduced. The 
supersonic cruise aerodynamic efficiency (lift/drag) of the SCAT-15F 
was 25 percent greater than the previous state of the art. In spite of this 
advanced level of aerodynamic technology, however, the supersonic 
and supporting aerodynamic activity was near its peak during the SCR 
program. It was found that improvements to the design and analysis 
methods could still be made, 148 and it was also indicated that entirely 
new methods might be needed to predict detailed aerodynamic 
parameters, such as pressure distributions, at critical structural and 
control design conditions. 149 Meanwhile, the highly efficient super-
sonic arrow-wing concept stood unused because of questionable sub-
sonic aerodynamic characteristics, which also gave rise to relatively 
poor noise characteristics. 
Although some effort was spent on improving supersonic 
aerodynamic efficiency during the NASA SCR program,150' 151 the 
principal thrust of the aerodynamic program was to find potential solu-
tions to the low-speed aerodynamic problems of the highly swept 
arrow-wing concept. This thrust was doubly important because 
Lockheed and Douglas had reference configurations that employed this 
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SC!? pro grain also Con 1dC7((J zn2p10 Cifl(fl13 10 high-peed aerodynaliiu3 SCR/ 
MDonnell-Dou4'las model tested at NASA Ames and Langley Unitary wind tunnels. 
concept, and at one point, Boeing proposed an arrow-wing supersonic 
technology demonstrator airplane. 
For investigating how to improve the low-speed performance of 
highly swept arrow-wing concepts, the SCR program supported a 
massive model construction program that included large models of a 
blended concept, the NASA reference SCAT-15F derivative, the 
McDonnell-Douglas Mach 2.2 concept, and a number of generic 
arrow-wing models. The experimental programs for testing this myriad 
of models were conducted mainly by personnel in the NASA Langley 
Research Center 30- by 60-foot tunnel, the 7- by 10-foot tunnels, and 
the VSTOL tunnel. Many technicians and engineers were involved, 
and nearly every conceivable test variable was considered. As a result 
of this concerted effort, the low-speed aerodynamic efficiencies of 
arrow-wing concepts were improved , 152
 solutions for some of the 
stability and control problems were found,t 53 and a substantial arrow-
wing low-speed data base was established. 154, 155 
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-. 
SCR aerodynamic test program - Iow-peed tests of McDonnell-Douglas arrow-wing con-
cept in Langley Research Center 30- by 60-footfall-scale wind tunnel. 
Not only did the low-speed performance of arrow wings improve 
during the SCR program, but the low-speed and high-speed perform-
ance of the Boeing-300 delta-wing concept improved 16 percent as 
well. 156 The combined improvements in aerodynamic analysis methods 
and aerodynamic efficiencies, accomplished during the SCR program, 
essentially brought this research discipline into a state of "technology 
readiness" for the development of viable supersonic cruise aircraft. 
PROGRESS IN STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
As indicated in Chapter 7, the structures and materials technology 
for building a supersonic cruise aircraft was available in the 1950s. The 
technology for building an acceptable supersonic transport was not 
available, however, and much of the technological shortfall was in the 
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A nuitici oJ SCR's test efforts to Improve low-speed aerodynamics 01 highly swept arrow 
- l)ll'ndf'd Tnnrlel in Langley full- vale wind tunnel. 
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structures and materials discipline. Mentioned particularly were the 
inability to rapidly and accurately assess the effect of design changes on 
the complex flexible structure of a supersonic transport and the absence 
of adequate low-cost structural concepts and fabrication techniques. 
Another critical need, which was not mentioned, was for a fuel-tank 
sealant material that would retain its integrity in supersonic flight ap-
plications. 
The structures and materials effort that evolved out of SCR support 
concentrated on these problems, but it also provided important data 
bases on supersonic loads and landing loads. An in-depth summary of 
this program is presented by Richard Heldenfels of the Langley 
Research Center in Supersonic Cruise Research 79. 151 
The NASA effort to improve methods for structural design and 
analysis has spanned the area from attempts to improve inputs, such as 
unsteady aerodynamics, 158 to research for improving the massive com-
bination of programs that provide the design and analysis capability. 159 
This effort has been successful as "advances continue to be made in the 
structural analysis and design area with the result that computational 
procedures are available now to design quickly a vehicle structure that 
meets the requirements for strength, divergence, and flutter with active 
controls included. This can be done accurately and"early enough in the 
design process to avoid costly changes during detail design." 160 
Research efforts to develop low-weight, low-cost structural concepts 
and low-cost fabrication techniques also covered a wide range of activi-
ty, from the time/temperature/stress analysis of composite materials at 
supersonic flight conditions, 16 ' to the fabrication of relatively large 
superplastically formed titanium panels. 162 This latter fabrication proc-
ess, the superplastic forming and concurrent diffusion bonding 
(SPF/DB) of titanium, appears to offer much promise for weight and 
cost reductions on future supersonic aircraft. 
The SPF/DB process, which was being investigated by Rockwell In-
ternational during the B-i bomber program, essentially involves the 
heating of a sheet or sheets of titanium in a mold until the titanium 
reaches a malleable temperature. A gas is then injected into the mold, 
and the titanium is either blown into a shape prescribed by the mold or 
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Advanced structural methods permit the use of many structural elements and degrees offree-
dom for more accurate analysis.
Roll Spot Weld Pattern 
Gas Pressure Tube
---	 ,-
•	 0 
-F 
Welded	
Before Superplastic Forming 
Gas Pressure
Partially Formed 
Face 
7^1^^ 
Gas 
Pressure Limiting 
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Complete Sandwich 
Sup erplastic forming and concurrent diffusion bonding (SPF/DB) of titanium - an ex-
citing process that permits complex structural elements to be blown into shape.
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SPF/DB structural panel fabricated by McDonnell-Douglas (courtesy of Douglas 
Aircraft). 
Array of complex structural elements formed by Rockwell International with the SPF/DB 
process (courtesy of Rockwell International). 
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More Rockwell International SPF/DB samples (court 	 o/ i?uku. e/I International). 
bonded to another titanium sheet with a bond of parent-metal strength. 
There seems to be no limit to the structural elements that can be 
formed by this process, and no fasteners are required within the struc-
tural element. An analysis of the use of this process in the design of a 
supersonic transport wing showed significant advantages over the 
aluminum brazed titanium honeycomb that was used in the Boeing 
U.S. SST design. 63 
The Douglas Aircraft Division of McDonnell-Douglas has made fur-
ther studies on the SPF/DB process. In this SCR-supported effort, four 
flat titanium sheets are placed in a mold, heated to plastic-metal 
temperatures, blown into shape, and diffusion-bonded together. Sand-
wich cover panels for the wing of a reference airplane configuration 
made in this manner, combined with similar methods for the wing in-
ternal structure, have reduced wing weight by about 7 percent. In ad-
dition, a change in the fuselage structure from titanium skin stringer to 
a titanium SPF/DB sandwich construction reduced the fuselage weight 
by about 22 percent.164
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Still another fallout of the SCR program is a technique that makes 
use of fibers to reinforce the basic titanium structure. This process 
promises further dramatic gains in structural efficiency and further cost 
reductions. 165, 166 
The final major problem area in the structures and materials 
research discipline was the need for a suitable fuel tank sealant for 
high-speed, high-temperature operation. This was a problem in the 
SST program and was the subject of study in the DOT SST Follow-On 
Program. During the SCR program, this research area, directed by the 
NASA Ames Research Center, produced elastomers based on a 
polymeric heterocyclic fluoroether that could prove to be a satisfactory 
fuel tank sealant for supersonic airplanes. This material has shown ex-
cellent thermal stability and low-temperature flexibility. It retains the 
stable characteristics in the presence of jet fuel and resists oxidation at 
high temperatures. 167 
In summarizing the technology effort in the SCR structures and 
materials effort through 1979, it has been indicated that "This 
technology can be used to design safe and durable structures of reduced 
weight and cost to improve the performance and economics of future 
supersonic cruise aircraft. 11168
 This statement was amplified in a Boeing 
report which stated that the "Results of this work have been very en-
couraging and, in particular, have made it possible to define configura-
tions of high aerodynamic potential. These configurations have been 
considered practical only because of the design refinements possible by 
the successful development of structural technologies. 	 169 
PROGRESS IN PROPULSION 
Engine noise and pollution are serious propulsion problems and 
were considered as such in the SCR program. If these two issues are 
considered in the environmental impact area, as has been done in this 
document, the main remaining and still critical issues confronting the 
SCR propulsion discipline were the development of propulsion systems 
that could efficiently meet the contradictory operating requirements of 
subsonic and supersonic speeds, and then to develop the component 
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• Into a Unitized. Load Carrying 
Structure
Fibers	 Titanium 
Bond	 Matrix 
Titanium 
Elemenf 1
Applications 
• Stiffness Critical Structure 
• Compression Buckling 
• High Axial Loads 
Benefits
(Ref. Titanium Plate) 
• Up to 65% Reduction in Weight 
• Up to 24% Savings In Cost 
Exciting new structural process makes use of titanium reinforced with fibers. 
5CR 3tructures eJJoTl tnc/ude3 aerueIatic tests of Boeing SCA 7 7-15F arrow-wing model 
(courtesy af Boeing).
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technology that would make these engines possible. Since the noise and 
pollution progress has already been discussed, only progress in the lat-
ter areas will be discussed here. 
PROPULSION STUDIES 
The SCR approach to the supersonic transport propulsion problem 
was to take a fresh look at all the propulsion cycles that would have any 
chance of meeting the demanding supersonic mission. These early 
studies were conducted by the NASA Lewis Research Center with the 
assistance of the propulsion system manufacturers, Pratt and Whitney 
and General Electric, 170 and making use of the SCR mission integra-
tion contractors, Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed. 
On the basis of these preliminary SCR studies, it was soon apparent 
that a successful SST would require an engine cycle that would ap-
proach the performance of the turbojet engine at supersonic speeds and 
the turbofan engine at subsonic speeds. Subsequently, such engines 
were identified, and the evolution of the Variable Cycle Engine pro-
Coannular
Nozzle/Reverser
System 
Low-Emissions
Duct Burner 
Low-Noise	 Variable 
Inlet	 Compressor 
Variable \\ Turbine 
Fan  
/ 
/ Low-Emissions 
Primary Burner 
Flow diagram of Pratt and Whitney variable-stream control engine (VSCE) in SCR/VCE 
program (courtesy of Pratt and Whitney).
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gram had begun. Through the process of evaluation by the mission in-
tegration teams on a realistic supersonic cruise aircraft mission and on 
a series of realistic supersonic airplane configurations, the technical 
shortcomings of the engine cycles could be identified and progressive 
alterations could be made. Through this refinement process, by 1976, 
each propulsion contractor had identified a "variable cycle engine" that 
showed promise. At this stage, the NASA VCE program was formed to 
develop and conduct programs for validating the critical features of 
these two engines. This VCE effort continued to be closely tied to the 
SCR program, and the propulsion companies were under contract not 
only to the VCE program but also to the SCR mission integration con-
tractors. This situation led to rapid dissemination of technical informa-
tion between the two programs and among the airframe and propulsion 
contractors. 
VARIABLE CYCLE ENGINE - 
The most important propulsion development in the SCR program 
was, of course, the "variable cycle engine" concept and the apparent in-
herent noise advantage of the dual coannular exhaust discussed in the 
previous section on "Progress in Environmental Issues." The details of 
the VCEs that evolved from the SCR program and were followed in the 
VCE program are not important to this discussion, but only the overall 
function of the engine. A good description of this function is provided 
by Sigalla: 
The need for variable-cycle engines in relation to the problem of designing a 
successful SST had been recognized for a long time. But it was only as a result 
of the SCR program that coordinated research by airplane manufacturers, 
engine manufacturers, and NASA technologists led to the mechanical and 
thermodynamic definition of such engines by Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and 
General Electric. It should be noted that a variable-cycle engine is not defined 
by any specific mechanical scheme. Rather, it is defined by its ability to meet 
a set of requirements aimed at eliminating the poor subsonic and transonic 
performance of supersonic engines designed for higher Mach numbers 
without affecting adversely the supersonic cruise performance of those 
engines. Such requirements are high supersonic cruise performance with low 
specific fuel consumption and high specific thrust (comparable to a dry turbo-
jet cycle), and subsonic cruise range factor almost equal to a supersonic cruise 
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range factor with the goal that subsonic fuel consumption be at least halfway 
between those of a turbojet and a bypass ratio 5 turbofan. Currently defined 
study variable-cycle engines meet these requirements.'7' 
A statement of the important advances in propulsion technology at-
tributable to the SCR and VCE programs was recently made by 
Driver: 
Of particular interest has been the evolution of airflow management to reduce 
off-design penalties. This gain has been made possible, in part, by the advent 
of digital controls. This technique has also resulted in the term variable-cycle 
engine, which implies operation at cruise like a turbojet, and operation at off-
design conditions similar to a turbofan. Advanced subsonic engines now 
operate with 6 or 7 internal control variables, whereas these advanced super-
sonic engines will have more than twice as many control variables -partially 
as a result of variable inlets and nozzles. The control of off-design perform-
ance has made important reductions in the fuel reserve requirement, paying 
important dividends in additional payload range. It should be recognized that 
both G.E. and Pratt & Whitney have actually run the critical engine features 
on a test stand and verified the design features studied in the SCR/VCE pro-
gram. In the G.E. case, the variable-cycle engine features have been incor-
porated in aJ-101 engine and the performance gains verified on the test stand 
with a running engine. 172 
Thus, the SCR/VCE program identified two advanced engines that 
showed promise of efficiently meeting the supersonic aircraft re-
quirements, pointed out several methods that could be used to reduce 
the engine noise and emissions to acceptable levels, and provided some 
preliminary validation tests to determine whether all of the elements 
could be put together in a unit. Much additional effort would have to 
be spent to make these concepts into real supersonic cruise aircraft 
engines, but the elements of the technology had been identified. 
It should be noted that "variable cycle engines" identified in the 
NASA SCR and VCE programs do not represent significant advances 
in propulsion cycle efficiencies over previous supersonic turbofan or 
turbojet engines. The advantage of these engines is the element of air-
flow control that provides for a better overall performance on the 
supersonic cruise mission than either a turbofan or a turbojet engine 
would provide. In addition, these engines would deliver the improved 
overall performance with lessweight, less fuel, and reduced noise.
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PROGRESS IN CONFIGURATION CONCEPTS/INTEGRATION 
As indicated in Chapter 7, one of the major technical problems of the 
past SST program was the integration of a myriad of disciplinary con-
cepts into an acceptable SST. In many instances, the aerodynamicist 
was looking for solutions to aerodynamic problems, the structures 
engineer was after a solution to structures problems, the propulsion 
engineer was working on propulsion problems, etc. Actually, all of 
these disciplinary personnel should have been working on airplane 
problems because, if the disciplinary solution could not become an in-
tegrated solution to the airplane problem, it was really not a solution. 
Because of this overriding importance of integrated technology in the 
complicated SST mission, the NASA SCR program made mission per-
formance integration the central element of the program. (See Chapter 
8.) The three industry teams (Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed) and 
one NASA in-house team not only assessed the applicability of 
disciplinary concepts, but also introduced disciplinary concepts and in-
tegrated concepts. 
It is very clear that the progress on the VCE was attributable mainly 
to the day-to-day interplay between the mission integration or systems 
studies teams and the propulsion manufacturers. The integration team 
could rapidly point out where the propulsion system had a shortcoming 
in thrust or performance, and the propulsion manufacturer could make 
modifications to overcome this shortcoming. Many iterations were 
made on the VCEs before they measured up to the SST mission. 
From the standpoint of technology growth, it was fortunate that each 
of the mission integration teams had a different overall configuration 
concept on which to assess the technology advances. Douglas opted for 
a highly swept arrow-wing concept similar to the NASA SCAT-15F, 
but designed for a lower cruise Mach number (2.2 compared to 2.7 for 
the SCAT-15F). With the lower design Mach number and the noise 
suppressor technology developed in a joint Douglas/NASA effort, 
Douglas hoped that the SST mission could be accomplished with a 
straight turbojet engine or a very low bypass turbofan. Lockheed also 
chose an arrow-wing configuration, but placed two of the four engines 
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McDonnell-Douglas reference concept for technologya vses ment. 
Lockheed reference airplane for SCR technology assessment. Note over/under engine loca-
lions on wing. 
Boeing technology assessment concept for 5CR -the improved blended-wing version of 
Dash 300 SST
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unconventionally above the wing for noise shielding purposes. Cruise 
Mach numbers between 2 and 2.55 were considered. Boeing made use 
of an updated blended version of the delta-wing 2707-300 airplane that 
was under study as the U.S. SST candidate. Because of this choice, 
both Boeing and the SCR program had the benefit of a storehouse of 
information that had been built on this concept. Boeing considered 
cruise Mach numbers between 2.2 and 2.7. The final reference con-
figuration was the NASA in-house concept that made use of an up-
dated highly swept SCAT-15F configuration that was proposed to 
cruise at Mach 2.7. The NASA in-house mission integration team used 
the modified SCAT-15F as an evaluation concept, and the NASA 
Lewis Research Center used it in their engine cycle studies early in the 
SCR program. A large data base was also available on this configura-
tion because of its study by Boeing, Lockheed, and Rockwell Interna-
tional during the U.S. SST program. 
Several important disciplinary technology advances were spurred by 
the mission integration teams. Among these were the Douglas sup-
pressor effort and the Lockheed noise-shielding concepts discussed in 
the engine noise section, the family concept of SST design introduced 
by Boeing, and the twin-fuselage idea suggested late in the SCR pro-
gram.
..-..----- .--- -. -	
- 
Supersonic technology demonstrator airplane proposed by Boeing (courtesy of Boeing). 
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Douglas noise-suppressor models (courtesy of McDonnell-Douglas). 
DOUGLAS NOISE SUPPRESSOR CONCEPT 
Douglas chose to take a "near term" reference airplane concept with a 
Mach 2.2 cruise speed and a relatively simple mini-bypass engine. If 
this airplane was to have a chance to make a good supersonic cruise air-
craft, even with advanced aerodynamic and structures technology, 
some sort of noise suppressor would be required. Consequently, 
Douglas designed and statically tested a number of small suppressor 
models. One of these models, a multitube/lobe concept, showed ex-
cellent static noise reduction capability. However, many mechanical 
noise suppressors have demonstrated significant levels of noise reduc-
tions at static conditions, but have lost effectiveness at forward velocity. 
In addition, any significant noise reduction was accompanied by a 
great loss of thrust, 173
 a very undesirable characteristic. For the 
Douglas suppressor to be different, it would have to be proven before 
any real technology advance could be presumed. And, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the Douglas suppressor proved to be different 
after a concentrated series of wind tunnel, spin rig, and flight tests in-
volving Rolls Royce, the Douglas Company, the NASA SCR Office, 
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Most promising Douglas suppressor validated in wind tunnel/flight test programs 
(courtesy of McDonnell-Douglas). 
British Aerospace, and the NASA Ames Research Center. The fact 
that the Douglas suppressor passed the tests 174
 was important because 
the other noise reduction techniques (i.e., coannular effects, noise 
shielding, and advanced operating procedures) could not in themselves 
bring the engine noise to desirable levels. 
NOISE SHIELDING 
The placement of two of the engines above the wing so that the wing 
and fuselage could be used as a noise shield was an idea proposed by 
Lockheed early in the SCR program. As pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, this placement provided a substantial noise reduction of 3 to 5 
EPNdB. However, the technology areas that this opened for further 
study and data accumulation were just as important. The airflow pat-
terns and pressures on the upper surface of a highly swept wing are 
quite different than those on the lower surface where the engines had 
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been placed in the past. The technical questions about whether the 
aerodynamic design and analysis programs would handle this un-
conventional case and how this engine placement would affect inlet 
design and operation, etc., had to be answered. This engine placement 
would also probably make more of the wing trailing edge available for 
controls, and this factor had to be considered. Thus, the desirable goal 
of noise reduction led to disciplinary problems in aerodynamics and 
design integration. 75 
AIRPLANE FAMILY CONCEPT 
One of the major strengths of the American airplane industry has 
been the development of families of subsonic jet transports from a given 
basic design by fuselage "stretching" or small evolutionary changes. 
These airplane "families" have met the operating requirements of a 
variety of airlines and route structures, and this approach has led to 
large savings in costs to the manufacturers and airlines. A big weakness 
of both the Concorde and U.S. SST programs was that each was essen-
tially based on a "one airplane" effort. Because of the more critical 
dependence of airplane resistance (drag) on airplane shape (area 
distribution) in the supersonic flight regime, the practice of fuselage 
stretching or lengthening did not appear to be feasible. In addition, it 
was far too costly to develop and certify differently sized airplanes and 
engines to meet the specific requirements of each of the airlines. As a 
result of these factors, a "one-sized" Concorde was proposed to cap ire 
the North Atlantic passenger traffic from the 120- to 140-passenger 
Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 subsonic transports that were then 
available. By the time the Concorde was in service, however, the com-
petition on the North Atlantic had grown to include the 250- to 
450-passenger "jumbo" jet aircraft, the Boeing 747, the Douglas 
DC-10, and the Lockheed L-1011. The Concorde could not compete 
with the productivity of these large aircraft even with a 2.5-times cruise 
speed capability. A larger Concorde would have preserved the produc-
tivity advantages of the SST. 
A breakthrough in the supersonic "airplane family" idea was turned 
in by the Boeing mission integration team during the SCR program. 
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As a means of increasing the marginal cruise efficiency of their delta-
wing reference airplane, the Boeing team considered the use of 
wing/body blending to improve cruise aerodynamics. 116 Blending pro-
vided a 16 percent increase in cruise lift/drag, 177 and the study in-
dicated that a supersonic family of airplanes might be possible with the 
use of lateral fuselage "stretch" rather than the longitudinal stretch that 
had been employed in creating a subsonic "family." Preliminary results 
showed that the lateral stretch provided large changes in passenger 
capacity with relatively small changes in construction and performance 
when compared to the original design. Before this approach could be 
adopted, however, aerodynamic and structural validation would have 
to be accomplished and emergency egress and safety problems would 
have to be considered. The "proof of concept" studies were completed 
with the use of Boeing "in-house" and SCR-supported manpower with 
the result indicating the "lateral-stretch" concept to be feasible for either 
blended or conventional wing/body structures. The results also suggest 
that future supersonic airplanes can and should be designed as 
members of a family. 118 
The Boeing study of the "family" concept indicated that, by means of 
fairly simple body inserts, supersonic transports can be evolved with 
payload variations from 230 to 330 passengers and ranges from 3200 to 
5200 nautical miles with essentially the same levels of aerodynamic effi-
ciency. This important technology will allow the designer to match 
various airline payload range requirements while keeping the expen-
sive parts of the airplane unchanged. 119 
LARGE-PAYLOAD SST CONCEPTS 
Toward the end of the SCR program, Boeing conducted a study on 
large-payload supersonic cruise airplanes that could compete with 
future large double-decked subsonic airplanes. One of these was a large 
supersonic transport with two decks that could fly from New York to 
Paris with 500 passengers. Another concept that Boeing considered 
made use of twin fuselages separated by the engine package. Initial 
evaluation of this concept indicated the surprising result that perhaps a 
60 percent increase in volume could be obtained at no cost in 
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SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
Large-payload, high-productivity concept proposed by Boeing - double-deck passenger 
facilities (courtesy of Boeing). 
aerodynamic efficiency. 180
 These preliminary results, although ex-
citing in their meaning to supersonic flight efficiency and productivity, 
were not validated to the same depth as other elements of the SCR pro-
gram because of the termination of the program. 
OTHER TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS 
A number of other important concepts were studied during the SCR 
program and were brought to a greater state of technology readiness. 
Among these were the use of active controls to suppress undesirable 
aeroelastic deflections or vibrations without resorting to heavier, more 
costly structural elements, !s!
 and the use of active-control landing gear 
to reduce the forces on the wing during landing impact . !82
 Both of these 
concepts promised reductions in weight or improvements in fatigue 
life. Another important concept developed by Boeing was a leading-
edge flap that could control the vortex on the leading edge of highly 
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SUPERSONIC CRUISE TECHNOLOGY 
Artist's concept oJ twin-Juselage SST 
swept arrow wings and prevent flow separation. 183 This flap develop-
ment was one of the principal elements leading to an improvement in 
the low-speed lift/drag of arrow wings, one of the primary goals of the 
SCR aerodynamic performance discipline. 
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS 
During the course of the NASA SCR and VCE programs 
(1972-1981), substantial technical progress was made in all elements of 
technology relating to supersonic cruise flight, with the possible excep-
tion of sonic boom. (As mentioned earlier, the SCR program did not 
have sufficient funding to determine the level of acceptability of sonic 
boom, and an operating rule was in effect that forbade the supersonic 
overland flight of commercial aircraft.) The science of technology in-
tegration was also advanced, and a number of new concepts were iden-
tified that could lead to acceptable, competitive supersonic transport 
aircraft. In the next chapter an attempt is made to quantify the SCR 
and VCE progress and to discuss the possible ramifications of this 
progress. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Supersonic Cruise Technology Before (1971) and After (1982) the NASA 
SCR and VCE Programs 
Although much supersonic technology progress was made before 
and during the SST program (see Chapters 3 and 4), the cancellation 
of that program in 1971 raised many questions about the status of 
technology. The combined improvements and advances of several 
decades of research were not sufficient to ensure a viable supersonic 
transport. Both the Concorde and the proposed U.S. SST were 
marginal from the standpoint of aerodynamic, propulsive, and struc-
tural efficiencies, and both were projected to have critical environmen-
tal problems in the areas of engine noise, pollution, and sonic boom. 
No technology for solving these problems appeared to be on the 
horizon, and as a result, the U.S. SST program was canceled and the 
Concorde production program was severely curtailed. 
Over the decade since the cancellation of the U.S. SST program, the 
NASA SCR and VCE programs have had the responsibility of filling 
this supersonic technology void and providing the base for a viable 
supersonic transport. Some of the progress from this technology effort 
was described in the previous chapter. This chapter will present quan-
titative comparisons of the technology progress and will discuss some of 
the possible ramifications of the results.
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COMPARISONS 
EMISSIONS 
Most of the progress on engine emissions was made outside the SCR 
and VCE programs, but it was still principally motivated by the ques-
tions that had arisen about the supersonic transport. The NASA Lewis 
Research Center effort on burner technology provided practical 
burners for SCR application that had nitrous oxide emission indices of 
about one-half of those that existed at the end of the U.S. SST pro-
gram. Conceptual burners were considered that can lead to emission 
indices less than 20 percent of conventional burners. 
NASA participated in studies for improving the understanding of the 
effect of engine emissions on the depletion of the protective ozone layer 
in the atmosphere. Although this influence was largely unknown at the 
close of the SST program, the DOT ClAP and the HAPP programs 
have done much to answer the questions. Where the earlier ClAP and 
National Academy of Sciences studies showed a substantial, but non-
critical, depletion of ozone due to engine emissions, later HAPP studies 
have shown that this effect might actually lead to a small increase in 
ozone. This represents a rather dramatic reversal in the technical 
understanding of the atmosphere, but it does not alter the fact that this 
question should be a continuous subject of study. 
ENGINE NOISE 
As mentioned earlier, the only noise reduction technology available 
at the end of the U.S. SST program was the use of large oversized 
engines that resulted in extremely large performance losses by the pro-
posed SST. These performance losses would prohibit the SST from 
making a minimal North Atlantic mission. The SCR and VCE pro-
grams substantially improved this technical situation by identifying 
and partially validating four methods of noise reduction: mechanical 
suppression, noise shielding, coannular effects, and advanced 
operating procedures. It is estimated that a combination of these effects 
could be used on a current SST design to reduce the noise 10 to 12 
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BEFORE/AFTER SCR AND VCE PROGRAMS 
decibels (dB) below the levels expected of the U.S. SST concept. 
Another 10-dB reduction would likely result from a continuing focused 
research program on supersonic cruise aircraft over the next 8 to 10 
years. 
These identified noise reductions are quite dramatic and indicate 
that the noise exposure levels for supersonic cruise vehicles can be com-
parable to their equivalent subsonic counterparts. 184 
AERODYNAMICS 
At the close of the U.S. SST program in 1971, the cruise aero-
dynamic efficiency of the proposed airplane concept was marginal, and 
no means were readily available for improving this efficiency. Concepts 
such as the highly swept arrow wing provided the desirable cruise effi-
ciency, but were aerodynamically deficient at low speeds. This 
technical quandry has been somewhat alleviated by aerodynamic 
research conducted by NASA and SCR contractors. Through the use 
of wing/body blending, along with a slight strake extension, the cruise 
aerodynamic efficiency of the delta-like SST configuration has been 
improved by about 16 percent to come within 10 percent of the highly 
swept arrow wing and 33 percent better than the Concorde. In addi-
tion, the SCR aerodynamics program identified flap arrangements that 
produce a 16 percent improvement in the low-speed lift/drag of the ar-
row wing compared with 1971 levels when plain flaps were used. These 
aerodynamic improvements have very favorable connotations for both 
concepts. 
STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
As the U.S. SST program drew to a close in 1971, the proposed 
airplane had an aeroelastic problem of serious magnitude, and this 
problem was further compounded by a late decision to consider over-
sized engines for reducing noise. The proposed titanium structure was 
acceptable, but the fabrication costs were expected to be high. Along 
with improved methods for designing and assessing aeroelastic 
characteristics, the NASA SCR program has provided some structural 
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concepts and fabrication processes that offer drastic reductions in the 
weight and/or cost of supersonic structures. The superplastic forming 
and concurrent diffusion bonding (SPF/DB) of titanium, first proposed 
by Rockwell International and then brought to a high state of 
technology readiness by Douglas, offers a 25 percent reduction in 
weight and a 33 percent reduction in cost when compared to conven-
tional titanium plate. Further improvements developed by Douglas in-
clude the use of fiber-reinforced advanced titanium (FRAT) to provide 
additional reductions in weight at some cost penalty. Weight reduction 
is one of the most powerful means for improving the performance of an 
airplane. 
PROPULSION 
The General Electric GE-4 afterburning turbojet engine that was 
proposed for the U.S. SST was perhaps the best compromise that 
technology could provide in 1971. It provided reasonably good super-
sonic performance and, with the use of afterburners, provided ade-
quate thrust for takeoff and acceleration to cruise speed. Because it was 
basically a turbojet engine, however, its performance at subsonic 
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speeds was only nominal. In addition, the use of the afterburner for 
takeoff and climb implied noise levels that were well above the 
108-EPNdB level established by the FAR 36 noise rule placed in effect 
in 1969. The proposal to use an oversized GE-4 to reduce noise not 
only created drastic problems in airplane integration, but would also 
have led to performance degradations in the propulsion system. 
Perhaps the most spectacular development of the SCR and VCE 
programs was the replacement of the uncertain 1971 propulsion 
technology with the "variable cycle engine" and the component 
technologies for reduced noise and emissions. When compared to the 
1971 GE-4, the VCE provides a 10 percent reduction in supersonic 
cruise specific-fuel-consumption (sfc), a similar reduction in transonic 
sfc, and a remarkable 24 percent reduction in the sfc at important sub-
sonic speeds. Furthermore, the VCE provides this improved perform-
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ance with a weight that is only 75 percent of that of the GE-4. This 
represents a tremendous gain in propulsion technology, and 
remember, many elements of the VCE were validated during the SCR 
and VCE programs. 
MISSION INTEGRATION 
It is difficult to quantify the technology improvements in mission in-
tegration or the impact of the SCR concepts on technology for super-
sonic cruise flight. It is certain, however, that these systems integration 
studies were responsible for many of the disciplinary technology ad-
vances, and concepts/such as the "supersonic airplane family" offered 
solutions to long-time questions. 
POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF SCR AND VCE TECHNOLOGY 
With no current effort in the United States involving the area of 
supersonic cruise flight, there are no realistic projections for the use of 
luIII 
Improvements in propulsion as a result of SCR/VCE programs.
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SCR or VCE technology other than the isolated elements that will find 
their way onto subsonic transports or on short-range supersonic 
military aircraft. There is no military interest in supersonic cruise flight 
in the true sense, and there appears to be little interest in this concept of 
flight within the U.S. Government or the airplane industry. There are 
sporadic bursts of activity on the possibility of using SCR and VCE 
technology to develop a supersonic business jet transport, 185
 but there 
is no way to assess the sincerity of these efforts. Certainly a large 
amount of money would be required to develop such an airplane, and 
it would almost assuredly have to come from private sources. 
Although there are no present potential applications of the SCR and 
VCE technology efforts, there are still possibilities for the development 
of an outstanding supersonic transport. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the noise and emissions would be greatly reduced from prior 
SST levels, and the technology advances in structures, aerodynamics, 
and propulsion would lead to great improvements in range/payload 
capability, fuel use, cost, and economics. 
RANGE/PAYLOAD CAPABILITY 
If we forget for a minute that the 1971 SST had perhaps unaccept-
able noise characteristics, it was to transport 280 passengers a distance 
of 3600 nautical miles. With the use of SCR and VCE "airplane family" 
technology, approximately 385 passengers could be transported the 
3600-nautical-mile distance, a payload improvement of 37.5 percent. 
Or, the 280-passenger payload of the 1971 SST could be transported a 
distance of 4950 nautical miles with SCR and VCE technology, a 
range improvement of 37.5 percent. In providing this 37.5 percent im-
provement in range/payload capability, the SCR/VCE technology 
SST would burn only about one-half as much fuel per seat-mile as the 
1971 SST. 
EcoNoMIcs/PRoDucnvrr 
One means of measuring the economics of supersonic transports is to 
determine the ticket surcharge that the supersonic passenger would 
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have to pay for the airline to make a return on investment equal to the 
subsonic transport. For the 1971 SST, the required surcharge was 
about 50 percent above the subsonic tourist rate. The SCR and VCE 
technology would provide the basis to drive this surcharge to nearly 
zero. 186 The major reason for this, of course, is the fact that the SCR 
and VCE programs have been able to restore speed to the productivity 
equation at very little increase in total operating costs. 
OTHER POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS 
The NASA SCR and VCE technology could lead to supersonic 
military-troop and equipment-moving transports that would give real 
meaning to the term "rapid deployment forces." There is also some 
possible application of the technology to the development of a super-
sonic missile carrier. 187 
Now that the NASA SCR and VCE programs have identified solu-
tions to some of the major problems of supersonic cruise flight, what is 
the future course of the effort? The final chapter addresses this 
question.
200
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CHAPTER 11 
Future Directions of Supersonic 
Cruise Research 
During the past decade, the NASA SCR and VCE programs have 
identified technology that will meet many of the needs of future super-
sonic cruise aircraft. At a cost of about 7.5 cents per year for each 
American, these programs have identified and validated many 
elements of an important new engine concept—the variable cycle 
engine; identified and partially validated four promising means of 
noise reduction; built and tested a wide variety of wind tunnel models 
to establish a comprehensive aerodynamic data base; promoted and 
spread the technology of superplastic forming and bonding of titanium 
from which grew the FRAT effort; answered the age-old problem of 
SST sizing with the SST airplane family concept; developed two large-
payload, high-productivity concepts that can compete with almost any 
future airplane and may, because of their size, have sonic boom advan-
tages; and promoted many improvements to the analytic methods for 
structural design and analysis. Quite important also, the SCR and 
VCE programs have kept a cadre of skilled, dedicated supersonic 
specialists alive in the airplane industry. These teams, along with 
NASA and other SCR and VCE contractors, were to continue to 
validate the elements of supersonic cruise technology that had been 
identified and continue highly focused programs for identifying even 
more advanced technology. There were still "bugs" in the SPF/DB and 
FRAT structural forming processes, and there were some areas of 
uncertainty in almost every disciplinary field, as well as in the area of 
concept integration. There were also fertile fields like sonic boom and 
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laminar flow at supersonic speeds that had to be reopened because of 
the high potential payoff. And, of course, the focused nature of the pro-
gram would bring further "breakthroughs" that could not be an-
ticipated. 
When this document was proposed in early 1981, the final chapter 
was to outline the future course and milestones of the SCR and VCE 
programs. Work had been initiated on the critical inlet configurations 
that were to "feed" air to the variable cycle engines. In addition, wind 
tunnel models were planned for determining the aerodynamic 
characteristics of the large-payload twin-fuselage concept that was 
under consideration, and the focused SCR and VCE programs were to 
move forward in other areas. However, as a result of budget problems 
in fiscal year 1982, NASA canceled the focused SCR and VCE pro-
grams. With the Soviet SST program in a stagnant state and no further 
Concordes in sight, there appeared to be no clear and immediate need 
for SCR technology and there was no clear expression of commercial 
interest in the VCE program. 
The cancellation of the NASA SCR and VCE programs has led to 
the breakup of the industry teams that participated in the supersonic 
cruise effort and has left the future status of supersonic cruise 
technology in doubt. The NASA Lewis Research Center will probably 
test the inlet hardware that has been prepared, and NASA will con-
tinue an effort in supersonic technology. However, this effort will not 
provide a unified research attack on problems unique to supersonic air-
craft and will not generate the interest and support of industry that a 
focused program would. 
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Im portant SCR/VCE inlet tests will be continued (courtesy of Boeing,).
V	 - 
Douglas inlet hardwarc]oT tests at NASA Lewis Research Center (courtesy of McDonnell-
Douglas). 
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